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ABSTRACT 
How do we do what we do?  Casting light on this essential question, the 
blossoming perspective of computational cognitive neuroscience gives rise to the 
present exposition of the nervous system and its phenomena of value‑based 
decision making and learning.  As justified herein by not only theory but also 
simulation against empirical data, human decision making and learning are framed 
mathematically in the explicit terms of two fundamental classes of algorithms—
namely, sequential sampling and reinforcement learning.  These counterparts are 
complementary in their coverage of the dynamics of unified neural, mental, and 
behavioral processes at different temporal scales.  Novel variants of models based 
on such algorithms are introduced here to account for findings from experiments 
including measurements of both behavior and the brain in human participants. 
 
In principle, formal dynamical models of decision making hold the potential to 
represent fundamental computations underpinning value‑based (i.e., preferential) 
decisions in addition to perceptual decisions.  Sequential‑sampling models such as 
the race model and the drift‑diffusion model that are grounded in simplicity, 
analytical tractability, and optimality remain popular, but some of their more recent 
counterparts have instead been designed with an aim for more feasibility as 
architectures to be implemented by actual neural systems.  In Chapter 2, 
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connectionist models are proposed at an intermediate level of analysis that bridges 
mental phenomena and underlying neurophysiological mechanisms.  Several such 
models drawing elements from the established race, drift‑diffusion, 
feedforward‑inhibition, divisive‑normalization, and competing‑accumulator models 
were tested with respect to fitting empirical data from human participants making 
choices between foods on the basis of hedonic value rather than a traditional 
perceptual attribute.  Even when considering performance at emulating behavior 
alone, more neurally plausible models were set apart from more normative race or 
drift‑diffusion models both quantitatively and qualitatively despite remaining 
parsimonious.  To best capture the paradigm, a novel six‑parameter computational 
model was formulated with features including hierarchical levels of competition via 
mutual inhibition as well as a static approximation of attentional modulation, which 
promotes “winner‑take‑all” processing.  Moreover, a meta‑analysis encompassing 
several related experiments validated the robustness of model‑predicted trends in 
humans’ value‑based choices and concomitant reaction times.  These findings 
have yet further implications for analysis of neurophysiological data in accordance 
with computational modeling, which is also discussed in this new light. 
 
Decision making in any brain is imperfect and costly in terms of time and energy.  
Operating under such constraints, an organism could be in a position to improve 
performance if an opportunity arose to exploit informative patterns in the 
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environment being searched.  Such an improvement of performance could entail 
both faster and more accurate (i.e., reward‑maximizing) decisions.  Chapter 3 
investigated the extent to which human participants could learn to take advantage 
of immediate patterns in the spatial arrangement of serially presented foods such 
that a region of space would consistently be associated with greater subjective 
value.  Eye movements leading up to choices demonstrated rapidly induced biases 
in the selective allocation of visual fixation and attention that were accompanied by 
both faster and more accurate choices of desired goods as implicit learning 
occurred.  However, for the control condition with its spatially balanced reward 
environment, these subjects exhibited preexisting lateralized biases for eye and 
hand movements (i.e., leftward and rightward, respectively) that could act in 
opposition not only to each other but also to the orienting biases elicited by the 
experimental manipulation, producing an asymmetry between the left and right 
hemifields with respect to performance.  Potentially owing at least in part to 
learned cultural conventions (e.g., reading from left to right), the findings herein 
particularly revealed an intrinsic leftward bias underlying initial saccades in the 
midst of more immediate feedback‑directed processes for which spatial biases can 
be learned flexibly to optimize oculomotor and manual control in value‑based 
decision making.  The present study thus replicates general findings of learned 
attentional biases in a novel context with inherently rewarding stimuli and goes on 
to further elucidate the interactions between endogenous and exogenous biases. 
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Prediction‑error signals consistent with formal models of “reinforcement learning” 
(RL) have repeatedly been found within dopaminergic nuclei of the midbrain and 
dopaminoceptive areas of the striatum.  However, the precise form of the RL 
algorithms implemented in the human brain is not yet well determined.  For 
Chapter 4, we created a novel paradigm optimized to dissociate the subtypes of 
reward‑prediction errors that function as the key computational signatures of two 
distinct classes of RL models—namely, “actor/critic” models and 
action‑value‑learning models (e.g., the Q‑learning model).  The 
state‑value‑prediction error (SVPE), which is independent of actions, is a hallmark 
of the actor/critic architecture, whereas the action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) is 
the distinguishing feature of action‑value‑learning algorithms.  To test for the 
presence of these prediction‑error signals in the brain, we scanned human 
participants with a high‑resolution functional magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) 
protocol optimized to enable measurement of neural activity in the dopaminergic 
midbrain as well as the striatal areas to which it projects.  In keeping with the 
actor/critic model, the SVPE signal was detected in the substantia nigra.  The 
SVPE was also clearly present in both the ventral striatum and the dorsal striatum.  
However, alongside these purely state‑value‑based computations we also found 
evidence for AVPE signals throughout the striatum.  These high‑resolution fMRI 
findings suggest that model‑free aspects of reward learning in humans can be 
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explained algorithmically with RL in terms of an actor/critic mechanism operating in 
parallel with a system for more direct action‑value learning.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We are a way for the cosmos to know itself.” 
– Carl Sagan 
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Computational neuroscience 
 
You are a machine.  Yes, you.  Humans are machines (de La Mettrie, 1747).  
There are differences between us and the machines that we machines construct, 
but we are machines nevertheless.  This humbling fact is far from obvious.  It was 
only as the 20th century ushered in the modern era of science that even mental 
phenomena, including consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003; Koch, 2004; Tononi et 
al., 2016), could be coherently framed in purely physical terms applicable to 
humans and other animals alike.  Physicalism (Neurath, 1931), the philosophical 
principle that everything is physical, has with sheer evidence taken shape as the 
new dogma, readily extending into both neurobiology and psychology, which are 
merely two sides of the same coin.  Causal determinism has fully supplanted the 
ill‑defined notion of free will (Spinoza, 1677).  However compelling the subjective 
illusion of free will may seem, there is no “ghost” in the machine that embodies life 
(Ryle, 1949). 
 
As your ultimate role is that of a vessel for your DNA like every organism of Earth 
(Darwin & Wallace, 1858; Darwin, 1859, 1871; Watson & Crick, 1953), you have 
been precisely assembled by some 4 billion years (Dodd et al., 2017) of evolution 
to have a set of genetically encoded predispositions that contribute to determining 
your behavior together with the dynamic states of an environment both internal 
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and external.  As you—that is, your atoms—are made of the same matter that 
everything else in the observable universe consists of, every aspect of your 
existence is a direct consequence of the immutable laws of physics (Dalton, 1808; 
Patrignani et al., 2016).  Therefore, the abstract language of mathematics can be 
utilized to model and understand human systems—at any scope even—just as 
with any other dynamical physical system (Lapicque, 1907; Lotka, 1920, 1925; 
Volterra, 1926; Lewin, 1935, 1936, 1951; Rashevsky, 1938, 1947; McCulloch & 
Pitts, 1943; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Householder & Landahl, 1945; 
Wiener, 1948; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Turing, 1950; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952; 
von Bertalanffy, 1968).  The only caveat lies in the inherent complexity of biotic 
systems.  The human nervous system, our primary interface with the environment, 
is characterized by its plasticity (Hebb, 1949; Bennett et al., 1964) and it being 
especially complex and chaotic (Moon, 1992; Abraham & Gilgen, 1995; Robertson 
& Combs, 1995) among biotic subsystems, such that the distinctive diversity that 
we exhibit in behavioral phenotypes contrasts with the uniformity of our species 
with respect to genotype (Rosenberg et al., 2002).  Yet, notwithstanding the 
difficulty of an endeavor toward absolutely comprehensive mechanistic 
understanding in practice, it effectively remains within the realm of possibility in 
theory (but see Gödel, 1931, for a minor caveat in the incompleteness theorems of 
mathematical logic).  Ergo, the still‑nascent discipline of computational 
neuroscience (Conrad et al., 1974; Sejnowski et al., 1988; Schwartz, 1990; 
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Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Koch, 1999; Dayan & Abbott, 2001) has risen to 
the challenge of explaining how we do what we do in an exact manner. 
 
In the spirit of a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962), computational neuroscience is 
distinguished by the application of mathematical modeling as a window into the 
functions of neural systems.  To illustrate the significance of this approach that is a 
cornerstone of the present thesis, consider by way of analogy the idealized model 
of a pendulum as a simple harmonic oscillator in classical mechanics (Huygens, 
1673; Young & Freedman, 2016).  For small angles of displacement, the period of 
the pendulum’s oscillation can be approximated with the following equation: 
 
𝑇" = 𝑓 𝑃, 𝐸 = 𝑓 𝐿", 𝑔* = 2𝜋 𝐿"𝑔* 
 
That is, the period TP is a function of the pendulum’s length LP and the local 
environment’s acceleration due to gravity gE.  The former parameter represents 
the internal state of the pendulum P, whereas the latter parameter represents the 
state of the pendulum’s external environment E.  Although the solution provided by 
this model will inevitably be an approximate solution for any pendulum in the real 
world, the model is nonetheless tractable and useful enough to be viable as a tool 
for analysis and prediction.  After all, a pendulum clock can serve as a reliable 
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timekeeping device.  As the adage goes, “all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” (Box & Draper, 1987). 
 
Turning back to neural systems, the goals of the neuroscientist and the 
psychologist are ultimately tantamount to those of the physicist.  They all simply 
inquire as to how a system does what it does.  To this end, neurophysiology can 
be reduced to elementary functional units in the form of computations (Rashevsky, 
1938; McCulloch & Pitts, 1943; Wiener, 1948; Turing, 1950; Minsky, 1961).  In 
relation to information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), computation is 
information processing—essentially, the processing of input to generate output 
(Church, 1936; Turing, 1937).  A corollary of this definition is that, at some level, 
the medium for computing is irrelevant with respect to the computability of an 
operation; computation as it emerges from neural systems resembles computation 
in electronic and mechanical computing systems as well as in organisms lacking a 
nervous system.  Whereas a conventional computer is typically a serial digital 
system, the nervous system is a parallel analog system capable of quasi‑digital 
output; yet, such differences do not detract from the preceding assertion at all.  An 
elegant mathematical statement of the overall relationship between input and 
output in a biotic system can be found in Lewin’s “field theory” (Lewin, 1935, 1936), 
which emphasizes topology.  Lewin’s equation is slightly modified here: 
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 𝐵. = 𝑓 𝑆. = 𝑓 𝑂, 𝐸  . 
 
That is, the organism’s behavior BO, which in this particular context includes 
mental events, is a function of the organism’s “life space” (or situation) SO, which 
encompasses the internal state of the organism O, the state of the organism’s 
external environment E, and the interactions between the organism and the 
environment.  The parallels with the aforementioned model of a pendulum are 
striking.  As the behavior of an abiotic physical system is causally determined by 
certain internal and external variables, so too is the behavior of a person causally 
determined by internal and external variables, including other people.  The task for 
the scientist, then, is to ascertain the relevant variables in the structure and 
function of the dynamical system of interest, where structure determines function.  
The universality of such parallels across all systems is integral to systems theory 
and cybernetics (Wiener, 1948; von Bertalanffy, 1968). 
 
A comprehensive understanding of any information‑processing system can only be 
achieved with adequate descriptions at three complementary levels of analysis 
(Marr, 1982).  At one extreme, the computational‑theoretic level is concerned with 
the most abstract mapping from one kind of information to another.  At the 
opposite extreme, the implementational and physical level is concerned with the 
details of how functions of the system are actually realized as part of its tangible 
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architecture.  Positioned between these extremes, the algorithmic and 
representational level is concerned with the representations of input and output as 
well as the algorithms transforming one into the other.  In keeping with scientific 
reductionism, one or two of these levels of description may be deemphasized 
initially in the pursuit of incremental progress with research, but, ultimately, these 
levels must be linked because the system that they reflect different aspects of is 
unitary in actuality. 
 
Computational cognitive neuroscience 
 
Emerging only recently as a bridge between computational neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology (Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967; Reisberg, 2015) within the 
broader domain of cognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 1984; Gazzaniga & 
Mangun, 2014), the subdomain of computational cognitive neuroscience (O’Reilly, 
1998; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015) specifically 
aims to establish direct links between neural processes and mental processes as 
part of a unified neurocomputational account of brain, mind, and behavior.  Owing 
to a paradigm shift in the form of the “cognitive revolution” and the genesis of 
cognitive science in the middle of the 20th century (Gardner, 1985; Miller, 2003), 
the present approach thus stands as an alternative to the strict behaviorist 
approach (Watson, 1913, 1924) that fails to account for any internal events 
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because they are not as straightforward to measure as external behaviors are.  
Furthermore, the present approach stands as an alternative to the exclusively 
“cognitivist” (or “neobehaviorist”) approach (Uttal, 2001, 2011) that fails to account 
for substrates in neurophysiology because of the challenges involved in mapping 
neural states to mental states and behavior.  Considering the direct relationship 
between neurophysiological and psychological phenomena in actuality, a better 
understanding of the brain can enable a better understanding of the mind; likewise, 
a better understanding of the mind can enable a better understanding of the brain.  
The addition of computational modeling provides a coherent framework within 
which theoretical and experimental methods for comprehending both the mind and 
the brain are readily integrated.  Harmony between theory and praxis is essential.  
Although mental states themselves cannot be measured directly, they are reflected 
in neurophysiological signals and in consequent behavior in measurable ways. 
 
Owing to recent advances in engineering and technology, developments in 
noninvasive techniques for recording manifestations of neural activity in vivo have 
made experimental research with human subjects increasingly viable in 
neuroscience, which in its brief history (Kandel et al., 2012) has been dominated 
by research in nonhuman animals despite Homo sapiens being the species that 
we are generally most curious about.  Electrophysiological techniques such as 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Luck, 2014) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
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boast high temporal resolution but are limited by low spatial resolution and 
coverage of only those neurophysiological signals that can be detected from the 
scalp; conversely, functional‑neuroimaging techniques such as functional 
magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) (Huettel et al., 2014) and positron‑emission 
tomography (PET) compensate for their low temporal resolution with high spatial 
resolution and three‑dimensional coverage of the entire brain if needed.  Yet, a 
caveat noted for correlational methods such as these is that they should eventually 
be complemented by causal methods such as transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) and transcranial direct‑current stimulation (tDCS) (Wagner et al., 2007) or, if 
possible, the lesion studies of traditional neuropsychology (Broca, 1861; Adolphs, 
2016).  Later discussed along with EEG in Chapter 2 of the present dissertation 
and also featured prominently in Chapter 4, fMRI has emerged as the most 
popular tool among these for its balanced efficiency.  The notable advent of the 
blood‑oxygen‑level‑dependent (BOLD) contrast (Ogawa et al., 1990, 1992; Kim & 
Ogawa, 2012) in fMRI has veritably revolutionized cognitive neuroscience as a 
whole (Kanwisher, 2010; Mather et al., 2013). 
 
Computational cognitive neuroscience in particular is bolstered by the practice of 
computational‑model‑based analysis in neuroimaging (O’Doherty et al., 2007; 
Forstmann et al., 2011), employing in neuroscientific methods the sort of cognitive 
models that were once confined to the sphere of mathematical psychology (Luce 
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et al., 1963; Busemeyer et al., 2015) with little to no regard for neurophysiology.  
Exponential growth in processing power has facilitated the implementation of 
increasingly intricate computer simulations that are becoming progressively more 
plausible with respect to actual nervous systems.  Connecting the explicit 
quantitative predictions of generative models to empirical observations of neural 
signals as well as behavior on a trialwise basis allows for an unprecedented level 
of rigor to be achieved in experiments.  That is, whereas purely qualitative 
linguistic labels are intrinsically vague, an unambiguous exposition of laboratory 
findings in relation to theory becomes feasible with mathematics available to 
complement and clarify the intended meaning of any linguistic labels.  In defining a 
hypothetical algorithm for the brain, the scientist necessarily must be clear and 
objective; this constraint is ideal because any form of ambiguity or subjectivity is 
anathema to science. 
 
Decision neuroscience 
 
Overlapping to some extent with computational cognitive neuroscience is the 
burgeoning field of decision neuroscience (O’Doherty & Bossaerts, 2008; Dreher & 
Tremblay, 2017), which lies at the interface between affect and cognition (Adolphs 
& Damasio, 2001) with particular emphasis on conceptualized processes such as 
evaluation, decision making, and learning in the context of these.  Emotions are 
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central and causative states comprising more than subjective feelings (Darwin, 
1872; Anderson & Adolphs, 2014) and as such are intertwined with many cognitive 
processes, meaning that cognitive neuroscience cannot operate independently of 
affective neuroscience (Davidson & Sutton, 1995) and vice versa.  Related to 
decision neuroscience is the title of “neuroeconomics” (Glimcher & Rustichini, 
2004; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013) that reflects the movement toward an 
interdisciplinary synthesis of the decision sciences in the spirit of its predecessor, 
behavioral economics (Simon, 1955; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 1999).  
Behavioral economics initially introduced a psychological perspective to contrast 
with the abstractions of microeconomics and its normative assumptions of 
rationality such as in expected‑utility theory (Bernoulli, 1738; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944).  Different axioms can produce disparate definitions of 
rationality in decision theory, but it is rare for humans and other animals alike to 
perfectly adhere to the optimal strategy of any formally rational agent within a 
specific context.  To whatever extent a biotic system may be optimal, it would be 
optimized foremost for versatility across the diverse range of situations 
encountered and adapted to throughout the phylogenetic history of the organism.  
As descriptive models of value‑based or economic decision‑making behavior 
supersede the prescriptive models, the additional information afforded by 
neuroscience in lieu of a black‑box approach for the brain is crucial for achieving a 
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complete portrait even if one (e.g., an economist or a policymaker) is not interested 
in the nervous system per se. 
 
The present dissertation 
 
Poised at the nexus of computational cognitive neuroscience and decision 
neuroscience, this dissertation integrates experimental, theoretical, and 
computational approaches into its methodology in an effort to precisely elucidate 
value‑based decision making and learning in the human nervous system.  The 
following three empirical studies, including a meta‑analysis of multiple 
experiments, relate computational modeling to laboratory findings in the choices 
made by human participants, the timing of those choices, the eye movements 
leading up to those choices, and the neural activity mediating observed behavior.  
Herein, human decision making and learning are framed mathematically in the 
explicit terms of two fundamental classes of algorithms—namely, sequential 
sampling (Wald, 1947; Stone, 1960; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006) 
and reinforcement learning (RL) (Minsky, 1961; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Witten, 
1977; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998)—that are 
complementary in their coverage of neural and behavioral dynamics at different 
temporal scales.  Whereas standard RL does not encompass all forms of 
value‑based learning (e.g., Tolman, 1948; Bellman, 1957), sequential sampling 
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hypothetically could encompass all forms of decision making.  Both sequential 
sampling and reinforcement learning are similarly viable as canonical biological 
algorithms that even could be ubiquitous in organisms other than animals with 
nervous systems (Reid et al., 2015; Abramson & Chicas‑Mosier, 2016; van Dujin, 
2017).  Another aspect of the cyclical complementarity between decision making 
and learning lies in the mechanisms by which learning guides decision making 
across time while decisions and their outcomes determine the information that is 
actually processed during learning.  Feedback, the output of learning, completes 
the loop by updating the representations processed in hedonic evaluation, which 
forms the basis for the comparisons made in value‑based decision making (e.g., 
“What do I want?”) by providing input as sensation does for perceptual decision 
making (e.g., “What do I see?”). 
 
There are a number of major open questions of concern to the present domain of 
inquiry, and the specific topics of the studies that follow were intended to address 
some of the most basic unanswered questions about value‑based decision making 
and learning as well as the interrelated concepts of hedonic evaluation and 
attention.  For instance, how do we make value‑based (i.e., preferential) decisions 
in general?  How do the processes involved relate to those involved in perceptual 
decisions?  How does human decision making and learning relate to normative 
models that formally prescribe optimal strategies in accordance with decision 
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theory and control theory?  How does attention impact evaluation and decision 
making?  Conversely, how do evaluation and decision making impact attentional 
processes?  How are attentional feedback loops formed?  How does value‑based 
learning shape attention?  How do we learn value‑based associations and habits 
as future behaviors are predetermined?  How does active learning compare to 
passive learning in the absence of action?  How are value‑based levels and other 
levels of representation for an option or a state maintained or integrated as the 
dynamics of decision making and learning progress?  How might different learning 
strategies and algorithms coexist or even interact?  When asking “how” in such a 
manner, the goal here is to provide as precise of an answer as possible, which is 
best accomplished with recourse to computational models of the processes under 
scrutiny.  Thus, implicit in all of these queries investigated herein is one 
fundamental, overarching question: To what extent can decision making, learning, 
and related processes be practically reduced to explicit algorithms that 
comprehensively account for human neurophysiology and behavior as measured 
empirically? 
 
Value‑based decisions can take many forms, but here the focus is on two that are 
quite common for people—that is, decisions about types of food and decisions 
about opportunities to acquire money.  However, this factor of stimulus modality is 
mostly incidental in consideration of the evidence that the brain computes 
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hedonic‑value signals according to a common scale or currency with such 
representations encoded in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Montague & Berns, 
2002; O’Doherty, 2007; Chib et al., 2009; McNamee et al., 2013; Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014), which is consistent with functional‑neuroimaging 
results in Chapter 4 of the present dissertation.  It is by such value‑computing 
mechanisms that one is able to compare and choose among qualitatively distinct 
options despite there being no objective metric for conversion across them.  Thus, 
it is reasonable to speculate that the findings herein, which have been observed in 
the context of people selecting actions to earn gustatory or monetary rewards, are 
mostly generalizable for other types of rewards in other settings as long as there 
exists the fundamental element of value‑based decision making.  Like many such 
complex stimuli, foods are evaluated with respect to multiple attributes that are 
weighted and integrated with internal state information into inherently subjective 
net value signals.  Despite being represented subjectively (Bernoulli, 1738), money 
is instead a mathematical abstraction that is well defined and objectively 
quantifiable.  Because a monetary decision lacking a probabilistic element (e.g., a 
guarantee of one dollar versus a guarantee of two dollars) can be reduced to a 
simple mathematical operation that performs a subtraction of quantities without 
requiring affective processing of the prospective rewards per se, decisions about 
familiar foods are better suited to investigation of the processes that sample noisy 
value signals, which are to be explicated in Chapter 2 of the present dissertation.  
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Chapter 3 follows along the same lines with food for stimuli but also adds an extra 
dimension across trials, where value is consistently mapped to points in space 
according to a learnable pattern.  On the other hand, as money is not only a salient 
motivator for modern humans but also one straightforward to quantify and interpret 
as a repeated reward for lack of satiation, it is better suited to investigation of the 
processes underlying learning and control.  Chapter 4 instead presents subjects 
with an objective task to maximally accumulate monetary rewards over the course 
of the experiment. 
 
Being in its early stages still, the empirical research herein is for now limited to 
two‑alternative forced‑choice (2AFC) paradigms in the tradition of psychophysics 
(Fechner, 1860), whereby one’s subjective preferences or percepts are revealed 
across trials as the probabilities of the binary choices align to at least some extent 
with a sigmoid psychometric function related to differences in the parameters of 
alternatives (Shepard, 1957; Luce, 1959).  Although multialternative paradigms 
and other complexities such as simultaneous representation of multiple attributes 
will also need to be investigated in the future (see Discussion), extrapolation from 
the findings in 2AFC paradigms can be merited to the extent that fundamental 
computations are emphasized here.  Keeping these experiments well controlled 
and relatively simple is necessary for a firm grasp of the nature of the core 
problems and the brain’s solutions to them, which can be far from simple to 
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comprehend despite the apparent simplicity of a given scenario as merely a 
reflection of the acuity of our personal intuition.  Indeed, we take for granted in 
ourselves a plethora of phenomenal capabilities that even our most state‑of‑the‑art 
computing technology has yet to match and in many cases likely never will match. 
 
The present dissertation is essentially arranged in increasing order of complexity—
starting first from the basic decision problem itself within the short‑term scope of 
individual events and ending with the long‑term control problem that necessitates 
learning information across multiple encounters with apparently related events.  
The former problem is not only simpler than the latter but also embedded within 
the latter.  Ultimately, then, the two can and should be modeled in parallel within a 
hierarchy (see Discussion).  However, here they are first dealt with serially and 
separately for the most part in the interest of maintaining clarity and tractability 
while novel models are being explored.  To begin with in Chapter 2, the broad 
question of how we make value‑based decisions is addressed with a standard 
factorial comparison of neuroalgorithmic models—each drawing from different 
strands in a literature that has primarily dealt with perceptual decision making 
(Bogacz et al., 2006; Ditterich, 2010; Teodorescu et al., 2013).  Yet, missing from 
all of the a‑priori models was the oft‑overlooked factor of attention (Shimojo et al., 
2003; Krajbich et al., 2010), which was elaborated on here with its role being put 
forth as an explanation for effects in empirical data otherwise unaccounted for.  
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Measurements of the concomitant reaction time complemented measurements of 
discrete choices inasmuch as chronometry provides additional information for 
inference about neurophysiological and mental processes underlying behavior 
(Luce, 1986).  The ensuing framework that bridged evaluation, decision making, 
and attention subsequently formed the foundation for Chapter 3, where the eye’s 
direction of gaze was tracked as an overt signal of the focus of attention to further 
investigate the role of attention as it specifically relates to value‑based decision 
making as well as learning. 
 
Chapter 2 of the present dissertation, a meta‑analytic study of behavior including 
reaction time, concerns value‑based decision making in the presence of options 
that are familiar and thus do not demand learning as part of the task.  In this case, 
subjects made choices between foods in a 2AFC paradigm that crucially featured 
unpredictable subjective values covering a two‑dimensional input space 
(Teodorescu et al., 2013; Liston & Stone, 2013).  A task less typical of such 2AFC 
paradigms, value‑based decision making is distinguished from perceptual decision 
making insofar as the former drives actions via processes that are more 
internalized and subjective, lacking an objectively correct solution as determined 
by the state of the environment in the case of perception.  Despite this important 
distinction, these two types of decision making fundamentally share a common 
problem with solutions that are likely to have a common phylogenetic origin.  Thus, 
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canonical algorithms have been proposed to be applicable to both value‑based 
and perceptual decisions alike (Summerfield & Tsetos, 2012; Polanía et al., 2014; 
Dutilh & Rieskamp, 2016); a review of the literature in Chapter 2 elaborates on the 
range of proposed models thus far.  A compelling account of neural 
decision‑making processes has emerged in the form of sequential‑sampling 
models (Stone, 1960) that simulate the inner workings of the brain as a dynamical 
system that sequentially samples noisy information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) 
and integrates it per a process of evidence accumulation.  Whereas sensory 
evidence comprises the input sampled during perceptual decision making, signals 
of hedonic value (i.e., subjective utility) are sampled during value‑based decision 
making.  Invoking the aforementioned “field theory” (Lewin, 1935, 1936) with its 
mathematical formalization of topological relations, “decision field theory” 
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) postulated this sampling of valence as a 
fundamental computation.  Sequential sampling has a firm basis as an optimal 
strategy (Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948) in stochastic control theory in the vein of 
sequential hypothesis testing (Wald, 1945, 1947; Barnard, 1946), and 
observations in behavior and neurophysiology alike suggest that such 
integration‑to‑threshold processes drive decisions in humans and other animals 
(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Gold & Shadlen, 2007).  Yet, the descriptive modeling 
coupled with empirical data herein brings to light subtleties of how more neurally 
plausible models with features such as imperfect competition and attentional 
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modulation deviate from normative models of decision making and better account 
for human behavior in doing so.  Ultimately, a novel model is proposed for the 
paradigm with the practical aim of balancing parsimony and accuracy (Myung, 
2000), and the predictions of this model were even verified across several related 
experiments with a meta‑analysis. 
 
Adhering to the same general scheme of a 2AFC task with foods as stimuli, the 
study that followed was actually first analyzed in passing as part of the 
aforementioned meta‑analysis without regard for the eye‑tracking component or 
the specific experimental manipulations detailed below.  Whereas Chapter 2 
parsimoniously modeled the net impact of attention on value‑based decisions with 
a static approximation, Chapter 3 simultaneously examined the reciprocal impact 
of value‑based decision‑making and learning processes on attentional processes 
as reflected in eye movements.  As Chapter 2 revealed that decisions made by 
humans were optimal only to an extent, Chapter 3 was to reveal limitations in 
optimal learning of an exploitable pattern in the immediate environment that in 
some cases could contradict internal predispositions in orienting behavior.  The 
very concept of attention as it is introduced in Chapter 2 covers a broad set of 
processes that were demonstrated to even play a major role in the form of covert 
attention when the task did not allow for eye movements.  However, facilitating eye 
movements with spatially separated stimuli in the next task enabled precise 
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measurement of an overt manifestation of attention in the form of visual orienting 
during decision making. 
 
Chapter 3 of the present dissertation, an eye‑tracking study, concerns value‑based 
decision making with a learning component and also expands upon the role of 
attention introduced in the previous chapter.  Subjects again were making choices 
about inherently rewarding familiar foods, but an additional opportunity for implicit 
learning arose in the consistency of the spatial mapping of value per the 
experimental manipulation.  That is, the observer was in a position to exploit an 
informative pattern in the environment and optimize performance by preferentially 
searching a location consistently associated with greater subjective value.  In such 
visually guided (but manually executed) decision making, the direction of one’s 
gaze functions as a proxy for the selective focus of attention.  For visually minded 
animals such as humans, oculomotor control is especially representative of a 
directed sampling process that is driven by gains in information as well as gains in 
value—that is, minimization of uncertainty and maximization of reward, 
respectively (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Tatler et al., 2011; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et 
al., 2014).  Value‑based decision making is impacted by attentional processes to 
the extent that attention selectively enhances the neural representation of an 
option and can generate a bias in favor of it that influences sequential‑sampling 
processes (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 
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2013).  Furthermore, a positive‑feedback loop emerges as stimuli attract attention 
by possessing high reward value and thus become even more likely to be chosen 
merely because they are attended to (Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 
2006, 2007), which is a critical aspect of the modeling in Chapter 2.  In addition to 
the spatial biases that could in fact be learned flexibly to optimize oculomotor 
control in value‑based decision making even in the absence of any overt cues, the 
findings also revealed an asymmetry in this learning due to an intrinsic leftward 
bias for initial saccades (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja 
et al., 2011) that is presumably a consequence of deeply ingrained cultural 
conventions (Chokron & Imbert, 1993; Chokron & De Agostini, 1995; Chokron et 
al., 1998) as well as innate biases (Vallortigara, 2006; Rugani et al., 2010; 
Frasnelli et al., 2012).  This asymmetry in the capacity to learn where to seek out 
high value corresponded to an asymmetry in the extent to which subjects could 
improve their decision‑making performance with respect to both the speed and 
accuracy of choices. 
 
Although some net effects of value‑based learning on manual and oculomotor 
control were indeed significant as hypothesized in the preceding study, a formal 
model of the actual reward‑learning processes underlying said effects was still 
lacking.  Chapter 4 was to address this shortcoming with computational modeling 
in a context more amenable to quantitative analysis.  Despite Chapters 3 and 4 
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relying on somewhat divergent experimental paradigms—having, for example, 
differences in stimulus modality and the importance of eye movements and 
attention—these paradigms had in common an essential role for habit formation 
(Thorndike, 1898; Pavlov, 1927).  Rather than learning to associate points in space 
and corresponding actions with intrinsically rewarding stimuli as in Chapter 3, the 
subject in Chapter 4 was to learn such associations for arbitrary stimuli and 
arbitrary actions contingent on the presence of certain stimuli as representations of 
states of the environment.  Nevertheless, both experiments tested properties of the 
prediction‑error‑based learning of value representations that ultimately amounts to 
biases of future behavior in one direction or another (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).  
Although Chapter 2 does discuss the method of computational‑model‑based 
analysis for neurophysiological data (O’Doherty et al., 2007; Forstmann et al., 
2011), Chapter 4 marks the actual application in practice of this method to 
functional‑neuroimaging data in tandem with behavioral data.  Computational 
modeling that implemented as many as three different learning algorithms (Sutton 
& Barto, 1998) in parallel was to guide the identification of learning (i.e., 
prediction‑error) signals in the human brain and, in particular, the basal ganglia 
and the dopamine system. 
 
Chapter 4 of the present dissertation, an fMRI study featuring a specialized 
high‑resolution protocol, delves deeper into value‑based learning in the context of 
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“reinforcement learning” (RL)—essentially, an area of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence (Minsky, 1961; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 
1998) that invokes theories from psychology (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and 
ultimately has come full circle to inspire its own source of inspiration.  As with 
sequential sampling in the case of well‑informed decisions, RL models can be 
reconciled to an extent with the optimal standards of control theory for ambiguous 
decision problems that demand learning and a tradeoff between exploitation of 
what is known and exploration of what is not known (Daw et al., 2006b).  This 
“model‑free” (i.e., habitual) learning coexists with other forms of reward‑related 
learning such as in “model‑based” (i.e., goal‑directed) control (Tolman, 1948), and 
these subsystems can also interact (O’Doherty et al., 2017).  A parallel dichotomy 
demarcates instrumental (or operant) conditioning (Thorndike, 1898) and 
Pavlovian (or classical) conditioning (Pavlov, 1927) as being response‑dependent 
and response‑independent, respectively (Miller & Konorski, 1928; Thorndike, 
1932; Skinner, 1935, 1937; Konorski & Miller, 1937; Schlosberg, 1937; Mowrer, 
1947; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; O’Doherty et al., 2017), which applies to 
model‑based variants of learning as well (Dayan & Berridge, 2014).  Within 
Pavlovian conditioning there is an additional division between preparatory and 
consummatory reflexive behaviors: the former are nonspecific (e.g., autonomic 
arousal or pupil dilation), whereas the latter are responses specific to the stimulus 
type (e.g., orienting, approaching, salivating, or chewing) (Konorski, 1967).  
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Whereas Bayesian modeling and dynamic‑programming algorithms (Bellman, 
1957) have illuminated aspects of model‑based learning, RL algorithms based on 
caching have refined our understanding of model‑free learning.  In particular, 
temporal‑difference algorithms (Sutton, 1988) with abstract representations of 
expected value in real time have formalized strategies for learning via the 
signature reward‑prediction error (RPE) that has been documented in 
dopaminergic neurons as predicted by theory (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et 
al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Glimcher, 2011; Schultz, 2015).  
These RPE signals are computed as the difference between observed or 
anticipated rewards and the agent’s expectation for the value of the relevant state 
or state‑action pair.  As elaborated on in Chapter 4, there exists within RL the 
“actor/critic” model (Witten, 1977; Barto et al., 1983; Sutton, 1984) and 
action‑value‑learning models such as the Q‑learning model (Watkins, 1989) that 
are distinguished by learning about the values of states and actions, respectively, 
via different variants of the RPE signal.  Here, however, a hybrid model took the 
novel approach of integrating the state‑value‑learning actor/critic architecture 
(Houk et al., 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Suri & Schultz, 1998, 1999; Joel et al., 
2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006a) with action‑value learning and 
was found to account for not only human behavior but also the learning signals in 
the mesostriatal dopamine system. 
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Chapter 5 of the present dissertation, the final chapter, draws to a close with more 
general discussion of ideas of the sort presented thus far together with the 
empirical findings compiled in Chapters 2 through 4, interweaving these distinct 
threads as parts of a greater tapestry.  Having made headway in addressing the 
foundational questions raised thus far from first principles, broader implications of 
these studies are discussed at an individual level as well as in relation to each 
other and the relevant literature.  Moreover, future directions are suggested for the 
wider program of research on value‑based decision making and learning within not 
only computational cognitive neuroscience but also related fields, including both 
pure and applied domains of inquiry. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
Value‑based decision making via sequential sampling with 
hierarchical competition and attentional modulation 
Jaron T. Colas 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In principle, formal dynamical models of decision making hold the potential to 
represent fundamental computations underpinning value‑based (i.e., preferential) 
decisions in addition to perceptual decisions.  Sequential‑sampling models such as 
the race model and the drift‑diffusion model that are grounded in simplicity, 
analytical tractability, and optimality remain popular, but some of their more recent 
counterparts have instead been designed with an aim for more feasibility as 
architectures to be implemented by actual neural systems.  Connectionist models 
are proposed herein at an intermediate level of analysis that bridges mental 
phenomena and underlying neurophysiological mechanisms.  Several such 
models drawing elements from the established race, drift‑diffusion, 
feedforward‑inhibition, divisive‑normalization, and competing‑accumulator models 
were tested with respect to fitting empirical data from human participants making 
choices between foods on the basis of hedonic value rather than a traditional 
perceptual attribute.  Even when considering performance at emulating behavior 
alone, more neurally plausible models were set apart from more normative race or 
drift‑diffusion models both quantitatively and qualitatively despite remaining 
parsimonious.  To best capture the paradigm, a novel six‑parameter computational 
model was formulated with features including hierarchical levels of competition via 
mutual inhibition as well as a static approximation of attentional modulation, which 
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promotes “winner‑take‑all” processing.  Moreover, a meta‑analysis encompassing 
several related experiments validated the robustness of model‑predicted trends in 
humans’ value‑based choices and concomitant reaction times.  These findings 
have yet further implications for analysis of neurophysiological data in accordance 
with computational modeling, which is also discussed in this new light.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
How do we make value‑based (i.e., preferential) decisions?  A variety of 
computational models have put forth possible answers to this question in the form 
of general algorithms by which options are effectively compared and decided upon 
in the presence of noisy information (Shannon & Weaver, 1949).  With numerous 
existing models to choose among and so many possible models yet to be defined, 
the pressing key issues concerning which new models merit exploration and which 
models are best under which circumstances remain far from resolved.  As theory 
ultimately must be reconciled with praxis and actual data, the present study took 
an empirical approach to model selection for a two‑alternative forced‑choice 
(2AFC) paradigm (Fechner, 1860) involving the subjective values of foods (Fig. 1). 
 
Following the introduction of the sequential probability‑ratio test (SPRT) (Wald, 
1945, 1947; Barnard, 1946), stochastic control theory offered an optimal standard 
(Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948) for dynamical modeling of decision‑making processes 
and was adopted by cognitive psychology as the basis of the sequential‑sampling 
models (SSMs) (Stone, 1960) that would rival the atemporal models of 
signal‑detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966).  Truest to the SPRT and since 
emerging as the most popular and influential SSM is the drift‑diffusion model 
(Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Wagenmakers et al., 2007), which 
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posits a unidimensional (or mirror‑symmetric) process accumulating the relative 
evidence between alternatives (i.e., the log‑likelihood ratio).  An alternative to the 
drift‑diffusion model commonly referred to as the race model (LaBerge, 1962; 
Raab, 1962; Vickers, 1970; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) instead assumes a race of 
independent accumulators in parallel within a multidimensional system.  In addition 
to boasting mathematical elegance, both of these models can be regarded as 
normative inasmuch as each adheres to a distinct definition of optimality (see 
Discussion). 
 
Yet, recent advances in neuroscience have begun to lend insight toward a less 
prescriptive and more descriptive account of human decision making constrained 
by neural plausibility rather than simplicity, analytical tractability, or optimality.  The 
implications of these advances are not limited to interpretation of 
neurophysiological signals.  On the contrary, the present study reveals unique 
contributions of this neurocentric modeling to the emulation of human behavior.  
Measurements of the concomitant reaction time (RT) complemented 
measurements of discrete choices inasmuch as chronometry provides additional 
information for inference about neurophysiological and mental processes 
underlying behavior (Luce, 1986).  A substantial and growing body of theoretical 
and experimental work has solidified the notion that animals’ decisions are driven 
by diffusion‑like sequential‑sampling and integration‑to‑threshold processes in the 
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nervous system (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Gold & Shadlen, 2007).  That is, inputs in 
the form of reward‑value or evidence signals are sampled and integrated into 
accumulating decision signals that activate respective execution signals upon 
reaching a threshold at which an action is selected.  Rather than making decisions 
about the perceptual qualities of stimuli, subjects in the present study instead 
chose which of the two foods presented for each trial they would prefer to eat.  
Whereas research within this domain has typically emphasized the simpler case of 
perceptual decision making, more recent investigation has begun to suggest that 
such canonical computations are similarly implicated in value‑based and economic 
decision making as well (Summerfield & Tsetos, 2012; Polanía et al., 2014; Dutilh 
& Rieskamp, 2016).  Invoking “field theory” (Lewin, 1935, 1936) with its 
mathematical formalization of decision making in terms of topology, “decision field 
theory” (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001) was among the first 
dynamical models to be explicitly related to preferential decisions, and SSMs 
originally intended for perceptual decision making were eventually suggested to 
generalize to other domains (e.g., Usher & McClelland, 2004).  Nevertheless, 
many questions remain as to pivotal details of the architectures of these putative 
dynamical systems, including the extent to which the representations of individual 
options interact (Bogacz et al., 2006; Ditterich, 2010; Teodorescu et al., 2013). 
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Any computational model of decision making occupies a position along a spectrum 
(Frank, 2015) ranging from the most simple and abstract cognitive models to the 
most detailed and biophysically realistic models that explicitly represent properties 
of individual neurons and membrane proteins (Wang, 2002).  A connectionist 
model as desired here could stand as a middling hybrid to appease the tension 
between these dichotomous extremes, each of which entail advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to accuracy, parsimony, and interpretability.  The 
present work implicitly tested for oft‑overlooked modulatory effects of attention 
(Shimojo et al., 2003; Krajbich et al., 2010) and its associated positive‑feedback 
loops as well as essential aspects of established neuroalgorithmic models—
namely, the feedforward‑inhibition model (Ditterich et al., 2003; Mazurek et al., 
2003), the leaky‑competing‑accumulator (LCA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 
2004), and the divisive‑normalization model (Heeger, 1992; Louie et al., 2011, 
2013; Carandini & Heeger, 2012), which actually has origins outside the realm of 
SSMs.  Prior studies have generally evaluated SSMs using stimuli that vary along 
a single dimension and are thus intrinsically competitive, such as in a 
signal‑detection or motion‑discrimination task.  Crucially, the 2AFC paradigm 
explored herein is distinguished by alternatives with parameters that are 
statistically independent across trials (Teodorescu et al., 2013; Liston & Stone, 
2013).  This feature enabled rigorous assessment of competitive mechanisms or 
lack thereof. 
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In the spirit of Occam’s razor and the proverbial assertion that “all models are 
wrong, but some are useful” (Box & Draper, 1987), various dynamical models were 
compared with an aim for achieving an ideal balance of parsimony and accuracy 
(Myung, 2000), where the latter reflects both empirical fitting performance and 
theoretical neural plausibility.  Temporality was essential, as effects on observed 
RT—that is, half of the available behavioral data—are beyond the scope of any 
static model.  Moreover, applicability to computational‑model‑based analysis of 
neurophysiological data (O’Doherty et al., 2007; Forstmann et al., 2011) imposed 
additional constraints.  A novel synthesis of key concepts at a moderate level of 
complexity was to quantitatively account for this class of value‑based decisions in 
a sizeable data set including RT distributions from human subjects.  Furthermore, 
a meta‑analysis of experiments similarly involving binary choices about randomly 
sampled foods with uncorrelated values went on to reveal qualitative trends across 
multiple independent data sets that could be related to predictions of this novel 
hybrid model.  
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METHODS 
 
Participants 
 
Participants in all of the individual studies were generally healthy volunteers 
between 18 and 40 years old from Caltech and the local community.  The number 
of participants included in each study is listed in Table 1.  Participants in the JC1, 
JC2, and SL studies were all right‑handed.  Across all studies, criteria for 
participation included enjoying and regularly eating common American snack 
foods such as those used for the experiments.  Participants provided informed 
written consent for every individual study’s protocols, which were in this and all 
other cases approved by the California Institute of Technology Institutional Review 
Board.  Participants were paid for completing a study and always received a 
chosen food item. 
 
Experimental procedures: Modeled data set 
 
Prior to acquisition of the “JC1” data set proper, the subject first completed an 
ancillary rating task that solicited the subjective values of all stimuli with linear 
rankings.  Images of 70 generally appetitive snack foods were presented against a 
black background one at a time. The subject reported the desirability of eating 
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each food at the end of the experiment according to a 5‑point scale (0: “not at all”, 
1: “slightly”, 2: “moderately”, 3: “strongly”, 4: “extremely”).  The subject was given 
unlimited time to respond by pressing one of five buttons along a row on a 
keyboard with the right hand.  As feedback, the selected rating was presented 
centrally as a white Arabic numeral during an intertrial interval of 1000 ms.  The 
orientation of the scale was counterbalanced across subjects so that neither side 
was consistently associated with positive valence.  The order of stimulus 
presentation was randomized for each subject.  These images were chromatic and 
had a resolution of 288 x 288 pixels and each subtended 8.0° x 8.0° of visual 
angle.  Stimuli were presented on a 23‑inch LCD monitor with a resolution of 1024 
x 768 pixels from a distance of 100 cm as part of an interface programmed using 
MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
 
Stimuli were randomly selected to form 720 pairs for the subject’s unique 
sequence of trials in the main choice task (i.e., for the modeled JC1 data set) as 
follows.  Only foods with a rating of subjective value greater than zero were 
included.  Pairs were first selected so as to balance the differences in value 
ranging from 0 to 3 as much as possible.  Each pair of values among the ten 
possible combinations was also balanced within each value‑difference bin.  The 
side on which the food with greater value was presented was counterbalanced 
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within each of the ten combinations.  Stimuli were never repeated in consecutive 
trials. 
 
The subject was allotted 3 s to choose between a pair of food stimuli presented 
adjacently to each other on either side of the white fixation spot (Fig. 1a).  
Incidentally, electroencephalography (EEG) data were also being acquired while 
the subject performed this choice task.  Thus, the subject needed to maintain 
fixation at all times during trials to prevent eye‑movement artifacts from 
contaminating EEG signals.  This task also featured three main experimental 
conditions in randomly ordered blocks of 60 trials with balanced values: the subject 
would choose by pressing one of two buttons with either index finger, by stepping 
on one of two pedals, or with the actions unknown until the time of choosing is 
indicated.  Whereas the subject immediately indicated the choice using the 
appropriate action for the button and pedal conditions, the unknown condition 
instead required that the time of choice first be indicated without regard to action 
by pressing the space bar with the right thumb.  This nonspecific response, which 
corresponded to the relevant reaction time (RT), would initiate a cue in the form of 
the letter H above fixation or the letter F below fixation as instruction for a button or 
pedal response, respectively.  Only 800 ms was allotted to subsequently indicate 
which item was chosen in the unknown condition’s second phase so as to prevent 
further deliberation after reporting that a decision had been made.  Thus, the data 
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from all three conditions could be concatenated prior to analysis.  The subject was 
prepared for the time constraint of the unknown condition with practice trials as 
well as at least 100 trials of a task with the same timing that merely required 
reporting which randomly selected side of the screen a gray square appeared on 
for each trial.  The action cues of the unknown condition were randomly 
counterbalanced for each subject.  These cues were colored cyan and yellow with 
the color mapping counterbalanced across subjects.  Trials were separated by an 
intertrial interval drawn from a uniform distribution ranging between 2500 and 3500 
ms, and self‑paced breaks for blinking and other movements that must be 
restricted for EEG were available every three trials. 
 
The subject was required to refrain from eating or drinking anything except for 
water for at least 2 hours prior to the start of the experiment.  The procedure was 
incentive‑compatible (Hurwicz, 1972) inasmuch as the hungry subject was 
informed that one of the choices made was to be selected randomly and 
implemented at the end of the session.  That is, upon completion, the subject was 
provided with this chosen food and required to consume it.  Failure to choose in 
time for any trial resulted in the choice being made randomly by the computer, 
such that the subject could not avoid any choice. 
 
Experimental procedures: Meta‑analysis 
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The meta‑analysis included six additional data sets (Table 1).  Common to these 
studies was the basic scheme of a 2AFC task for which subjects made 
incentive‑compatible preferential decisions about randomly sampled foods with 
values that were uncorrelated across trials; however, unlike the original (i.e., JC1) 
study that was modeled, the stimuli were always presented separately on opposite 
sides of the display with no restrictions on eye movements (Fig. 1b).  Option 
values were similarly derived from single‑stimulus rating tasks, and the number of 
possible values is listed for each study in Table 1.  The specific details of the 
experimental procedures of these studies are not directly relevant to the 
meta‑analysis, but their primary distinguishing features are described here. 
 
The “JC2” data set was taken from a functional magnetic‑resonance imaging 
(fMRI) study analogous to the original EEG study.  As mentioned previously, 
however, eye movements were allowed.  Moreover, the subject was instead 
allotted 4560 ms to respond. 
 
The “CH” data set was taken from the blocked control condition of a 
mouse‑tracking study.  In the two experimental conditions omitted here, decisions 
were not made naturally but rather on the basis of either only taste or only 
healthiness.  Instead of responding with a conventional button press, the subject 
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used a computer mouse to move a cursor from the center of the bottom of the 
display to the location of the preferred food in either the upper‑left or the 
upper‑right corner and clicked within a rectangle surrounding the image.  This 
mouse‑click response was delivered within 4 s. 
 
The “IK” data set (Krajbich et al., 2010) was taken from an eye‑tracking study with 
the most standard version of the 2AFC task.  The subject was given unlimited time 
to respond. 
 
The “SL” data set was taken from an fMRI study including two experimental 
conditions that were collapsed prior to analysis, as with the JC1 and JC2 data sets.  
This study was unique in that generally aversive foods were also included in equal 
proportion in the set of stimuli.  Seven possible values emerged from averaging of 
two separate ratings along a 4‑point scale.  Whereas the subject simply indicated 
the preferred food in the “approach” condition, the instruction was to instead 
indicate the nonpreferred food in the “avoid” condition.  The subject was allotted 3 
s to respond. 
 
The “JL” data set (Colas & Lu, 2017, from Chapter 3 of the present dissertation) 
was taken from an eye‑tracking study including four between‑subject experimental 
conditions divided into two blocks of trials each that could all be analyzed together.  
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The essential manipulation was that for one of the two blocks the stimulus with 
greater value was presented on the same side of the display for 90% of the trials.  
The four conditions corresponded to a control block followed by a leftward‑bias 
block, a control block followed by a rightward‑bias block, a leftward‑bias block 
followed by a control block, and a rightward‑bias block followed by a control block.  
The relatively subtle effects of the learned spatial biases could be averaged out for 
the sake of simplicity.  The subject was given unlimited time to respond. 
 
The “NS” data set (Sullivan et al., 2015) was taken from a second mouse‑tracking 
study.  Although the instruction was simply to choose the more desirable food, the 
subject was also reminded to be health‑conscious with the presentation of 
information concerning the importance of healthy eating before the task.  The 
subject was given unlimited time to respond. 
 
Computational modeling 
 
The neural‑network framework common to all of the models posits that separate 
populations of neurons represent the decision signals specific to each option under 
consideration.  These neuronal ensembles are reduced to individual units in a 
connectionist scheme, such that the decision signal dx(t) corresponds to the 
current aggregate level of activity in the decision‑making neurons representing 
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alternative x at time t.  These decision signals are initialized to zero at stimulus 
onset (i.e., t = 0) as follows: 
 ∀	𝑥:		𝑑6 𝑡 = 0 = 0 
 
The latent value Vx of each alternative is unknown at stimulus onset, as the 
processes underlying stimulus recognition and evaluation require some time.  
Thus, the value signal vx(t) within an ensemble of value‑encoding neurons is 
initialized to zero and subsequently elevates to Vx as a step function after the 
constant predecision time T0 has elapsed like so: 
 
∀	𝑥:		𝑣6 𝑡 = 0,				𝑡 < 𝑇;𝑉6,			𝑡 ≥ 𝑇; 
 
The fixed predecision time for the value‑signal input was biologically constrained to 
be 150 ms for this paradigm (see Discussion).  Time is discretized here to reflect 
the iterative implementations of these algorithms in practice as approximations of 
differential equations in continuous time.  While every decision signal remains 
below the threshold level D (an arbitrary positive constant here set to 100 to 
represent 100%), the Markov process evolves by fixed time increments Δt (here 
set to 10 ms) according to this generalized recurrence relation: 
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 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑓6 𝑡 + 𝜀6 𝑡  
 
The first decision signal to reach the threshold level of activity D immediately 
triggers the respective execution signal ex(t) for the alternative represented.  This 
motoric execution signal takes the form of a step function that defines the RT upon 
onset and also resets the entire system in preparation for the next trial.  A 
threshold‑linear activation function is implemented with the max operator to rectify 
negative activity, which is neurally implausible and also would exaggerate the 
effects of lateral inhibition if present.  The first recursive term, dx(t), produces 
perfect integration across time by means of balanced recurrent self‑excitation and 
leakage.  The final term, εx(t) (or N(0,σ2)x(t) henceforth to be explicit), combines all 
sources of noise into a Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 0 and parameterized 
standard deviation σ that is drawn from independently within each alternative’s 
subsystem at every time step.  The middle term, fx(t), collectively represents all of 
the terms that vary across the individual models compared (Figs. 2 & 3, Table 2). 
 
The race model 
 
The race model (Fig. 2a) (LaBerge, 1962; Raab, 1962; Vickers, 1970; Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008) postulates the most basic of the algorithms tested with complete 
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independence at all levels of the process.  Thus, the recurrence relation for the 
decision signal is only modified as follows: 
 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔𝑣6 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G 6 𝑡  
 
The positive constant b corresponds to the baseline input (e.g., urgency signals) 
common to every ensemble of decision‑making neurons.  The positive constant g 
represents the gain of the value‑signal input vx(t). 
 
The neural drift‑diffusion (NDD) model 
 
The standard drift‑diffusion model (Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2007) is neurally implausible to the extent that it is 
unidimensional, which would translate to negative activation as the signal is biased 
toward an arbitrarily designated alternative.  A two‑channel representation of the 
standard drift‑diffusion model can always be reduced to a single dimension 
because the mirror‑symmetric paired signals are perfectly anticorrelated by 
definition and lack independent sources of noise.  Thus, a neural drift‑diffusion 
(NDD) model (Fig. 2b) was contrived to be relatable to the other models within this 
neural‑network framework.  This similarity was to facilitate comparison and 
emphasize specifically the ramifications of perfect competition between inputs.  
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That is, this neural implementation still retains the distinguishing feature of 
sensitivity to differences in input alone, as reflected here (where n denotes the 
number of alternatives): 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣6 𝑡 − 1𝑛 − 1 𝑣K 𝑡KL6 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G 6 𝑡  
 
This parsimonious “max‑minus‑average” variant of the drift‑diffusion model 
extended to multiple alternatives could be regarded as less optimal than the 
“max‑minus‑next” variant with a drift rate that only reflects the difference between 
the two signals with greatest magnitude by means of an obscure filtering process 
(see Discussion).  Nevertheless, this distinction becomes irrelevant in the present 
case of two alternatives (i.e., n = 2), which reduces the general equation for 
alternative x to the following pair of equations: 
 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣M 𝑡 − 𝑣G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
 
The subtractive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (SNFI) model 
 
The subtractive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (SNFI) model (Fig. 2b) 
(Ditterich et al., 2003; Mazurek et al., 2003) resembles the NDD model with a 
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similar subtractive term but also adds a free parameter to render that 
input‑dependent competition imperfect like so: 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣6 𝑡 − 𝑖O 𝑣K 𝑡KL6 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G 6 𝑡  
 
For two alternatives, the equation is again reducible to a simpler pair of equations: 
 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣M 𝑡 − 𝑖O𝑣G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖O𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
 
The NDD model is thus a special case of the SNFI model where iv = 1/(n‑1), such 
that iv = 1 for n = 2.  The constant iv (with the constraint 0 ≤ iv ≤ 1) represents 
value‑signal inhibition ambiguously and potentially corresponds to the combined 
influence of lateral inhibition (i.e., input normalization or relative coding as opposed 
to absolute coding) and feedforward inhibition.  To be precise, lateral inhibition 
should actually be incorporated into an equation representing the value‑signal 
input vx(t), whereas feedforward inhibition would remain as is in the equation for 
decision signals.  This distinction is relevant for actual nervous systems.  At this 
level of abstraction, however, lateral and feedforward inhibition are represented 
collectively in simplified equations because the two variants are ultimately 
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mathematically equivalent insofar as each can mimic the other at the levels of 
decision signals and behavioral output. 
 
The divisive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (DNFI) model 
 
The divisive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (DNFI) model (Fig. 2b) 
(Heeger, 1992; Louie et al., 2011, 2013; Carandini & Heeger, 2012) is merely the 
divisive analog of the SNFI model with the recurrence relation modified as follows: 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣6 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣K 𝑡K + 𝑁(0, 𝜎G)6(𝑡)  
 
For two alternatives, this translates to the following reduction: 
 
𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣M 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑣G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  
𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣G 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑣G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
 
The positive constant s denotes semisaturation.  As was also the case for the 
SNFI model, the simplified notational convention places input‑dependent 
competition entirely within the equation for the decision signal rather than that for 
the value signal despite the ambiguity between lateral and feedforward inhibition at 
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the level of value signals.  Even without a quantifiable confound in degrees of 
freedom, the divisive transformation entails a less parsimonious assumption than a 
subtractive transformation by virtue of the complexity inherent to an actual neural 
implementation of shunting inhibition or otherwise divisive inhibition (Carandini & 
Heeger, 1994; Carandini et al., 1997; Holt & Koch, 1997).  Another consideration—
one that is also relevant for other computational mechanisms explored herein—is 
that the divisive transformation itself could emerge from a process with more 
temporally complex properties (Louie et al., 2014).  However, the simpler model of 
divisive normalization from which the DNFI model is derived has in fact been 
suggested to account for empirically observed neuronal activity thought to encode 
motivational value (Louie et al., 2011). 
 
The competing‑accumulator (CA) model 
 
The competing‑accumulator (CA) model (Fig. 2c) (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 
2004) substitutes state‑dependent competition (i.e., dependent on the state of a 
decision signal) in lieu of input‑dependent competition as the means by which 
each alternative’s representations interact, producing a more complex recurrence 
relation: 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔𝑣6 𝑡 − 𝑖S 𝑑K 𝑡KL6 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G 6 𝑡  
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For two alternatives, the system is described by these coupled equations: 
 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔𝑣M 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
 
The constant id (with the constraint 0 ≤ id ≤ 1) represents decision‑signal inhibition, 
which only reflects the lateral inhibition between competing ensembles of 
decision‑making neurons. 
 
The subtractive competing‑accumulator (SCA) model 
 
The subtractive competing‑accumulator (SCA) model (Fig. 2d) synthesizes the 
SNFI and CA models with subtractive input‑dependent competition and subtractive 
state‑dependent competition acting in concert as written here: 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣6 𝑡 − 𝑖O 𝑣K 𝑡KL6 − 𝑖S 𝑑K 𝑡KL6
+ 𝑁 0, 𝜎G 6 𝑡  
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For two alternatives, the same reductions apply to produce the following coupled 
equations: 
 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣M 𝑡 − 𝑖O𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑏 + 𝑔 𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖O𝑣M 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
 
The divisive competing‑accumulator (DCA) model 
 
The divisive competing‑accumulator (DCA) model (Fig. 2d) is the divisive analog 
of the SCA model and instead synthesizes the DNFI and CA models with divisive 
input‑dependent competition and subtractive state‑dependent competition per the 
following algorithm: 
 
𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑6 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣6 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣K 𝑡K − 𝑖S 𝑑K 𝑡KL6 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎G)6(𝑡)  
 
For two alternatives, this can again be reduced to a pair of coupled equations: 
 
𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣M 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G M 𝑡  
𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = max	 0, 𝑑G 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝑏 + 𝑣G 𝑡𝑠 + 𝑣M 𝑡 + 𝑣G 𝑡 − 𝑖S𝑑M 𝑡 + 𝑁 0, 𝜎G G 𝑡  
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The supralinear subtractive competing‑accumulator (SSCA) model 
 
The supralinear subtractive competing‑accumulator model (SSCA) model (Fig. 3) 
retains all of the features of the best‑performing SCA model with only one 
exception to relate to the concept of attentional modulation.  Rather than being 
encoded in a linear fashion, value signals are transformed according to a power 
law determined by the constant a (with the constraint a ≥ 1) as the exponent.  As a 
static approximation of dynamic processes, this strictly supralinear exponentiation 
is intended to capture the net effects of attention, which tends to be drawn to the 
representations of options with greater value and thus selectively amplifies them 
as part of a positive‑feedback loop promoting “winner‑take‑all” processing 
(Shimojo et al., 2003) (see Discussion).  Whereas the recurrence relation for the 
decision signal of the SCA model remains unchanged, the value signal is instead 
modeled with this new equation: 
 
∀	𝑥:		𝑣6 𝑡 = 0,						𝑡 < 𝑇;𝑉6T,			𝑡 ≥ 𝑇; 
 
Model fitting 
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The free parameters of each model (Table 2) were fitted to the original JC1 data 
set using a standard chi‑squared fitting method as follows (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 
2002).  Trials were first arbitrarily divided between training and test data sets of 
equal size according to the parity of the trials’ indices; odd‑numbered trials from 
odd‑numbered subjects and even‑numbered trials from even‑numbered subjects 
were assigned to training, and the remaining half of the trials were reserved for 
subsequent out‑of‑sample validation.  Excessively fast contaminant observations 
(only 8 in total) were omitted below a lower limit of 300 ms, which accounts for the 
cumulative temporal constraints of visual recognition, decision making, and motoric 
execution.  Data were concatenated across experimental conditions and subjects 
to sample RT distributions sufficiently and compensate for having few trials per 
subject and infrequent incorrect responses.  Taking only the training data, the 
frequencies of either choice and the 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90% quantiles (i.e., six 
bins) of their respective RT distributions were calculated for each of the ten 
possible input vectors pairing the four linearly ranked input values.  These input 
vectors were assigned equal weight in fitting to capture parametric effects.  For 
comparison, Monte Carlo simulation was employed to generate 2,000 trials with 
each input vector for a given model and a given set of parameters.  A χ2 statistic 
served as the objective function to be minimized, and the tuning parameters were 
optimized with respect to goodness of fit using iterations of the Nelder‑Mead 
simplex algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965) with randomized seeding. 
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In addition to the generative models, two discriminative models were fitted to the 
data to provide extreme upper and lower benchmarks for fitting performance.  The 
saturated model was used to predict behavior in the test data using all of the 
training data directly, thus maximizing the degrees of freedom in accordance with 
the number of observations.  The null model with a minimal three degrees of 
freedom assumes no effects of different inputs; rather, the mean choice 
frequencies across inputs were extracted along with the means of the minima and 
maxima of the RT distributions across both inputs and choices to define the range 
of a single uniform distribution for prediction. 
 
Comparing models in a pairwise manner, likelihood‑ratio tests were first used to 
verify the statistical significance of any improvement in fitting performance.  
Moreover, for the model comparison as a whole, penalties were imposed for model 
complexity at two standard levels using either the Akaike information criterion with 
correction for finite sample size (AICc) (Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989) or the 
stricter Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
 
Data analysis 
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The best‑fitting instantiations of the models were used to simulate 20,000 trials 
with each of the ten possible input vectors.  Trials were first classified into three 
distinct categories within the empirical data set and the simulated data set for 
juxtaposition as follows.  Correct choices consistent with value ratings occurred 
when the option with greater value was chosen.  Incorrect choices not consistent 
with value ratings occurred when the option with lesser value was chosen.  
Indifferent choices were defined as such when the two options were of equal 
value.  RTs for these different types of choices were compared independently of 
parametric effects using two‑tailed independent‑samples t tests. 
 
Excluding indifferent choices, the first logistic‑regression model described 
accuracy (i.e., the probability of choosing the option with greater value) as a 
function of the absolute value of the difference between input values and the sum 
of the input values.  The second model included the greater value and the lesser 
value in their original forms.  An analogous pair of complementary 
linear‑regression models was applied to the RT separately for correct and incorrect 
choices.  For the special case of indifferent choices (i.e., difference equals zero), 
only one model including the sum of values was necessary.  As discussed 
previously, excessively fast contaminant observations were omitted below a lower 
limit of 300 ms.  To facilitate comparison across studies in the meta‑analysis, the 
values were first normalized linearly such that the minimum and maximum values 
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corresponded to zero and unity, respectively.  Moreover, parameter estimates for 
the RT analyses were subsequently normalized such that each regression 
coefficient was divided by the coefficient for the constant term.  To illustrate, a 
hypothetical coefficient of ‑0.1 for the greater value’s effect on RT would imply that, 
ceteris paribus, the RT becomes 10% faster than the mean if the greater value is 
at its maximum level.  Statistical significance was determined for main effects and 
contrasts using two‑tailed one‑sample t tests and 95% confidence intervals.  
Despite one‑tailed tests being justified by strong a priori hypotheses in most cases, 
more conservative two‑tailed tests were used in their stead here to err on the side 
of caution.  Contrasts of the effects within a regression model were limited to the 
absolute values of the parameter estimates to avoid redundancy.  That is, a 
significant difference between a signed positive effect and a signed negative effect 
is less informative than a significant difference between these effects irrespective 
of sign. 
 
The same analyses of accuracy and RT were employed within each of the other 
data sets that were included in the meta‑analysis.  Aggregate results across all 
data sets were produced by assigning weights to each data set in proportion to the 
total number of trials included for each analysis.  
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RESULTS 
 
Computational modeling 
 
Multiple theoretically sound hypotheses for competitive interactions have been 
proposed in the literature—including the absence of any such interactions.  Seven 
models were first assembled a priori per a factorial design (Fig. 2).  Taking into 
consideration the role of attentional processes, the most successful of these 
models was then augmented to form an eighth model with superior performance 
(Fig. 3).  Dissociating and testing specific mechanisms requires a tractable 
common framework be nested within incrementally varied models representing 
each potential feature.  Thus, the particular versions of the models included in this 
formal model comparison (Table 2) all derived core ideas from published models 
but were not strictly identical to the original versions. 
 
The race model (Fig. 2a) (LaBerge, 1962; Raab, 1962; Vickers, 1970; Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008) is the most basic option by virtue of its rigid assumption that the 
channels representing each option remain independent at all levels.  The 
drift‑diffusion model (Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Wagenmakers et 
al., 2007) corresponds to the opposite extreme of a single channel that represents 
the relative evidence between two inputs collectively.  Whereas this work 
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emphasized some degree of neural plausibility, the standard drift‑diffusion model is 
implausible insofar as it simulates only one bidirectional decision signal.  In light of 
this shortcoming, a modified neural drift‑diffusion (NDD) model was substituted for 
its separate decision signals that better align with the arrangement of pathways in 
the nervous system.  This neural implementation still retains the distinguishing 
feature of sensitivity to differences alone by means of perfect competition between 
inputs.  Such input‑dependent competition (Fig. 2b) could also be imperfect and 
take the form of lateral inhibition (i.e., input normalization or relative coding) or 
feedforward inhibition at the level of value‑signal inputs, which could entail either 
subtractive (Ditterich et al., 2003; Mazurek et al., 2003) or divisive (Heeger, 1992; 
Louie et al., 2011, 2013; Carandini & Heeger, 2012) transformations of inputs.  
These two alternatives served as the basis for the subtractive 
normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (SNFI) model and its more complex divisive 
analog, the divisive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (DNFI) model.  Input 
normalization and feedforward inhibition are referred to collectively in this particular 
context because of mimicry in effects at the level of decision signals and thus in 
ultimate behavioral output.  In contrast, state‑dependent competition (Fig. 2c)—
that is, competition dependent on the states of accumulating decision signals—can 
be implemented via downstream lateral inhibition, as for the 
competing‑accumulator (CA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 2004).  The 
hitherto unexplored possibility of input‑dependent competition and state‑dependent 
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competition coexisting at hierarchical levels (Fig. 2d) was considered as well with 
the introduction of a novel pair of hybrids—namely, the subtractive 
competing‑accumulator (SCA) and divisive competing‑accumulator (DCA) models. 
 
Despite yielding the best performance among these candidates, the SCA model 
still failed to account for some qualitative effects in empirical data.  This deficiency 
was addressed as the missing factor of selective attention (Shimojo et al., 2003; 
Krajbich et al., 2010) was incorporated into this framework with a parsimonious 
approximation to produce the supralinear subtractive competing‑accumulator 
(SSCA) model (Fig. 3). 
 
Initial model comparison 
 
As determined by a global metric for goodness of fit to distributions of choices and 
RTs both within and out of sample, the seven initial models were ranked as follows 
(in descending order): SCA, DCA, CA, SNFI, DNFI, NDD, race, and null (p < 0.05 
with the following exception) (Fig. 4).  However, the evidence favoring the DCA 
model over the CA model was insignificant for the test data set after model 
complexity was formally taken into account (p > 0.05), as could also be 
demonstrated by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), which 
imposes a penalty for each degree of freedom, or even a less stringent alternative 
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in the form of the Akaike information criterion with correction for finite sample size 
(AICc) (Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989).  Otherwise, additional free 
parameters were objectively justified, and predictive performance even remained 
comparable with out‑of‑sample validation, ruling out overfitting.  All fitted 
parameters, including the baseline input, were robustly nonzero (or greater than 
unity in the case of attentional modulation) (Table 3).  In the cases of the 
hybridized SCA and DCA models, the fitted parameters for input‑ and 
state‑dependent competition decreased as expected relative to their assignments 
in the SNFI, DNFI, and CA models, where one level of competition is omitted and 
so must be compensated for by overfitting at the remaining level.  The superior 
performance of the subtractive models relative to the divisive models was all the 
more remarkable in light of the greater—albeit unquantifiable—degree of 
complexity inherent to the divisive models irrespectively of countable degrees of 
freedom, as this added complexity and nonlinearity would enable more flexible 
fitting of data in general. 
 
As the value of one stimulus was not a reliable predictor of the other value, this 
paradigm’s two‑dimensional input space facilitated extraction of effects 
parametrically related to stimulus values.  The subjective value (i.e., utility) of each 
option was derived from the subject’s linear rating of the desirability of eating the 
food when presented in isolation.  A complete portrait of accuracy and RT was 
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attained by means of two complementary models.  One regression analysis 
included the ranked greater and lesser values individually, and the other featured 
the absolute difference between the values and their sum, which are orthogonal 
linear combinations of the original terms.  To be thorough, RT was analyzed in this 
fashion separately for the distinct categories of correct, incorrect, and indifferent 
choices—with the exception that only the effect of the sum was relevant for 
indifferent choices.  These difference and sum terms can represent (inverse) 
difficulty and overall motivational (or incentive) salience (Robinson & Berridge, 
1993; Schultz, 2015), respectively, to an extent, but net effects must be interpreted 
with prudence because these linear combinations together are sufficiently flexible 
for mimicry to occur.  As an illustration of this caveat, which has been overlooked 
all too often in previous studies, an effect of the greater value alone could also 
result in effects of difference (i.e., greater minus lesser) and sum (i.e., greater plus 
lesser) each with magnitude equal to half of that of the greater‑value effect. 
 
As expected for the modeled data set, choice accuracy (Fig. 5, Table 4) increased 
as the greater value increased (β = 3.517, t = 29.05, p < 10‑184) and conversely 
decreased as the lesser value increased (β = ‑3.038, t = 24.42, p < 10‑130).  
Notably, the option with the greater value also possessed significantly more weight 
than its lesser‑valued alternative (M = 0.479, p < 0.05).  A corollary of this 
asymmetry is that accuracy not only increased with the difference between the 
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values (β = 3.278, t = 29.37, p < 10‑188) but also effectively increased with their 
sum (β = 0.239, t = 4.68, p < 10‑5), albeit to a much smaller degree (M = 3.038, p < 
0.05).  None of the seven a‑priori models were capable of capturing these effects 
in subjects’ choices—even qualitatively.  The NDD model naturally predicted equal 
weights for the greater and lesser values and missed this pattern of overweighting 
(p >> 0.05), as did the CA model (p > 0.05), but the SCA, DCA, SNFI, DNFI, and 
race models even predicted a contradictory overweighting of the lesser value 
instead (p < 0.05).  To clarify, “overweighting” in this context implies deviation from 
the symmetric weighting of each value prescribed by the normative drift‑diffusion 
model.  As detailed below, the SSCA model alone could address this 
phenomenon. 
 
When choosing correctly between options of unequal value (upper‑left corners in 
Fig. 6, Table 5), the greater value exerted a speedup effect on RT (β = ‑0.260, t = 
23.02, p << 0.05) while the lesser value exerted a slowdown effect (β = 0.066, t = 
5.73, p < 10‑7).  Moreover, the degree to which the greater value sped up the RT 
exceeded the degree to which the lesser value slowed down the RT (M = 0.195, p 
< 0.05).  Correspondingly, the RT became faster as both the difference (β = 
‑0.163, t = 17.43, p << 0.05) and the sum (β = ‑0.097, t = 15.05, p << 0.05) 
increased, but more so for the difference (M = 0.066, p < 0.05).  All of the more 
neurally plausible models featuring imperfect competition—namely, the SCA, DCA, 
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CA, SNFI, and DNFI models—could account for this set of effects on RT (p < 
0.05), whereas the more normative NDD and race models categorically fail to do 
so regardless of parameter assignments.  A byproduct of the NDD model’s 
assumption of perfect subtractive competition is that the observed effect of sum on 
RT is missed altogether (p >> 0.05) with perfectly anticorrelated weights for the 
individual values (p >> 0.05).  The opposite issue applies to the race model due to 
its lack of competition, such that the weights for the individual values are unequal 
(p < 0.05) but instead both negative (p < 0.05) and so produce an effect of the 
difference weaker than that of the sum (p < 0.05).  This pattern is to be expected in 
the presence of “statistical facilitation” (Todd, 1912; Hershenson, 1962; Raab, 
1962) (see Discussion).  Such subtleties in effects of individual values on behavior 
again underscore the importance of taking both inputs into consideration rather 
than reducing them to a single dimension of difficulty by analyzing on the basis of 
differences alone, which is standard among previous studies. 
 
Incorrect choices of the option with lesser value (lower‑right corners in Fig. 6, 
Table 6) were much less frequent and dominated by pairs of stimuli with small 
differences in value, resulting in substantially reduced statistical power.  
Nevertheless, RTs for these enigmatic errors were notably slower than those for 
correct choices (M = 108 ms, t = 14.93, p << 0.05).  All of the models could exhibit 
this slowing effect to varying degrees (p < 0.05).  There were also speedup effects 
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of the greater value (β = ‑0.111, t = 2.88, p = 0.004) and the difference between 
values (β = ‑0.087, t = 2.41, p = 0.016), which nearly all of the models shared as 
well (p < 0.05) with the lone exception of a net slowdown effect for the difference in 
the CA model (p < 0.05).  Lacking power, however, the absence of significant 
effects for both the lesser value (β = 0.063, t = 1.57, p = 0.116) and the sum of 
values (β = ‑0.024, t = 1.55, p = 0.120) remains ambiguous while at least one of 
these variables has a significant impact on RT as part of every model’s predictions 
(p < 0.05). 
 
Decisions made with indifference when the values were matched (diagonals from 
lower left to upper right in Fig. 6, Table 7) were slower than correct responses as 
expected with increased difficulty (M = 107 ms, t = 20.86, p << 0.05), which was 
likewise true of all models (p < 0.05).  In this case the RT again became faster as 
the sum of the equal values increased (β = ‑0.069, t = 10.76, p << 0.05), providing 
the strongest evidence of an effect of motivational salience.  Excluding the NDD 
model, which cannot account for such an effect outside of the difference under any 
circumstances (p > 0.05), all other models had this prediction in common (p < 
0.05). 
 
The SSCA model 
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Although the more neurally plausible of the seven a‑priori models could account for 
the more robust impact of a stimulus with greater value on subjects’ RTs, none of 
these five accounts—to wit, SCA, DCA, CA, SNFI, and DNFI—entailed the 
analogous overweighting of greater values observed in subjects’ choices.  With 
even the best‑performing SCA model still incomplete, its successor, the SSCA 
model, offered a viable remedy for this deficit with an assumption of attentional 
modulation, which translates to selective amplification of inputs that are already of 
high magnitude as part of a positive‑feedback loop promoting “winner‑take‑all” 
processing (Shimojo et al., 2003) (see Discussion).  As a static approximation of 
these dynamics, the impact of attention was parsimoniously reduced to a single 
free parameter that controls a supralinear power law.  This addition enhanced the 
overall goodness of fit to an extent that justified the extra degree of freedom (p < 
0.05).  Furthermore, the SSCA model demonstrated a qualitative improvement by 
correctly reproducing the overweighting of options with greater value (p < 0.05) as 
reflected in choices that were similarly characterized by a net positive effect of the 
sum of values (p < 0.05) (Fig. 5, Table 4).  With respect to RT, the SSCA model 
essentially retained all of the aforementioned desirable predictions of the nested 
SCA model (p < 0.05).  Despite this qualitative resemblance, however, there was 
significant quantitative improvement in the correspondence between simulated and 
actual RT distributions (Fig. 7). 
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This data set served as an ideally rigorous test case; that is, the benefits of the 
SSCA model were even more striking here in light of the fact that central visual 
fixation was mandatory and sufficient to process the adjacent stimuli 
simultaneously (Fig. 1a).  It is therefore implied that the downstream effects of 
covert shifting of the focus of attention could be revealed in the absence of overt 
eye movements. 
 
Meta‑analysis 
 
To verify the extent to which these findings that were amenable to computational 
modeling were robust and so would generalize beyond the particular data set 
under scrutiny, a meta‑analysis subsequently tested for qualitative replication of 
the critical effects with a scope encompassing seven experiments altogether 
(Table 1).  In contrast to the modeled data set, which will henceforth be referred to 
as “JC1”, the added studies featured stimuli that were well separated spatially and 
thus required saccades in order for each to be foveated (Fig. 1b).  Otherwise, 
these experimental paradigms generally adhered to the same basic scheme of a 
2AFC task for which subjects made preferential choices between randomly 
sampled foods with uncorrelated subjective values. 
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With regard to choice accuracy (Table 4), the aggregate results of the 
meta‑analysis replicated the findings from the original data set.  Across all studies, 
accuracy increased as the greater value increased (β = 4.036, p < 0.05) and 
asymmetrically decreased as the lesser value increased (β = ‑3.444, p < 0.05).  As 
before, significant overweighting of the alternative with greater value was apparent 
(M = 0.592, p < 0.05).  This pattern likewise translated to increasing accuracy as a 
function of both the difference between the values (β = 3.740, p < 0.05) and their 
sum (β = 0.296, p < 0.05), where the difference had substantially more of an 
impact (M = 3.444, p < 0.05).  The tendency toward overweighting options with 
greater value was statistically significant within three data sets (i.e., JC1, JC2, and 
JL) (p < 0.05) and at least trending in the same direction for another three.  
Likewise, the positive effect of the sum was significant within five data sets (i.e., 
JC1, JC2, SL, JL, and NS) (p < 0.05). 
 
Turning next to RTs for correct choices (Table 5), the aggregate results again 
completely replicated the original set of findings.  The greater value made the RT 
faster across studies (β = ‑0.374, p < 0.05), whereas the lesser value slowed it 
down (β = 0.182, p < 0.05).  There was a similar asymmetry between these 
oppositional effects (M = 0.192, p < 0.05).  In keeping with that pattern, so too did 
the RT become faster as both the difference (β = ‑0.278, p < 0.05) and the sum (β 
= ‑0.096, p < 0.05) increased with another imbalance between those two effects 
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(M = 0.182, p < 0.05).  All of these relevant trends were fully significant within five 
data sets (i.e., JC1, JC2, CH, SL, and JL) (p < 0.05).  Moreover, the remaining two 
data sets (i.e., IK and NS) were still largely in harmony with the others, such that 
four of the six critical effects were significant for each (p < 0.05). 
 
Whereas the previous results were adequately powered and robust across most of 
the data sets included in the meta‑analysis, the RTs observed for incorrect choices 
(Table 6) were not sampled sufficiently and thus formed less consistent 
distributions.  Despite the additional noise, it remained the case for all studies that 
incorrect choices tended to be made more slowly than correct choices (p < 0.05).  
Furthermore, the aggregate result suggested that RTs became faster as the 
difference between values increased for incorrect choices as well (β = ‑0.201, p < 
0.05).  That is, the speedup effect of the greater value (β = ‑0.220, p < 0.05) was 
not significantly different (M = 0.036, p > 0.05) from the slowing effect of the lesser 
value (β = 0.184, p < 0.05).  Four data sets (i.e., JC1, SL, JL, and NS) all yielded 
speedup effects of the greater value (p < 0.05) and the difference between values 
(p < 0.05), but only two of these (i.e., SL and JL) also demonstrated a significant 
slowing effect of the lesser value (p < 0.05).  Although the NDD model does 
corroborate such a pattern in error RTs (p < 0.05) despite underperforming 
otherwise, even more data will be necessary to reconcile the discrepancies here 
and reach more definitive conclusions.  For instance, two data sets (i.e., CH and 
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NS) also showed subjects responding more quickly as the sum increased (p < 
0.05), which is instead in keeping with predictions from the more neurally plausible 
models (p < 0.05). 
 
As concerns the final case of RT for indifferent choices (Table 7), which were 
again delivered more slowly than correct choices across all studies (p < 0.05), the 
aggregate result replicated the speedup effect of the sum of values (β = ‑0.070, p 
< 0.05).  Five of the six data sets that included indifferent choices (i.e., JC1, JC2, 
CH, SL, and NS) exhibited this effect individually (p < 0.05). 
 
Altogether, the meta‑analysis generally validated the original claims suggested by 
the modeled data set.  Certain qualitative aspects of the findings are summarized 
in Table 8.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Summary 
 
The present study has made strides toward achieving a mechanistic 
understanding of value‑based decision making by formally juxtaposing the explicit 
predictions of computational models and empirical observations of the behavior of 
human subjects.  The two‑dimensional input space common to every experiment 
tested as part of this meta‑analytic approach crucially enabled rigorous 
assessment of parametric value‑related effects.  Although the NDD model 
appreciably outperformed the race model, the strictest normative assumptions of 
either independent accumulation or perfect subtractive comparison that underlie 
the race and drift‑diffusion algorithms, respectively, were each apparently falsified.  
By instead representing signals separately but also with imperfect direct 
competition between them in the form of mutual inhibition, more neurally plausible 
SSMs offered an account both quantitatively and qualitatively superior while 
remaining relatively parsimonious.  Foremost among these was the SSCA model, 
a novel connectionist model of a multidimensional nonlinear dynamical system 
featuring hierarchical levels of competition as well as an approximation of 
attentional modulation with the efficiency of only six free parameters. 
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Optimality or lack thereof 
 
The drift‑diffusion model, which is most closely derived from the SPRT, prescribes 
an optimal solution for the 2AFC paradigm by virtue of attaining the fastest 
possible mean RT for a given level of accuracy.  However, this is but one of many 
feasible definitions of optimality.  The extent to which biology is optimal in domains 
such as this and which parameters natural selection should optimize remain 
elusive points of contention (Bogacz et al., 2006; Bogacz & Gurney, 2007; 
Houston et al., 2007; Waksberg et al., 2009; Bogacz et al., 2010; van Ravenzwaaij 
et al., 2012; McNamara et al., 2014).  Whereas Bogacz and colleagues (2006) 
suggested equivalence between the original LCA model (Usher & McClelland, 
2001) and the optimal drift‑diffusion model under specific conditions, van 
Ravenzwaaij and colleagues (2012) suggested otherwise and demonstrated that 
such equivalence only applies under even more extreme conditions that are so 
improbable and artificial as to be negligible.  In a similar vein, the purely descriptive 
SSCA model is relatively far removed from any provably optimal computations 
other than the fundamental sequential sampling.  Yet, a constrained optimization 
shaped by evolutionary adaptation need not necessarily align with mathematically 
provable optimality in a specific context when there also exists demand for 
versatility across the diverse and dynamic environments that humans and other 
animals encounter. 
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The discrepancy between the normative race and drift‑diffusion models illustrates 
one aspect of the nuanced nature of optimality in this context.  An oft‑cited 
limitation of the framework shared by the SPRT and the drift‑diffusion model is that 
it does not readily generalize beyond binary decisions as the race model does.  
The “max‑minus‑average” variant of the drift‑diffusion model directly implied by the 
standard SPRT is suboptimal (McMillen & Holmes, 2006; Niwa & Ditterich, 2008; 
Ditterich, 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), but the unknown optimal standard for 
multiple alternatives can be approximated asymptotically for sufficiently low error 
rates by the multihypothesis SPRT (Dragalin et al., 1999) and an analogous 
“max‑minus‑next” variant of the drift‑diffusion model assuming that all signals other 
than the two with greatest magnitude are somehow filtered out (McMillen & 
Holmes, 2006; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 2013; Teodorescu & Usher, 
2013).  However, the feasibility of such a scheme when extrapolating to many 
more than three alternatives has yet to be fully established as tenable.  The need 
to accommodate multiple responses was a relevant factor to motivate laying the 
groundwork of the race model (Morton, 1964), but it was not the only factor. 
 
Incidentally, Raab (1962) was not concerned with matters of optimality and actually 
first proposed the basic scheme of a race of independent accumulators to account 
for a documented effect of “statistical facilitation” (Todd, 1912; Hershenson, 1962).  
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In the context of a 2AFC paradigm, statistical facilitation implies a tendency 
towards faster responses as both values increase—that is, not only the value of 
the better (i.e., more frequently chosen) alternative but also the value of the worse 
alternative.  Under the assumption of independent parallel processes driving each 
choice, this phenomenon results from additional overlap between each choice’s 
RT distributions as the accumulation rate of the alternative with lesser value 
approaches that of the alternative with greater value.  The present study made use 
of these predictions as they starkly contrasted with those of the drift‑diffusion and 
NDD models or more neurally plausible models featuring imperfect competition.  
The former symmetrically yield slower RTs as the lesser value increases and 
reduces the relative evidence, whereas the latter for most parameter assignments 
exhibit a weaker net slowing effect on RT as the lesser value increases but are 
also flexible enough to accommodate statistical facilitation with a sufficiently low 
degree of mutual inhibition. 
 
By postulating absolute rather than relative representations of value within 
independent accumulating signals, the race model can also be regarded as 
prescriptive or optimal but in a manner altogether separate from the drift‑diffusion 
model.  The optimality of the speed‑accuracy tradeoff (Johnson, 1939) in the 
SPRT and the drift‑diffusion model is predicated on options and sources of 
evidence for them remaining stable, as is true of most artificial laboratory settings.  
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However, such circumstances are not representative of the dynamic world in which 
organisms have evolved to make fitness‑maximizing decisions in real time that 
regularly demand flexibility and rapid reaction to changing states (Cisek, 2007, 
2012).  Absolute representations of individual stimuli that are insensitive to context 
could actually be ideal for such situations in which external surroundings and even 
internal states are unstable.  Moreover, ecological validity aside, normative 
decision theory mandates that, when faced with multiple alternatives, a rational 
agent whose goal is to maximize utility should make decisions exhibiting 
“independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) in accordance with the 
Shepard‑Luce choice rule (Shepard, 1957; Luce, 1959).  This independence 
axiom, which entails the probability of choosing one alternative over another being 
wholly unaffected by any other alternatives, can emerge directly from the race 
model in the form of a Gibbs softmax function (Marley & Colonius, 1992; 
Bundesen, 1993).  In a certain respect, then, the more neurally plausible SSMs 
with imperfect competition offer an intermediate alternative that effectively tempers 
the narrow optimality of the SPRT with the broad optimality of the IIA axiom. 
 
Features of the SSCA model 
 
The persistent popularity of classical SSMs such as the race and drift‑diffusion 
models among experimentalists also stems from their efficiency and ease of use, 
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and thus even the SSCA model is intended to reach a viable compromise with a 
minimal increase in complexity outweighed by significant improvement in 
applicability to actual behavior and neurophysiology.  Essentially, the SSCA model 
has been designed to be somewhat biologically plausible while balancing the 
constraint of minimizing its parameter count so as to ensure that each element 
remains fully interpretable and also avoid inappropriate assumptions and 
overfitting of empirical data.  Moreover, fitting the free parameters of a model of 
this complexity can pose an intractably nonconvex optimization problem with 
computational demands exacerbated by Monte Carlo simulation of stochastic time 
series lacking closed‑form expressions.  Each degree of freedom added intensifies 
this problem exponentially.  In contrast, simpler variants of the race and 
drift‑diffusion models boast more tractable optimization problems further 
ameliorated by closed‑form expressions for distributions of choices and RTs 
(Wagenmakers et al., 2007; Brown & Heathcote, 2008).  Given these 
considerations, every free parameter of the SSCA model was carefully selected for 
proving itself critical both from a theoretical standpoint and from a practical 
standpoint. 
 
Findings from electrophysiology and other neuroscientific methods at scales 
ranging from single neurons to whole‑brain networks have begun to characterize 
the dynamics of neural decision‑making processes.  The SSCA model 
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parsimoniously draws from key neurocomputational principles that have emerged 
from this line of research.  In several regions of the brain, option‑selective decision 
signals encoded in neuronal firing rates have been shown to accumulate up to a 
threshold level during decision making at a rate proportional to the evidence in 
favor of a particular option (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Ding & Gold, 2010; O’Connell et al., 2012; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; Hanks et al., 
2014).  Some additional observations from work in this domain stand out for their 
core mechanistic implications.  Opposing decision signals representing 
non‑preferred alternatives tend to be commensurately suppressed.  The rate of 
accumulation reflects not only stimulus attributes but also the nonspecific urgency 
to act (Churchland et al., 2008; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Thura & Cisek, 2014; 
Hanks et al., 2014).  Thresholds for downstream activation of motor output remain 
constant (Hanes & Schall, 1996).  Also relevant is the notion that attending to 
stimuli or stimulus features—whether perceptual or valence‑related—selectively 
enhances the neural signals representing them (Yantis & Serences, 2003; 
Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004; Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Cohen & Maunsell, 2009; 
Lim et al., 2011; McGinty et al., 2016; Leong et al., 2017). 
 
Essentially, separate neural ensembles are here assumed to encode 
option‑specific decision signals that compete at hierarchical levels while 
accumulating activity up to a fixed threshold for motor output at a rate proportional 
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to the value of the option encoded and also boosted by the additional impetus of 
value‑dependent attention and nonspecific urgency signals.  Although its 
influences are broad—also including the feedforward‑inhibition model (Ditterich et 
al., 2003; Mazurek et al., 2003), the urgency‑gating model (Cisek et al., 2009; 
Thura et al., 2012), and the drift‑diffusion model with attention (Krajbich et al., 
2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011)—the SSCA model is distinguished as a member of 
a narrow class of nonlinear attractor‑network models such as the LCA model 
(Usher & McClelland, 2001, 2004) and established biophysical models (Wang, 
2002; Wong & Wang, 2006; Wong et al., 2007) that emphasize state‑dependent 
competition via lateral inhibition.  However, the SSCA model as a whole is unique 
and deviates from the original seven‑parameter LCA model in multiple ways.  In 
catering to this paradigm, the SSCA model exchanges four free parameters 
representing leakage, decision‑signal thresholds, nondecision time, and 
starting‑point variability for only three new parameters representing baseline input, 
input‑dependent competition, and attentional modulation. 
 
In contrast to the perfect integration of the SSCA model, the LCA model’s 
assumption that leakage overrides recurrent self‑excitation is a strong one and 
may not apply universally in reality (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Zhang & 
Bogacz, 2010; Brunton et al., 2013).  Indeed, leakage is only an optimal feature for 
dynamic situations in which information is updated after initial stimulus onset so as 
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to potentially warrant an effective change of mind prior to action.  A single free 
parameter represents the net effect of the balance between leakage and recurrent 
self‑excitation as part of an Ornstein‑Uhlenbeck process (Ricciardi, 1977), and this 
parameter is constrained to be negative (i.e., leakage‑dominant) for the LCA 
model.  However, for this particular paradigm where the stimuli predictably remain 
stable within every trial, there was no compelling evidence of a need for either net 
leakage or net self‑excitation within the framework.  Whereas leaky integration is a 
fundamental characteristic of the dynamics of individual neurons, populations of 
neurons characterized by a range of intrinsic time constants are nonetheless 
capable of achieving perfect integration collectively by means of reverberating 
activity, as is assumed by the SSCA model (Shadlen & Newsome, 1994; Seung, 
1996; Simen et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
 
The decision signal’s threshold for execution is fixed at an arbitrary value to serve 
as the SSCA model’s scaling parameter.  Generally, the interpretation of fitted 
parameter assignments must be contextualized in the presence of a scaling 
parameter, which is typical of this variety of models (Donkin et al., 2009).  
However, especially with the addition of an urgency signal, a fixed threshold for 
motor output is actually better justified by observations of neurophysiology (Hanes 
& Schall, 1996; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Ding & Gold, 2010; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Hanks et al., 
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2014; Thura & Cisek, 2014) than alternative constraints proposed in previous 
models.  As discussed below, the urgency signal can mimic the theoretical 
collapsing boundary of a diffusion process.  Past approaches include fixed 
within‑trial noise (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) or—as in the original LCA 
model—normalized inputs that always sum to a fixed constant (Usher & 
McClelland, 2001; Brown & Heathcote, 2005, 2008).  Tradeoffs are inevitable in 
this case, but the former solution overlooks the possibility that the fidelity of 
signaling could vary across conditions being compared.  The latter solution, on the 
other hand, is inflexible in its rescaling of inputs and can degrade both absolute 
and relative information about their magnitudes. 
 
Decision‑making processes are generally expected to be preceded and followed 
by perceptual stimulus‑encoding processes and motoric action‑execution 
processes, respectively, which collectively fall under the concept of nondecision 
time (Ratcliff, 1978; Luce, 1986).  Whereas these nondecision processes are 
typically reduced to a single additive constant as part of the estimated RT, such a 
simplification is prone to miss subtle dynamics of actual neural decision signals 
(Teichert et al., 2016), which are nonlinear, susceptible to noise, and driven by the 
urgency to act as well as perhaps attention itself.  Furthermore, the ensuing 
ambiguity surrounding predecision time, postdecision time, and intermittent lapses 
of attention (e.g., during blinking or saccades) (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich 
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& Rangel, 2011) obfuscates the correspondence between simulated dynamics of 
neural activity and the time courses of acquired neurophysiological signals.  In 
contrast to fitted nondecision times often in the range of several hundred 
milliseconds, the initial stages of visual object recognition (Bentin et al., 1996; 
Schmolesky et al., 1998; Allison et al., 1999; Liu et al., 2002), processing of a 
stimulus’s associated hedonic value (Harris et al., 2011; Larsen & O’Doherty, 
2014), and response preparation (Ledberg et al., 2007) generally begin within 200 
ms of the onset of stimulation.  Thus, parameterizing the nondecision time not only 
necessitates an additional degree of freedom that is noisy and particularly 
susceptible to overfitting but also makes neurally implausible assumptions that 
cannot be applied directly to computational‑model‑based analysis of 
neurophysiological data.  The SSCA model instead opts for a biologically 
constrained predecision time—conservatively set to 150 ms in this value‑based 
paradigm (Harris et al., 2011; Larsen & O’Doherty, 2014)—only at the level of 
value‑signal inputs, which are defined with a step function.  Downstream decision 
signals as simulated are never static, evolving explicitly even before the onset of 
value signals. 
 
Another consequence of the SSCA model’s predecision phase is that starting‑point 
variability emerges from the accumulation of persistent noise before the delayed 
onset of value‑signal inputs.  Although this emergent starting‑point variability does 
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not have as much flexibility as explicitly parameterized variability in the actual 
starting point corresponding to trial onset, qualitative effects such as the potential 
for more frequent fast errors (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) remain without the 
complications of an additional degree of freedom.  Conversely, RT distributions for 
errors can simultaneously be shifted in the opposite direction relative to correct 
responses, which typically constitutes the more prominent effect.  Along with 
non‑Gaussian noise (Link & Heath, 1975) and asymmetric biases (Ashby, 1983; 
Ratcliff, 1985), across‑trial variability in rates of evidence or valence accumulation 
has been suggested to account for the slower RTs observed for errors (Ratcliff, 
1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Brown & Heathcote, 2005, 
2008).  Multiple sources of variability across trials as well as hysteresis are entirely 
feasible insofar as biological signals are inherently probabilistic.  Nevertheless, in 
light of recent reports of neurophysiology reflecting fixed thresholds and urgency 
signaling, across‑trial variability in drift rate may not be the only factor or even a 
primary factor involved in such discrepancies in timing between correct and 
incorrect responses (Hawkins et al., 2015).  The scope of the present model 
comparison does not include free parameters for auxiliary sources of variability 
across trials in the interest of interpretability, but the significance of across‑trial 
variability in starting points, rates of accumulation, onset of input signals, and other 
parametric elements yet to be explored as part of a more comprehensive model 
also featuring urgency signals will merit investigation in future research. 
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Inclusion of a parametric baseline input in the models tested here substantially 
improves fitting performance but is even more significant for its theoretical 
implications in relation to signaling of the urgency to act.  The stationary threshold 
of the SPRT is no longer optimal even in the most basic 2AFC paradigm if either of 
the following commonly occurring conditions apply: the reliability of information 
could vary from trial to trial, or a cost of effort could be associated with deliberation 
time within a trial.  The psychometric implications of a decaying threshold 
(Rapoport & Burkheimer, 1971; Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988; Ditterich, 2006a, 
2006b; Frazier & Yu, 2008), including in particular decreasing accuracy as a 
function of elapsed time (i.e., slower errors), can bear striking resemblance to 
those of a nonspecific urgency signal (Hawkins et al., 2015).  However, the 
urgency signal is more neurally plausible when considering the robust evidence of 
constant thresholds for decision signals as encoded in the firing rates of neurons 
(Hanes & Schall, 1996; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; 
Churchland et al., 2008; Ding & Gold, 2010; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Hanks et al., 
2014; Thura & Cisek, 2014).  This persistent baseline input also prevents decision 
signals that represent relatively low or even negative (i.e., aversive) values from 
being deterministically attracted to the null‑activity state by the forces of lateral 
inhibition.  Such attraction might also be avoided with the assumption of a 
sufficiently high starting point for the decision signal at trial onset (van Ravenzwaaij 
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et al., 2012), but the neural plausibility of a nonzero starting point of high relative 
magnitude remains questionable, which implies yet another free parameter that is 
ambiguously constrained by neurophysiology. 
 
Whereas the urgency‑gating model suggests that a growing urgency signal is 
multiplicatively combined with a low‑pass‑filtered evidence signal (Cisek et al., 
2009; Thura et al., 2012; Thura & Cisek, 2014), the constant baseline input of the 
SSCA model yields some overlapping predictions for ultimate neural dynamics and 
behavior by means of a qualitatively distinct mechanism—that is, integration in lieu 
of independent gating.  There is experimental support for the existence of evidence 
accumulation as opposed to merely urgency accumulation alone, such as the 
persistent influence of early evidence on decisions when changing information 
conflicts across different time points within a trial (Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Kiani et 
al., 2008; Tsetsos et al., 2011, 2012; Winkel et al., 2014).  However, inclusion of a 
low‑pass filter with an appropriate time constant can also address these issues to 
some extent (Carland et al., 2015).  Further investigation of behavior under 
deliberately manipulated conditions as well as the flow of information across brain 
regions at the single‑neuron level will prove necessary to fully dissociate urgency 
gating, the integration of urgency‑like inputs, and—albeit to a lesser extent—
recurrent self‑excitation, which is dependent on the states of decision signals and 
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thus most capable of mimicking nonspecific urgency signals when competing 
decision signals correspond in magnitude. 
 
Whereas variants of the SNFI, DNFI, and CA models’ schemes for competition 
have typically each been considered in isolation and even posed as rivals in the 
literature, the present work has introduced the alternative possibility of 
complementarity between input‑dependent and state‑dependent forms of 
competition.  Their synthesis with free parameters for these two levels of 
competition within a novel hierarchical architecture further distinguishes the SSCA 
model from the original LCA model, which was instead proposed with the simplest 
divisive (Usher & McClelland, 2001) or subtractive (Usher & McClelland, 2004) 
input transformations lacking parameterization (i.e., b = 0 and s = 0 or iv = 1, 
respectively).  The theoretical interpretation of these rigid transformations was 
limited to input normalization (or relative coding) alone as opposed to feedforward 
inhibition.  However, although the more fine‑grained distinction between lateral and 
feedforward inhibition may not substantially impact behavioral model predictions at 
this level of abstraction, this distinction will nonetheless prove relevant for 
separately identifying value signals and decision‑making signals in the brain, 
where putative roles of different inhibitory mechanisms can be tested for directly.  
This nonparametric divisive normalization also has been put forth in part to 
eliminate the aforementioned scaling problem and reduce the number of free 
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parameters, but that solution is less plausible than the one proposed herein.  The 
present results instead suggest the need for the flexibility of parameterized 
input‑dependent competition in a descriptive model even when including 
state‑dependent competition despite the cost of the added complexity.  For 
example, the speedup effect of the sum of values on RT is missed with 
nonparametric subtraction, and with nonparametric division this effect of sum is too 
strong relative to the effect of the difference between values even to the point of 
outweighing the latter, contrary to what is observed in behavior. 
 
Selective attentional modulation of value signals and in particular the asymmetry of 
its allocation in proportion to value was demonstrated to provide a viable account 
for the overweighting of greater values observed in choice data as discussed 
previously.  Although at first drawn to perceptually salient (Itti & Koch, 2001) or 
novel (Yang et al., 2009) stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), attention 
disproportionately amplifies value signals of greater magnitude as they are 
integrated into respective decision signals because more attention also tends to be 
allocated for more rewarding options—and particularly so in the final moments 
prior to making a decision when acquisition of necessary information approaches 
its saturation point (Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2006, 2007; Krajbich 
et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 2013; Manohar & Husain, 
2013).  Reflecting preferential looking (Fantz, 1961) and the mere‑exposure effect 
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(Zajonc, 1968) in parallel with information seeking, this cascade effect of gaze and 
attention more generally in response to motivational salience (Schultz, 2015) or 
incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) emerges as a positive‑feedback 
loop biasing decisions.  Of additional note is that these effects were even present 
as a reflection of covert shifting of the focus of visual attention in the absence of 
eye movements for the modeled data set. 
 
Whereas Stevens’s power law (Stevens, 1957) from psychophysics in the vein of a 
nonlinear transfer function could in principle accommodate the possibility of 
supralinear as well as sublinear input‑output relationships, such an interpretation is 
not merited here because the subjective perception of hedonic value constitutes a 
special case that is described by a sublinear function in accordance with Gossen’s 
law of diminishing marginal utility from classical economics (Bernoulli, 1738; 
Gossen, 1854).  Supralinear manifestations of Stevens’s power law in general may 
actually themselves be a manifestation of the “winner‑take‑all” attentional 
phenomenon in question to some extent because attention permeates even 
processes at levels of representation independent of overt motoric orienting.  
Moreover, ratings of subjective value were already explicitly mapped onto a linear 
scale here.  Linear rating scales are ubiquitous outside the laboratory and quite 
familiar for these human subjects, and such linearized subjective ratings have 
been shown to be linearly related (Liljeholm et al., 2013) to fully 
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incentive‑compatible (Hurwicz, 1972) measurements of one’s “willingness to pay” 
for an item with currency (Becker et al., 1964).  Thus, it may be the case that, over 
time, the positive‑feedback loop emerging from attentional modulation during 
comparison that is essentially averaged out in the present model can effectively 
override the initial scaling of subjective value as can be observed in independent 
evaluations of isolated stimuli. 
 
Emphasizing net effects, the static power‑law implementation of attention currently 
used in the SSCA model is only intended to suffice as the most parsimonious 
solution to the challenging problem posed by the role of attention, however.  At this 
early stage, forcing potentially impactful mechanistic assumptions about the 
precise nature of attentional processes would not be appropriate in consideration 
of the fact that they still remain poorly understood in the context of decision‑making 
processes.  Further investigation of the neural mechanisms underlying such 
attention and their temporal properties will be necessary.  For example, findings 
suggesting that attention improves signal‑to‑noise ratios not only via amplification 
of gain (Yantis & Serences, 2003; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004; Maunsell & Treue, 
2006; Lim et al., 2011; McGinty et al., 2016; Leong et al., 2017) but also via 
reduction of noise (Cohen & Maunsell, 2009) or converse suppression of 
unattended input (Kelly et al., 2006; Hopf et al., 2006) have important implications 
for modeling.  An enhancement of signal‑to‑noise ratio is consistent with evidence 
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that visual fixations at the beginning of a trial tend to be directed at stimuli from 
which information must be obtained in contrast to fixations toward the end of a trial 
that tend to be directed at more rewarding stimuli (Manohar & Husain, 2013) and 
thus asymmetrically drive the positive‑feedback loops formed across at least 
attentional and value‑encoding signals if not also decision‑making signals.  
Moreover, in addition to this more top‑down motivational salience, bottom‑up 
perceptual salience directly tied to physical characteristics has the potential to 
initially exert a stronger influence on the attraction of attention to particular stimuli 
under consideration (Itti & Koch, 2001), producing biases even in contexts where 
only hedonic value is relevant (Milosavljevic et al., 2012; Towal et al., 2013). 
 
For future investigation, the spatial focus of attention can be approximated with 
high temporal resolution by measuring the direction of eye gaze as it shifts within a 
trial as part of eye‑tracking studies.  Along with neurophysiological measurements, 
eye tracking will prove fruitful for this line of research because it can be used to 
empirically test more complex models with an aim to describe not only how 
attention and visual fixation shapes decision‑making processes (Krajbich et al., 
2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) but also how eye movements are generated 
as part of this (Towal et al., 2013).  That is, attentional processes themselves can 
be modeled beyond their net effects as yet another dynamical system embedded 
within this framework.  On the other hand, the scope of the present work as an 
   
88 
 
initial step is structured so as to demonstrate in a generalizable manner the 
effectiveness of these neurally inspired tools even when only choice and RT data 
are available, which is typically the case for empirical computational studies of this 
nature. 
 
Finally, as the SSCA model aims to an extent for a descriptive and neurally 
plausible account, it forgoes the simplification of ballistic accumulation—that is, 
deterministic accumulation in the absence of within‑trial noise—which has been 
proposed for tractability and easier fitting of empirical data (Grice, 1972; Reddi & 
Carpenter, 2000; Reeves et al., 2005; Brown & Heathcote, 2005, 2008).  Although 
ballistic accumulation does offer practical advantages, this feature would 
fundamentally alter the chaotic and nonlinear dynamics of the model, resulting in 
overly rigid “winner‑take‑all” attractor effects.  The same is true of the model’s 
psychological interpretation inasmuch as the algorithm would no longer 
correspond to a sequential‑sampling process, which is necessarily stochastic.  The 
intrinsic stochasticity of biology strongly supports the notion of decision making as 
sequential sampling rather than ballistic accumulation, however. 
 
Levels of analysis in computational modeling 
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Opting for yet more detail than connectionist models such as the SSCA model, 
biophysical models such as that of Wang (2002) can grow substantially more 
complex but nonetheless preserve the fundamental structure proposed herein.  As 
a testament to this high‑level similarity, the schematic of the mean‑field reduction 
of the biophysical model (Wong & Wang, 2006; Wong et al., 2007) generally aligns 
with that of the CA model depicted in Figure 2c (Bogacz et al., 2006).  Reducing a 
population of neurons with correlated dynamics to a collective unit has indeed 
been shown to be a valid simplification (Ganguli et al., 2008; Zandbelt et al., 2014).  
The SSCA model and certain variants of the LCA model potentially provide a more 
parsimonious account for certain empirical findings that this biophysical model has 
been put forth to explain, including the prominent effects of the sum of values and 
the difference in values on RT and aggregate neural activity (Hunt et al., 2012), the 
relationship between the balance of neural excitation and inhibition and the 
speed‑accuracy tradeoff (Jocham et al., 2012), and a positive correlation between 
the bias in favor of choosing alternatives with greatest value and the values of 
alternatives with least value when more than two are under consideration (Chau et 
al., 2014).  Nevertheless, there is no “correct” degree of abstraction for modeling 
phenomena of the brain and mind; models at levels of analysis even as seemingly 
disparate as biophysics and cognition should be regarded as complementary and 
ultimately linkable rather than in rivalry (Frank, 2015). 
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In contrast with such biophysical models, the relative strength of the 
low‑dimensional SSCA model is endowed by its parsimony, interpretability, and 
generalizability.  Tests of data from an independent hold‑out sample verified that 
overfitting was not of concern for the SSCA model, which is a critical feature.  
Aside from the obvious advantage of mitigated computational demands, low 
dimensionality is especially relevant for situations in which a model must be fitted 
to multiple data sets while remaining valid and meaningful for comparison across 
data sets and with alternative models.  Generalization across experimental settings 
with varied tasks and temporal properties warrants freedom in the assignment of 
tuning parameters, which the biophysical model lacks in the ambiguity surrounding 
its degrees of freedom.  That is, the parameters of the biophysical model are fixed 
by default and necessarily derived from past experimental measurements made in 
particular parts of the brain in a single species while engaged in a single task—for 
example, lateral intraparietal cortex (i.e., “area LIP”) in a rhesus macaque while 
performing a random‑dot‑motion task with saccades (Wang, 2002).  However, 
considering that the predictions of more complex models correspondingly depend 
even more heavily on their parameter assignments as well as the parameters of 
the task, a valid model comparison requires that all relevant parameters of any 
model under consideration be optimized for the training data in order to ascertain 
each candidate’s true potential. 
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The models in this study are nested within a common neural‑network framework 
and distinguished by isolated key features for the sake of commensurability.  
Comparing models that differ in complex ways can prove futile to the extent that 
interpreting the exact sources of unique predictions is limited by contamination 
from other sources.  Thus, any extensions of the SSCA model, which is 
minimalistic by design, should be constructed with one incremental change at a 
time and tested for qualitative more so than quantitative improvement at describing 
empirical data in order to justify every additional assumption and the ensuing 
obstacles posed by fitting and theoretical interpretation (Palminteri et al., 2017).  
Constraining models to be as simple and parsimonious as possible is 
advantageous for testing the consequences of incremental changes to enable 
concrete understanding of fundamental mechanisms.  Basic models should be 
augmented to make them more neurally plausible from a theoretical standpoint, 
but accounting for effects related to stimulus attributes in empirical data remains 
the foremost priority.  For instance, the race model is fully nested within the SNFI 
and CA models by assuming no competition with iv = 0 and id = 0, respectively, and 
effectively nested within the DNFI model if semisaturation is sufficiently greater 
than input magnitudes (i.e., s >> ΣxVx).  The NDD model, on the other hand, is only 
nested within the SNFI model with iv = 1.  The SNFI and CA models are in turn 
nested within the SCA model, whereas the DNFI and CA models are nested within 
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the DCA model.  The additional free parameters could be adequately justified only 
with a demonstration of objectively superior performance in fitting empirical data. 
 
This incremental “top‑down” approach to modeling based on measurable 
functional properties stands as a viable alternative to the massively parallel 
“bottom‑up” approach advocated in using biophysical models, which instead 
impose many strong but putatively biologically grounded assumptions at once to 
generate complex emergent phenomena.  Although undoubtedly more applicable 
at the single‑neuron level, the bottom‑up approach can be hampered by issues 
related to high dimensionality, lack of interpretability, the potential for impactful 
inappropriate assumptions, questionable generalizability, ambiguity in selection of 
tuning parameters, and the risk of overfitting if tuning parameters are introduced.  
In addition to the aspect of model complexity quantified with statistical criteria that 
reflect explicit degrees of freedom, there is an unquantifiable aspect implicit in the 
model’s ostensible physical implementation.  As a case in point, a neural 
implementation of a divisive transformation of input would entail stricter structural 
assumptions than a less complex subtractive transformation despite both types 
similarly being reducible to only one additional free parameter here.  If the 
juxtaposition of the state‑ and input‑dependent competition of the CA and SNFI or 
DNFI models, respectively, were transposed from the connectionist framework to a 
biophysical framework, compound interactions among the many elements of such 
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a detailed system, which are not completely understood and also highly dependent 
upon context and parameter assignments, would severely limit inference with 
regard to the mechanistic implications of any disparities. 
 
Even without a foray into the most elaborate biophysics, one could hypothesize a 
connectionist model still more neurally plausible than the SSCA model by 
incorporating elements as varied as increased connectivity with both excitatory and 
inhibitory feedback connections, value and execution signals with more complex 
dynamics than step functions (Simen, 2012), noise specific to distinct layers of 
neural ensembles or subprocesses, state‑dependent (e.g., mean‑scaled) sources 
of within‑trial noise (Tolhurst et al., 1983; Shadlen & Newsome, 1998; Ditterich, 
2010; Louie et al., 2013), and across‑trial variability as discussed earlier.  
However, selecting a model with so many features to relate to empirical data can 
quickly grow into an intractable problem in the presence of complex nonlinear 
interactions that prevent dissociating and fitting the relevant parameters so as to 
discern among the myriad of possible combinations.  Many degrees of freedom, 
reciprocal connections, the associated feedforward and feedback loops, and 
partially redundant mechanisms in a complex dynamical system can give rise to 
functional mimicry and thus overlapping predictions for output that further limit 
interpretability.  Furthermore, if parameter optimization is successful, the addition 
of any free parameter within reason is likely to at least marginally improve the 
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quantitative fit of a model merely by virtue of an added opportunity for nonlinearity.  
A challenge for future work thus arises in assigning priority to certain elements 
over others while it is impractical to simply include every element that can be 
theorized in a model.  Incremental augmentations of the model could then be 
achieved by deliberately controlled experiments that would yield testable 
predictions contingent on inclusion of a given element that in theory better 
emulates actual nervous systems at a more abstract computational level. 
 
Computational‑model‑based analysis of neurophysiological data 
 
One of the principal goals of computational cognitive neuroscience (Forstmann & 
Wagenmakers, 2015) is to formulate generative models that encompass brain, 
mind, and behavior together.  To this end, a hybrid SSM such as the SSCA model 
that has been honed to balance the demands of efficiency in modeling and 
representativeness of neurobiology can also cater to computational‑model‑based 
analysis for neurophysiological data (O’Doherty et al., 2007; Forstmann et al., 
2011).  That is, the SSCA model can ultimately be related to not only behavioral 
output but also neural activity such as blood‑oxygen‑level‑dependent (BOLD) 
signals from functional magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) with its high spatial 
resolution (e.g., Hare et al., 2011) or event‑related potentials from 
electroencephalography (EEG) with its high temporal resolution (e.g., Polanía et 
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al., 2014).  Attempts have been made to relate output of normative SSMs such as 
the race and drift‑diffusion models to neurophysiological data under the 
assumption of adequately representing the brain’s functional architecture, but the 
SSCA algorithm could be appreciably more effective in such endeavors with the 
benefit of greater neural plausibility, better fits of behavior, and nonlinear flexibility.  
For any given trial, this model can generate temporally precise predictions for 
aggregate neural activity from stimulus onset to the time of response as 
collectively determined by attributes of all stimuli, the subject’s choice, and the RT.  
Such comprehensiveness is critical and actually sets the approach proposed 
herein apart from previous neuroimaging studies’ attempts to identify 
decision‑making processes with computational models instead limited to some 
subset of that information available to describe the input and output of individual 
trials. 
 
In terms of accuracy and interpretability, this fully model‑based approach to 
localization of decision‑making processes in the brain has far more potential than 
conventional methods that instead often rely on a functional signature involving 
reduction of the information in each trial to the relative evidence between options 
as a proxy for normative difficulty.  These linear signatures generally take the form 
of either the absolute difference between the values of options or the signed 
difference between chosen and nonchosen values, but the latter formulation 
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cannot even be reconciled with speedup effects of RT and concomitant negative 
effects on cumulative neural activity as a function of the absolute difference for 
incorrect as well as correct choices.  Although the RT is potentially a superior 
alternative for its direct reflection of actual behavior rather than parameters of 
stimuli, it is nonetheless also insufficient as an independent variable for the brain 
not only because of omission of information about choices and inputs but also 
because of further nonlinearity in the relationship between RT and the underlying 
neural dynamics that can be simulated on a trialwise basis. 
 
For each condition under which they are engaged, neural decision‑making 
processes should exhibit correlation between observed signals and the simulated 
signals of the SSCA model to the extent that these simulations would be derived 
from a theoretically sound and neurally plausible model empirically proven to fit 
well.  Decision‑making processes can thus be identified selectively among all 
processes active in the brain during a given task, including but not limited to the 
value‑encoding and action‑execution processes also within the scope of the 
model.  Specificity or lack thereof to experimentally manipulated conditions can 
then be determined.  This methodology enables principled “forward inference” 
across various conditions of interest by revealing qualitative dissociations in 
recruitment of particular brain areas during decision making (Henson, 2006; 
Mather et al., 2013).  The precision afforded by a comprehensive yet tractable 
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account of both the brain and behavior in terms of explicit computations and 
algorithms will prove pivotal in achieving a complete mechanistic understanding of 
decision making across diverse settings.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Task.  (a) For all studies, subjects were required to make a 
two‑alternative forced choice between a pair of randomly sampled foods with 
uncorrelated subjective values.  The original data set to which the forthcoming 
computational models were fitted was distinguished by a paradigm with adjacent 
stimuli and persistent fixation, allowing for only covert shifting of the focus of visual 
attention.  (b) In contrast, the other studies included in the meta‑analysis featured 
stimuli that were well separated spatially and thus required eye movements.  
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Data set Sub. Trials Val. Details 
J. Colas 1 (JC1) 31 21,394 4 fixation, 3 cond. (actions), EEG 
J. Colas 2 (JC2) 27 9,174 4 3 cond. (actions), fMRI 
C. Hutcherson (CH) 34 1,632 5 mouse, control condition only 
I. Krajbich, 2010 (IK) 39 3,791 11  
S. Lim (SL) 24 8,549 7 2 cond. (approach/avoid), fMRI 
Colas & J. Lu, 2017 (JL) 35 13,992 5 4 cond. (spatial bias) 
N. Sullivan, 2015 (NS) 28 5,560 5 mouse, health‑conscious 
Aggregate 218* 64,092   
 
Table 2.1.  Meta‑analysis: Data sets.  Listed for each of the studies included in 
the meta‑analysis are the number of subjects, the number of trials across subjects, 
the number of discrete option values that were to be normalized to a common 
range prior to analysis, and miscellaneous notable details.  *This total does not 
account for subjects who participated in more than one study.  
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Figure 2.2.  Dynamical models of neural decision making.  (a) The race model 
(LaBerge, 1962; Raab, 1962; Vickers, 1970; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) is the most 
basic of these by virtue of assuming that the representations of each option are 
completely independent.  (b) Input‑dependent competition is the signature feature 
common to the subtractive normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (SNFI) model 
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(Ditterich et al., 2003; Mazurek et al., 2003), the divisive 
normalization‑or‑feedforward‑inhibition (DNFI) model (Heeger, 1992; Louie et al., 
2011, 2013; Carandini & Heeger, 2012), and the neural drift‑diffusion (NDD) model 
(Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Wagenmakers et al., 2007).  The NDD 
model is nested within the SNFI model but instead posits perfect competition (i.e., 
iv = 1).  (c) The competing‑accumulator (CA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 
2004) is instead characterized by state‑dependent competition via lateral inhibition 
at the level of accumulating decision signals.  (d) The subtractive 
competing‑accumulator (SCA) and divisive competing‑accumulator (DCA) models 
take a novel approach of including both input‑dependent competition and 
state‑dependent competition in tandem.  Solid green and dashed red arrows 
indicate excitatory and inhibitory connections, respectively.  At the level of value 
signals, the leftmost vertical and diagonal dashed red arrows denote lateral 
inhibition (i.e., input normalization or relative coding) and feedforward inhibition, 
respectively, which are represented collectively here because in this context they 
are equivalent in terms of output.  The gray clouds reflect independent sources of 
noise.  Vertical gray bars symbolize thresholding mechanisms.  vx represents the 
ensemble of value‑encoding neurons representing alternative x.  dx represents the 
corresponding ensemble of decision‑making neurons.  ex represents the 
corresponding ensemble of execution neurons.  The free parameters are b for 
baseline input, g for the gain of value‑signal inputs, σ for noise, iv for value‑signal 
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inhibition as part of a subtractive transformation, s for semisaturation as part of a 
divisive transformation, and id for decision‑signal inhibition.  
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Figure 2.3.  The supralinear subtractive competing‑accumulator (SSCA) 
model.  The SSCA model builds upon the SCA model with the intention of 
approximating the net effects of the addition of an attentional module that 
selectively modulates value signals.  The positive‑feedback loops that are 
consequently formed generate disproportionate amplification of value signals that 
are already greater in magnitude, thus promoting “winner‑take‑all” processing 
(Shimojo et al., 2003).  This schematic only depicts a positive‑feedback loop at the 
level of value signals to adhere more closely to the parsimonious implementation 
used here with a static supralinear power law requiring only one free parameter, a.  
However, also plausible are loops at the next level bridging decision‑making 
signals and attentional processes either with or without intermediate value signals.  
The contrast between solid and dotted green lines symbolizes the asymmetry in 
the positive‑feedback loop’s impact on each alternative’s representation.  As time 
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progresses, there is an increasingly higher probability of attention being directed at 
the alternative with greater value, which is denoted by the G subscript, rather than 
the alternative with lesser value, which is denoted by the L subscript. 
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Model df 
Baseline (b) 
Gain (g) 
Noise (σ) 
Input‑dependent 
competition 
(iv or s or iv=1) 
State‑dependent 
competition 
(id) 
Power law 
as attention 
(a) 
Race 3 Free Absent Absent Absent 
NDD 3 Free Fixed / Subtractive (1) Absent Absent 
SNFI 4 Free Free / Subtractive (iv) Absent Absent 
DNFI 4 Free Free / Divisive (s) Absent Absent 
CA 4 Free Absent Free Absent 
SCA 5 Free Free / Subtractive (iv) Free Absent 
DCA 5 Free Free / Divisive (s) Free Absent 
SSCA 6 Free Free / Subtractive (iv) Free Free 
 
Table 2.2.  Model parameters.  All of the candidate models share three free 
parameters that correspond to baseline input (b), gain (g), and noise (σ), but the 
former two take on a different form in the divisive models.  The SNFI and DNFI 
models introduce an additional free parameter for subtractive (iv) or divisive (s) 
input‑dependent competition, respectively.  Nested within the SNFI model is the 
NDD model for iv = 1.  The CA model instead introduces a free parameter for 
state‑dependent competition (id).  The SCA and DCA models combine the CA 
model with the SNFI and DNFI models, respectively.  The SSCA model adds a 
sixth free parameter (a) for a static supralinear power law approximating 
attentional modulation.  The models are listed in ascending order of complexity.  
Divisive models are recognized as being inherently more complex than their 
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subtractive counterparts irrespectively of degrees of freedom.  Additionally, 
state‑dependent competition is recognized as being inherently more complex than 
input‑dependent competition.  “df” stands for degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 2.4.  Model comparison.  (a) The global fitting performance of each 
candidate model is first shown for the training data set.  The χ2 statistic 
corresponds to raw lack of fit, but two levels of adjustment for model complexity 
are also provided in the form of the corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc) 
and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  (b) A test data set of equal size was 
reserved for out‑of‑sample validation.  The saturated model revealed the best 
out‑of‑sample performance possible with maximal degrees of freedom.  Degrees 
of freedom are listed in parentheses.  
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Model b g σ iv s id a χ2Training χ2Test 
SSCA 1.434 0.085 2.265 0.465 ‑ 0.0180 1.373 153.26 186.84 
SCA 1.195 0.187 2.665 0.470 ‑ 0.0154 ‑ 189.50 227.41 
DCA 3.073 5.117 2.571 ‑ 13.80 0.0174 ‑ 240.03 295.48 
CA 1.219 0.233 1.933 ‑ ‑ 0.0252 ‑ 278.85 296.49 
SNFI 0.614 0.225 3.968 0.733 ‑ ‑ ‑ 322.65 354.44 
DNFI 0.109 2.212 3.970 ‑ 1.697 ‑ ‑ 422.12 461.82 
NDD 0.761 0.185 3.803 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 437.77 501.84 
Race 0.336 0.233 3.569 ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ 1257.36 1255.40 
Saturated        0.10 87.91 
Null        26,606 26,165 
 
Table 2.3.  Fitted parameters.  The best‑fitting sets of parameters for each 
computational model are listed along with χ2 statistics.  b corresponds to baseline 
input, g is gain, σ is noise, iv is value‑signal inhibition, s is semisaturation, id is 
decision‑signal inhibition, and a is the exponent representing attentional 
modulation.  The null and saturated models provided extreme lower and upper 
benchmarks for fitting performance, respectively.  As will be the convention for all 
tables and figures hereafter, the models are listed in descending order of 
performance.  
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Figure 2.5.  Choice accuracy.  (a) Choice accuracy (i.e., the probability of 
correctly choosing the option with greater value) as a function of both values is 
displayed first for the empirical data set.  Only the probabilities of correct choices 
are provided in the upper‑left corners of each panel to avoid redundancy.  (b) 
Accuracy is likewise shown for data sets simulated with each of the computational 
models in the first and third rows.  Differences between model predictions and 
observed results are highlighted in the second and fourth rows.  (c) The 
differences between chosen and nonchosen values and their sums are provided 
for reference.  
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Data set Trials Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
JC1 15,600 ‑0.263* (0.075) 
3.517* 
(0.121) > 
‑3.038* 
(0.124) 
3.278* 
(0.112) > 
0.239* 
(0.051) 
JC2 6,868 ‑0.238 (0.126) 
3.831* 
(0.199) > 
‑3.031* 
(0.206) 
3.431* 
(0.183) > 
0.400* 
(0.087) 
CH 1,128 0.778* (0.334) 
3.211* 
(0.599) n.s. 
‑3.526* 
(0.525) 
3.368* 
(0.532) > 
‑0.158 
(0.185) 
IK 3,266 0.222* (0.105) 
4.349* 
(0.364) n.s. 
‑4.154* 
(0.396) 
4.251* 
(0.367) > 
0.097 
(0.102) 
SL 6,707 0.537* (0.123) 
4.052* 
(0.270) n.s. 
‑3.650* 
(0.280) 
3.851* 
(0.260) > 
0.201* 
(0.089) 
JL 13,992 0.000 (0.107) 
4.768* 
(0.202) > 
‑3.881* 
(0.196) 
4.325* 
(0.186) > 
0.444* 
(0.071) 
NS 3,663 ‑0.158 (0.152) 
3.774* 
(0.287) n.s. 
‑3.236* 
(0.270) 
3.505* 
(0.269) > 
0.269* 
(0.096) 
Aggregate 51,224 ‑0.022 (0.110) 
4.036* 
(0.193) > 
‑3.444* 
(0.154) 
3.740* 
(0.168) > 
0.296* 
(0.049) 
Model  Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
SSCA  ‑0.325* (0.025) 
3.319* 
(0.042) > 
‑2.890* 
(0.043) 
3.104* 
(0.039) > 
0.214* 
(0.016) 
SCA  ‑0.035 (0.026) 
3.229* 
(0.045) < 
‑3.373* 
(0.045) 
3.301* 
(0.042) > 
‑0.072* 
(0.016) 
DCA  0.172* (0.026) 
2.990* 
(0.045) < 
‑3.485* 
(0.044) 
3.237* 
(0.042) > 
‑0.248* 
(0.016) 
CA  ‑0.084* (0.025) 
2.955* 
(0.041) n.s.  
‑3.005* 
(0.041) 
2.980* 
(0.038) > 
‑0.025 
(0.016) 
SNFI  ‑0.052* (0.027) 
3.415* 
(0.047) < 
‑3.514* 
(0.047) 
3.465* 
(0.044) > 
‑0.050* 
(0.016) 
DNFI  0.582* (0.025) 
2.096* 
(0.040) < 
‑3.211* 
(0.039) 
2.653* 
(0.036) > 
‑0.558* 
(0.016) 
NDD  ‑0.053* (0.026) 
3.331* 
(0.046) n.s. 
‑3.357* 
(0.046) 
3.344* 
(0.043) > 
‑0.013 
(0.016) 
Race  0.127* (0.022) 
1.944* 
(0.034) < 
‑2.252* 
(0.034) 
2.098* 
(0.031) > 
‑0.154* 
(0.015) 
 
   
111 
 
Table 2.4.  Meta‑analysis: Choice accuracy.  Listed for each data set and each 
computational model fitted to the original JC1 data set are parameter estimates 
from complementary logistic‑regression models of the probability of correctly 
choosing the option with greater value.  The first regression model included the 
individual greater and lesser values as regressors, whereas the second substituted 
the absolute difference between values (“Differ.”) as well as their sum.  Standard 
errors of the means are provided in parentheses.  Boldface and an asterisk 
indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  Contrasts between absolute values of 
effects (“|| vs ||” meaning “absolute value versus absolute value”) are reported with 
a greater‑than sign denoting a greater absolute effect to the left (p < 0.05), a 
less‑than sign denoting a greater absolute effect to the right (p < 0.05), and “n.s.” 
(i.e., “not significant”) denoting failure to reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the absolute values of the effects (p > 0.05).  These conventions apply to 
all tables hereafter.  
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Figure 2.6.  Reaction time.  (a) Following the conventions of the previous figure, 
mean reaction time (RT) as a function of both values is displayed first for the 
empirical data set.  (b) RT is likewise shown for data sets simulated with each of 
the computational models in the first and third rows.  Differences between model 
predictions and observed results are highlighted in the second and fourth rows.  (c) 
The differences between chosen and nonchosen values and their sums are again 
provided for reference.  The upper‑left and lower‑right corners of each panel 
correspond to correct and incorrect choices, respectively, and the diagonal midline 
between them corresponds to indifferent choices.  
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Data set Trials Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
JC1 13,342 1.093 (0.010) 
‑0.260* 
(0.011) > 
0.066* 
(0.011) 
‑0.163* 
(0.009) > 
‑0.097* 
(0.007) 
JC2 6,122 1.594 (0.023) 
‑0.282* 
(0.017) > 
0.043* 
(0.017) 
‑0.163* 
(0.014) > 
‑0.120* 
(0.010) 
CH 998 1.668 (0.053) 
‑0.242* 
(0.043) > 
0.088* 
(0.036) 
‑0.165* 
(0.034) > 
‑0.077* 
(0.020) 
IK 2,562 2.638 (0.079) 
‑0.742* 
(0.081) n.s. 
0.646* 
(0.092) 
‑0.694* 
(0.082) > 
‑0.048 
(0.029) 
SL 6,036 1.480 (0.017) 
‑0.301* 
(0.017) > 
0.197* 
(0.018) 
‑0.249* 
(0.015) > 
‑0.052* 
(0.009) 
JL 12,696 1.668 (0.026) 
‑0.521* 
(0.022) > 
0.300* 
(0.020) 
‑0.410* 
(0.018) > 
‑0.111* 
(0.010) 
NS 3,041 2.344 (0.161) 
‑0.320* 
(0.098) > 
0.087 
(0.086) 
‑0.204* 
(0.080) n.s. 
‑0.116* 
(0.046) 
Aggregate 44,797 1.563 (0.159) 
‑0.374* 
(0.054) > 
0.182* 
(0.058) 
‑0.278* 
(0.055) > 
‑0.096* 
(0.009) 
Model  Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
SSCA  1.101 (0.003) 
‑0.306* 
(0.004) > 
0.146* 
(0.004) 
‑0.226* 
(0.004) > 
‑0.080* 
(0.002) 
SCA  1.095 (0.003) 
‑0.299* 
(0.004) >  
0.142* 
(0.004) 
‑0.220* 
(0.003) > 
‑0.079* 
(0.002) 
DCA  1.093 (0.003) 
‑0.300* 
(0.004) > 
0.169* 
(0.004) 
‑0.235* 
(0.004) > 
‑0.066* 
(0.002) 
CA  1.099 (0.004) 
‑0.303* 
(0.004) > 
0.133* 
(0.004) 
‑0.218* 
(0.004) > 
‑0.085* 
(0.002) 
SNFI  1.078 (0.003) 
‑0.278* 
(0.004) > 
0.157* 
(0.004) 
‑0.217* 
(0.003) > 
‑0.060* 
(0.002) 
DNFI  0.980 (0.003) 
‑0.221* 
(0.004) > 
0.101* 
(0.004) 
‑0.161* 
(0.003) > 
‑0.060* 
(0.002) 
NDD  1.009 (0.003) 
‑0.214* 
(0.004) n.s. 
0.212* 
(0.004) 
‑0.213* 
(0.004) > 
‑0.001 
(0.002) 
Race  1.202 (0.003) 
‑0.314* 
(0.003) > 
‑0.087* 
(0.003) 
‑0.114* 
(0.003) < 
‑0.201* 
(0.002) 
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Table 2.5.  Meta‑analysis: Reaction time for correct choices.  Listed for each 
data set and each computational model fitted to the original JC1 data set are 
parameter estimates from complementary linear‑regression models of RT in units 
of seconds for correct choices of the option with greater value that are analogous 
to the previous logistic‑regression models.  As in the tables hereafter, these four 
regression coefficients of interest were normalized with respect to their associated 
constant term.  Boldface and an asterisk indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Data set Trials Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
JC1 2,258 1.046 (0.024) 
‑0.111* 
(0.039) n.s. 
0.063 
(0.040) 
‑0.087* 
(0.036) n.s. 
‑0.024 
(0.016) 
JC2 746 1.559 (0.067) 
‑0.070 
(0.071) n.s. 
‑0.009 
(0.073) 
‑0.031 
(0.066) n.s. 
‑0.040 
(0.030) 
CH 130 2.000 (0.196) 
‑0.153 
(0.181) n.s. 
‑0.109 
(0.164) 
‑0.022 
(0.164) n.s. 
‑0.131* 
(0.055) 
IK 704 2.448 (0.158) 
0.023 
(0.224) n.s. 
0.169 
(0.251) 
‑0.073 
(0.228) n.s. 
0.096 
(0.068) 
SL 671 1.498 (0.051) 
‑0.329* 
(0.072) n.s. 
0.394* 
(0.074) 
‑0.361* 
(0.068) > 
0.032 
(0.026) 
JL 1,296 1.680 (0.097) 
‑0.421* 
(0.111) n.s. 
0.432* 
(0.105) 
‑0.426* 
(0.101) > 
0.006 
(0.038) 
NS 622 2.808 (0.202) 
‑0.543* 
(0.142) > 
0.185 
(0.131) 
‑0.364* 
(0.130) n.s. 
‑0.179* 
(0.044) 
Aggregate 6,427 1.624 (0.218) 
‑0.220* 
(0.069) n.s. 
0.184* 
(0.064) 
‑0.201* 
(0.061) > 
‑0.018 
(0.026) 
Model  Constant Greater || vs || Lesser Differ. || vs || Sum 
SSCA  1.094 (0.007) 
‑0.114* 
(0.012) > 
‑0.036* 
(0.012) 
‑0.039* 
(0.011) < 
‑0.075* 
(0.004) 
SCA  1.130 (0.008) 
‑0.162* 
(0.012) >  
‑0.025* 
(0.012) 
‑0.068* 
(0.012) < 
‑0.093* 
(0.004) 
DCA  1.147 (0.008) 
‑0.159* 
(0.013) > 
‑0.032* 
(0.013) 
‑0.063* 
(0.012) < 
‑0.095* 
(0.004) 
CA  1.164 (0.008) 
‑0.084* 
(0.012) < 
‑0.168* 
(0.012) 
0.042* 
(0.011) < 
‑0.126* 
(0.004) 
SNFI  1.073 (0.007) 
‑0.196* 
(0.013) > 
0.074* 
(0.013) 
‑0.135* 
(0.012) > 
‑0.061* 
(0.004) 
DNFI  0.998 (0.006) 
‑0.156* 
(0.009) > 
0.007 
(0.009) 
‑0.082* 
(0.009) n.s. 
‑0.074* 
(0.003) 
NDD  1.012 (0.007) 
‑0.149* 
(0.013) n.s. 
0.154* 
(0.013) 
‑0.152* 
(0.012) > 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Race  1.211 (0.005) 
‑0.262* 
(0.006) > 
‑0.150* 
(0.006) 
‑0.056* 
(0.006) < 
‑0.206* 
(0.003) 
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Table 2.6.  Meta‑analysis: Reaction time for incorrect choices.  Listed for each 
data set and each computational model fitted to the original JC1 data set are 
parameter estimates from complementary linear‑regression models of RT for 
incorrect choices of the option with lesser value.  Boldface and an asterisk indicate 
statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Data set Trials Constant Sum 
JC1 5,794 1.040 (0.007) 
‑0.069* 
(0.006) 
JC2 2,306 1.543 (0.018) 
‑0.089* 
(0.010) 
CH 504 1.671 (0.053) 
‑0.061* 
(0.023) 
IK 525 2.543 (0.133) 
0.006 
(0.069) 
SL 1,842 1.549 (0.023) 
‑0.052* 
(0.013) 
NS 1,897 2.016 (0.086) 
‑0.089* 
(0.035) 
Aggregate 12,868 1.433 (0.171) 
‑0.070* 
(0.008) 
Model  Constant Sum 
SSCA  1.058 (0.002) 
‑0.078* 
(0.002) 
SCA  1.089  (0.002) 
‑0.096* 
(0.002) 
DCA  1.107  (0.002) 
‑0.097* 
(0.002) 
CA  1.106 (0.002) 
‑0.107* 
(0.002) 
SNFI  1.048 (0.002) 
‑0.073* 
(0.002) 
DNFI  1.032 (0.002) 
‑0.110* 
(0.001) 
NDD  0.972 (0.002) 
‑0.001 
(0.002) 
Race  1.228 (0.002) 
‑0.220* 
(0.001) 
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Table 2.7.  Meta‑analysis: Reaction time for indifferent choices.  Listed for 
each data set and each computational model fitted to the original JC1 data set are 
parameter estimates from a linear‑regression model of RT as a function of the sum 
of values for indifferent choices between options of equal value.  The JL data set is 
not listed here because it does not include indifferent choices.  Boldface and an 
asterisk indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 2.7.  Reaction‑time distributions.  RT distributions for each combination 
of chosen (“C”) and nonchosen (“N”) values are displayed with 100‑ms bins for the 
empirical data set (bars) and the data set generated by the preferred SSCA model 
(lines).  
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Data set 
Accuracy 
Reaction time 
Correct Incorrect Indif. 
G v L D v S G v L D v S G v L D v S S 
JC1 (21) + > ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ ns ns ‑ ns ns ‑ 
JC2 (9) + > ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ns ns ns ns ns ns ‑ 
CH (2) + ns ‑ + > ns ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ns ns ns ns ns ‑ ‑ 
IK (4) + ns ‑ + > ns ‑ ns + ‑ > ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
SL (9) + ns ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ ns + ‑ > ns ‑ 
JL (14) + > ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ ns + ‑ > ns N/A 
NS (6) + ns ‑ + > + ‑ > ns ‑ ns ‑ ‑ > ns ‑ ns ‑ ‑ 
Aggregate + > ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ ns + ‑ > ns ‑ 
Model G v L D v S G v L D v S G v L D v S S 
SSCA + > ‑ + > + ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ ‑ 
SCA + < ‑ + > ‑ ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ ‑ 
DCA + < ‑ + > ‑ ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ ‑ 
CA + ns ‑ + > ns ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ + < ‑ ‑ 
SNFI + < ‑ + > ‑ ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ 
DNFI + < ‑ + > ‑ ‑ > + ‑ > ‑ ‑ > ns ‑ ns ‑ ‑ 
NDD + = ‑ + > 0 ‑ = + ‑ > 0 ‑ = + ‑ > 0 0 
Race + < ‑ + > ‑ ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ ‑ > ‑ ‑ < ‑ ‑ 
 
Table 2.8.  Meta‑analysis: Qualitative summary.  This summary reduces the 
previous four tables to only qualitative assessments of effects on the basis of 
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statistical significance (p < 0.05) or lack thereof (p > 0.05).  Plus signs denote 
significantly positive effects, whereas minus signs denote significantly negative 
effects.  The NDD model is sufficiently rigid for the null hypothesis to actually be 
accepted with significance for any effects independent of the difference between 
values.  Approximate trial counts in units of thousands are listed in parentheses for 
each data set.  “G”, “L”, “D”, “S”, and “v” correspond to the headers in previous 
tables for “Greater”, “Lesser”, “Difference”, “Sum”, and “versus”, respectively.  
“N/A” stands for “not applicable.” 
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C h a p t e r  3  
Learning where to look for high value improves decision making 
asymmetrically 
Jaron T. Colas & Joy Lu 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Decision making in any brain is imperfect and costly in terms of time and energy.  
Operating under such constraints, an organism could be in a position to improve 
performance if an opportunity arose to exploit informative patterns in the 
environment being searched.  Such an improvement of performance could entail 
both faster and more accurate (i.e., reward‑maximizing) decisions.  The present 
study investigated the extent to which human participants could learn to take 
advantage of immediate patterns in the spatial arrangement of serially presented 
foods such that a region of space would consistently be associated with greater 
subjective value.  Eye movements leading up to choices demonstrated rapidly 
induced biases in the selective allocation of visual fixation and attention that were 
accompanied by both faster and more accurate choices of desired goods as 
implicit learning occurred.  However, for the control condition with its spatially 
balanced reward environment, these subjects exhibited preexisting lateralized 
biases for eye and hand movements (i.e., leftward and rightward, respectively) that 
could act in opposition not only to each other but also to the orienting biases 
elicited by the experimental manipulation, producing an asymmetry between the 
left and right hemifields with respect to performance.  Potentially owing at least in 
part to learned cultural conventions (e.g., reading from left to right), the findings 
herein particularly revealed an intrinsic leftward bias underlying initial saccades in 
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the midst of more immediate feedback‑directed processes for which spatial biases 
can be learned flexibly to optimize oculomotor and manual control in value‑based 
decision making.  The present study thus replicates general findings of learned 
attentional biases in a novel context with inherently rewarding stimuli and goes on 
to further elucidate the interactions between endogenous and exogenous biases.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Regardless of whether the task is foraging in the wild or shopping in a modern 
store, there is often consistency in the spatial layout of one’s surroundings that 
could potentially be of use to the individual making decisions.  Decision making is 
an active process that also entails searching for options and assessing what is 
actually available in order to compare the alternatives and select the best course of 
action.  As this searching can demand precious time and effort, an organism’s 
optimal strategy in a stable environment would be to adjust the priors (i.e., in the 
Bayesian sense) initializing the information‑seeking process in accordance with the 
patterned information content of previous observations.  The work herein explored 
the possibility of such a strategy in visually guided (but manually executed) 
value‑based decision making (Fig. 1a), a typical setting in which the direction of 
one’s gaze functions as a proxy for the focus of selective attention.  For visually 
minded animals such as humans, oculomotor control is especially representative 
of a directed sampling process that is driven by gains in information as well as 
gains in value—that is, minimization of uncertainty and maximization of reward, 
respectively (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Tatler et al., 2011; Gottlieb, 2012; Gottlieb et 
al., 2014). 
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In a similar vein but within the domain of perceptual decision making, prior studies 
in psychophysics have reported learned biases of visuospatial attention in 
response to consistencies in the presentation of simple target stimuli that have 
been rewarded (e.g., Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Liston & Stone, 2008; 
Hickey et al., 2010b, 2011; Krebs et al., 2010; Kristjánsson et al., 2010; Anderson 
et al., 2011a, 2011b; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2014; for 
review see Awh et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Anderson, 2016; Bourgeois et 
al., 2016).  Furthermore, this line of research has begun to shed light on 
neurophysiological manifestations of such biases as yet further evidence (e.g., 
Kawagoe et al., 1998; Ikeda & Hikosaka, 2003; Hikosaka et al., 2006; Peck et al., 
2009; Hickey et al., 2010a; Krebs et al., 2011; Yasuda et al., 2012; Kim & 
Hikosaka, 2013).  With priming observed across various perceptual‑discrimination 
tasks, task‑relevant stimuli newly imbued with value elicit faster and more correct 
behavior.  On the other hand, irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated 
with reward can still capture attention in extinction so as to instead interfere with 
performance in volatile environments when learned information is no longer 
applicable (Rutherford et al., 2010; Le Pelley et al., 2015; MacLean et al., 2016; 
Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017).  This contrast illustrates how heterogeneous factors—
whether internal or external and whether past or present—can be intertwined in 
proximal subdecisions about the deployment of attention (e.g., deciding where to 
look next), such that the traditional dichotomy of bottom‑up and top‑down (i.e., 
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salience‑driven and goal‑directed, respectively) processes in attention can be 
blurred (Awh et al., 2012; Krauzlis et al., 2014).  Yet, the scope of research on 
interactions between associative learning and attentional biases has heretofore 
been limited to perceptual decisions grounded in objective sensory features of 
stimuli rather than their subjective likeability. 
 
The present study introduces a paradigm involving value‑based decisions about 
complex stimuli (i.e., foods) that were made while eye movements were monitored 
in a structured setting more reminiscent of foraging or a modern analog such as 
shopping.  Ecological relevance aside, the task stands apart in that one would only 
implicitly learn where to seek out the most valuable stimuli without having to learn 
which stimuli are valuable to begin with because a given food’s value is 
determined internally and subjectively.  Of further interest is how inducing a spatial 
bias of attention would play out when robust biases are already present 
endogenously, as has been documented for tasks of this variety (Krajbich et al., 
2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011).  Presumably due to some 
combination of not only innate biases (Vallortigara, 2006; Rugani et al., 2010; 
Frasnelli et al., 2012) but also deeply ingrained cultural conventions (e.g., reading 
from left to right) (Chokron & Imbert, 1993; Chokron & De Agostini, 1995; Chokron 
et al., 1998) that involve learning over much longer temporal scales, human 
subjects from our Westernized American population exhibit a striking 
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predisposition to first examine the left side of a symmetric display.  Thus, a key 
aspect of this experiment was that the manipulation attempted to bias the observer 
in either direction with repeated exposure to relatively more valuable goods at a 
single location (Fig. 1b).  As such, this design allowed for dissociation of the 
endogenous and exogenous forces that coalesce into orienting and choice 
behavior.  Among the findings was a noteworthy asymmetry between learning to 
look to the left for high value and learning to look to the right for high value that 
also differentially affected the manually executed decisions.  
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METHODS 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty‑two (male:female = 16:16) of 35 volunteers between 18 and 35 years old 
from Caltech and the local community completed the study with proper acquisition 
of eye‑tracking data.  Criteria for participation included enjoying and regularly 
eating common American snack foods such as those used for the experiment.  
Participants provided informed written consent for a protocol approved by the 
California Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board.  Participants were 
paid $20 for completing the study in addition to receiving chosen foods. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
The subject first completed an ancillary rating task.  Images of 100 generally 
appetitive snack foods were presented against a black background one at a time.  
For each trial, the subject was given unlimited time to rate the desirability of eating 
a given food at the end of the experiment according to a 5‑point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly dislike” (1) to “strongly like” (5).  The response was 
delivered by pressing the key corresponding to the selected number on a 
keyboard.  These chromatic images had a resolution of 576 x 432 pixels and each 
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subtended 25° x 19° of visual angle.  The scale was displayed for reference above 
the food as black Arabic numerals on gray button icons below white text 
descriptors—altogether subtending 25° x 4°.  The selected rating was highlighted 
on the scale with a white rectangle for 500 ms of feedback following the response.  
Trials were separated by an intertrial interval of 500 ms, during which only a white 
fixation cross was displayed centrally.  The order of presentation was randomized 
for each subject.  Stimuli were presented on a 15‑inch LCD monitor with a 
resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels at a distance of 38 cm as part of an interface 
programmed using MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
 
A schematic of the two‑alternative forced‑choice (2AFC) task is shown in Figure 
1a.  The same images of foods were instead presented in pairs while the subject’s 
eye movements were recorded.  Positions of both eyes were acquired at 50 Hz 
and converted to Cartesian coordinates for the screen in real time using a Tobii 
x50 desktop‑mounted eye‑tracking system.  Trials were only initiated once the eye 
tracker’s algorithm verified during the intertrial interval that the subject’s direction of 
gaze had been stabilized for at least 500 ms on a white fixation cross subtending 
0.8° x 0.8° at the center of the display.  Upon removal of the fixation cross, the two 
stimuli were centered at eccentricities 15° to the left and right of the fixation point 
such that only one could be foveated at any given instant.  The subject was given 
unlimited time to make a binary choice indicating which of the foods would be 
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preferable to eat at the end of the experiment.  The response was delivered by 
pressing one of two keys with either the left or the right index finger.  The images 
were scaled down to 250 x 200 pixels and delineated by white rectangles each 
subtending 11° x 9°. 
 
The pairings and their order were randomized for each subject with two 
constraints—the first being that absolute differences in subjective value were 
uniformly distributed across the set {1, 2, 3} according to each individual’s ratings; 
these were to correspond to high, medium, and low difficulty levels, respectively.  
The lowest difficulty level of 4 was excluded to limit redundancy.  A second 
constraint related to the key experimental manipulation in this 2AFC task, which 
was divided into “biased” and “unbiased” blocks of 200 trials each.  During the 
unbiased block, the stimulus with greater value was presented to either visual 
hemifield with equal probability.  While the subject was not instructed about the 
possibility of such a manipulation, the biased block was instead characterized by 
the skewed appearance of greater value in either the left or the right hemifield for 
90% of trials.  According to a 2 x 2 between‑subjects factorial design (Fig. 1b), 
each subject was randomly assigned to one of four initial groups distinguished by 
the location where the bias was induced (i.e., leftward bias or rightward bias) and 
the counterbalanced ordering of the blocks (i.e., biased block before or after 
unbiased block). 
   
132 
 
 
The subject was required to refrain from eating or drinking anything except for 
water for at least 4 hours prior to the experiment.  The procedure was 
incentive‑compatible (Hurwicz, 1972) inasmuch as the hungry subject was 
informed that one of the choices made was to be selected randomly and 
implemented at the end of the session.  Upon completion, the subject was 
provided with this chosen food and required to remain within the laboratory for 15 
minutes or until all of the item had been consumed. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Prior to the main analysis, data were first concatenated into three between‑subject 
conditions (Fig. 1b)—namely, leftward bias, rightward bias, and control.  Biased 
blocks were combined across the two ordinal positions, whereas unbiased blocks 
were only recognized as belonging to the control condition if they occurred first and 
thus could establish an uncontaminated baseline.  Unbiased blocks occurring 
second in the sequence were instead assigned to either the left‑extinction 
condition or the right‑extinction condition accordingly.  Point estimates were 
generally limited to the latter 100 trials of each 200‑trial block to assess effects 
after learning was shown to have occurred. 
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Eye‑position data were analyzed with a standard region‑of‑interest (ROI) 
approach.  Specifically, rectangular ROIs were first defined over the left and right 
stimulus locations, including symmetric extensions of 1° along each dimension to 
accommodate noisy data acquisition and microsaccades.  Coordinates for the 
subject’s gaze were averaged across parallel streams of data for the two eyes 
whenever feasible.  The onset of visual fixation was marked by the moment at 
which the subject’s direction of gaze first landed within either ROI.  Fixation was 
coded as terminated once the gaze fell outside of that ROI if the gaze 
subsequently landed on the contralateral ROI.  Fixation outside of either ROI both 
preceded and followed by fixation within a single ROI was coded as a single 
saccade to that ROI under the assumption that the intervening period merely 
reflected inevitable sources of data loss such as blinking. 
 
For each condition, two aspects of eye movements were assessed and compared 
with respect to either spatial location or hedonic value.  The former metric 
corresponded to the distribution of the first saccades at trial onset, whereas the 
latter corresponded to the differential allocation of dwell time across entire trials.  
Accompanying the mean across the latter half of a block in the presented results, 
centered moving averages were computed trialwise with a symmetric window of 21 
trials to depict the time course of learning.  The frequency of initial saccades to one 
side was compared with the chance level of 50% within each of the main learning 
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conditions using one‑tailed (or two‑tailed in the case of the control condition) 
one‑sample t tests, and these frequencies were compared between conditions 
using one‑tailed independent‑samples t tests.  However, it should be noted that the 
assumption of wholly independent samples was overly stringent when comparing 
bias and control conditions with overlapping sets of subjects.  In a similar vein, 
95% confidence intervals as always provided are two‑tailed in the interest of being 
conservative.  Omitting the redundant control condition, similar tests were 
conducted for the frequency of initial saccades to whichever side contained the 
stimulus with greater value; however, a two‑tailed test was used to compare the 
bias conditions.  Analogous tests were conducted for the proportion of time within 
a trial that gaze was directed at either a fixed side or the side featuring greater 
value.  It was only this very last set of tests that remained one‑tailed for the 
extinction conditions, whereas two‑tailed tests were employed otherwise in line 
with the more exploratory nature of these subsequent analyses. 
 
Accuracy, which reflects the frequency of congruent choices of the option with 
greater value, was compared with the chance level of 50% within each condition 
and within each of three classifications of difficulty using one‑tailed one‑sample t 
tests.  Additionally of interest for the learning conditions were tests against the 
baseline performance level of 90% that could be achieved by heuristically 
choosing the more frequent response rather than properly performing the 
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value‑based task.  Differences in accuracy between conditions were tested for 
using one‑tailed independent‑samples t tests for comparisons between bias and 
control conditions along with a two‑tailed test for comparing bias conditions.  Each 
subject’s median reaction time (RT) was calculated separately for left‑ and 
right‑option choices.  RTs for each side were compared between pooled conditions 
using one‑tailed independent‑samples t tests.  As a complementary analysis, 
differences in RT between left and right choices were tested for within each 
condition using one‑tailed (or two‑tailed in the case of the control condition) 
one‑sample t tests, and these differences were additionally compared between 
conditions using one‑tailed independent‑samples t tests.  
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RESULTS 
 
Learning: Eye movements 
 
As concerns eye movements, of primary interest were the options attended to first 
within each trial and the amount of time spent examining either option.  Crucially, 
effects of habitual spatial biases would be intertwined with effects of hedonic value, 
which was encapsulated by ratings of how likeable each food would be.  Analyses 
focused on the latter half of each block—after a point at which essential learning 
about the state of the environment was shown to have taken effect. 
 
Replicating previous reports of inherent leftward biases of visuospatial attention 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011), the 
frequency of the first saccade within a trial being directed to the stimulus presented 
in the left visual hemifield (Fig. 2a) was significantly greater than the chance level 
in the control condition (M = 21.3%, CI = [5.6, 37.1], t14 = 2.91, p = 0.012).  
Whereas the control condition lacked any spatial pattern for subjective value, the 
bias conditions typically featured high‑valued stimuli on one side of the display 
without the subject being explicitly instructed as to this arrangement.  For the 
leftward‑bias condition, initial saccades to the left were more frequent than 
expected by chance (M = 37.9%, CI = [31.0, 44.8], t16 = 11.64, p < 10‑8) and 
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additionally more frequent as compared with the control condition (M = 16.6%, CI 
= [0.9, 32.3], t30 = 2.15, p = 0.020).  For the rightward‑bias condition, however, the 
frequency of initial saccades to the right‑side stimulus was not significantly greater 
than the chance level (M = 4.6%, CI = [‑14.1, 23.4], t14 = 0.53, p = 0.303) despite 
being significantly greater than the frequency observed in the control condition (M 
= 26.0%, CI = [‑2.6, 49.3], t28 = 2.28, p = 0.015).  Juxtaposition of the leftward‑bias 
and rightward‑bias conditions thus revealed the first aspect of an asymmetry 
whereby a leftward bias at baseline was enhanced or neutralized, respectively.  
Even after learning had saturated within this timeframe, this default effect could not 
be overridden to a degree that would culminate in a reversed net‑rightward bias. 
 
As the signature manipulation of the experiment was that the option with superior 
value appeared in the same visual hemifield for nine out of every ten trials, 
analogous analyses were instead conducted with regard to whichever side 
possessed greater value.  The frequency of initial saccades to the stimulus with 
greater value (Fig. 2b) was greater than the chance level for the leftward‑bias 
condition (M = 30.4%, CI = [24.5, 36.3], t16 = 10.94, p < 10‑8)—an effect similarly 
exceeding that observed in the rightward‑bias condition (M = 27.0%, CI = [12.5, 
41.5], t30 = 3.81, p < 10‑3).  The frequency of optimal initial saccades was not 
significantly greater than the chance level (M = 3.4%, CI = [‑11.3, 18.2], t14 = 0.50, 
p = 0.313) for the rightward‑bias condition.  Evident in the time course of learning, 
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however, is that this apparent lack of an effect merely reflected the inability of a 
learned rightward bias to surpass the suddenly maladaptive intrinsic leftward bias 
despite fully neutralizing it.  Altogether, the biases induced for initial saccades were 
consistent with selectively gathering information from loci with the greatest 
expected value as would be ideal. 
 
Expanding the scope of the analysis to the entire duration of a trial, the proportion 
of time spent fixating at the left location (Fig. 3a) was not significantly different from 
the chance level for the control condition (M = 1.0%, CI = [‑2.4, 4.3], t14 = 0.62, p = 
0.545), indicating that the aforementioned intrinsic leftward bias primarily affected 
only the beginning of an episode.  For the leftward‑bias condition, however, one’s 
gaze continued to be directed at the left‑side stimulus for a significantly 
disproportionate amount of time (M = 6.6%, CI = [2.5, 10.6], t16 = 3.40, p = 0.002).  
The rightward‑bias condition was instead characterized by significantly more time 
dwelling on the right side (M = 5.6%, CI = [1.4, 9.7], t14 = 2.89, p = 0.006).  This 
overall pattern of effects resembled that found for the initial saccade in a manner 
suggesting that the same attentional biases permeate much of the temporal extent 
of decision making. 
 
Again turning to the intersection of location and value, the proportion of time 
allocated to fixation on the stimulus with greater value (Fig. 3b) was greater than 
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the chance level even in the control condition (M = 3.9%, CI = [2.4, 5.5], t14 = 5.50, 
p < 10‑4).  This was to be expected insofar as the spotlight of attention gravitates 
toward expected value so as to guide upcoming action selection (Shimojo et al., 
2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2006, 2007; Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & 
Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 2013; Manohar & Husain, 2013).  Yet, the 
disproportionate amount of dwell time on the more desirable alternative for the 
leftward‑bias condition (M = 7.4%, CI = [3.8, 10.9], t16 = 4.37, p < 10‑3) further 
exceeded the control condition’s baseline (M = 3.4%, CI = [‑0.5, 7.3], t30 = 1.78, p = 
0.042).  In contrast, the disproportionate amount of dwell time on high value for the 
rightward‑bias condition (M = 6.0%, CI = [2.3, 9.7], t14 = 3.50, p = 0.002) was not 
significantly greater than the control level (M = 2.1%, CI = [‑1.7, 5.9], t28 = 1.11, p = 
0.138).  Yet, this proportion was not actually significantly greater for the leftward 
bias than for the rightward bias (M = 1.4%, CI = [‑3.6, 6.3], t30 = 0.56, p = 0.577).  
As a segue from the discovery that subjects were successful at optimizing 
oculomotor control as per the implicit statistics of the environment—albeit more 
robustly in the case of a leftward bias—the subsequent point of inquiry was to 
concern whether or not subjects were actually successful at optimizing their 
ultimate decisions with the benefit of more precisely deployed attention. 
 
Learning: Choices 
 
   
140 
 
Having established adaptive learning in eye movements, the accuracy of decisions 
and the speed with which they are made—namely, the reaction time (RT)—were 
expected to both improve to the extent that attending to preferable options would 
facilitate choosing them.  That is, the influence of attentional modulation within a 
sequential‑sampling process implies that selectively attending to an option biases 
decision‑making processes in favor of that option by means of a boost in the rate 
of accumulation of a decision signal.  Such effects would impart the most direct 
evidence that the spatial statistics of the rewarding environment are not only being 
learned but also being exploited in harmony with what is prescribed for an agent 
with limited cognitive resources by normative decision theory. 
 
With regard to the accuracy of choices, the experimental manipulation allowed for 
90% accuracy with recourse to the simpler heuristic strategy of invariably choosing 
the most frequent response (e.g., the left response in the leftward‑bias condition).  
Nevertheless, accuracy across all trials at all three levels of difficulty (Fig. 4a) 
exceeded this baseline level of 90% in both the leftward‑bias condition (M = 3.4%, 
CI = [0.8, 6.0], t16 = 2.81, p = 0.006) and the rightward‑bias condition (M = 2.3%, CI 
= [‑0.7, 5.4], t14 = 1.65, p = 0.061), albeit marginally so in the latter case.  These 
improvements in performance are evidence that, rather than relying upon 
speed‑oriented heuristics, subjects continued to properly perform the value‑based 
decision‑making task as they normally would but with the added benefit of learned 
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biases.  Furthermore, overall accuracy was greater for the leftward‑bias condition 
than for the control condition (M = 3.2%, CI = [‑0.5, 7.0], t30 = 1.75, p = 0.045).  In 
line with the previously reported asymmetries in effects on eye movements, this 
increase in accuracy relative to control was not significant for the rightward‑bias 
condition (M = 2.1%, CI = [‑1.9, 6.2], t28 = 1.08, p = 0.145), but the difference 
between the leftward‑bias and rightward‑bias conditions was also nonsignificant 
(M = 1.1%, CI = [‑2.7, 4.9], t30 = 0.58, p = 0.566). 
 
Choice accuracy was subsequently analyzed within bins assigned according to the 
difficulty of choices (Fig. 4b).  The most difficult trials, which correspond to the 
smallest differences in subjective value between stimuli, are of primary interest 
because these feature the most potential for improvement in performance as a 
consequence of learning.  Accuracy was greater than the chance level even at 
high difficulty across all three conditions (p < 0.05), such that the critical tests 
probed differences between conditions.  For trials of low or moderate difficulty, 
accuracy was saturated at near‑ceiling levels, which precluded any significant 
differences between bias and control conditions among the four comparisons—
namely, leftward bias at low difficulty (M = 1.4%, CI = [‑1.6, 4.3], t30 = 0.93, p = 
0.180), rightward bias at low difficulty (M = 1.2%, CI = [‑2.0, 4.4], t27 = 0.79, p = 
0.219), leftward bias at medium difficulty (M = 1.7%, CI = [‑2.5, 5.8], t30 = 0.82, p = 
0.210), and rightward bias at medium difficulty (M = 1.5%, CI = [‑3.3, 6.2], t28 = 
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0.63, p = 0.265).  However, the accuracy of noisier high‑difficulty choices was 
greater in the leftward‑bias condition than in the control condition (M = 7.4%, CI = 
[1.4, 13.4], t30 = 2.51, p = 0.009).  A nonsignificant effect was observed for the 
rightward‑bias condition (M = 3.7%, CI = [‑3.1, 10.6], t28 = 1.11, p = 0.138), but the 
difference in accuracy between the leftward‑bias and rightward‑bias conditions at 
high difficulty did not reach statistical significance (M = 3.7%, CI = [‑3.0, 10.4], t30 = 
1.12, p = 0.272). 
 
First considering only choices of the left‑side option, RT (Fig. 4c) was indeed 
faster for the leftward‑bias condition as compared to the control condition (M = 150 
ms, CI = [‑28, 329], t30 = 1.72, p = 0.048).  On the other hand, right‑choice RT was 
marginally slower for the leftward‑bias condition than for the control condition (M = 
150 ms, CI = [‑43, 344], t30 = 1.59, p = 0.062).  Nevertheless, overall speed 
improved insofar as left‑option choices were much more frequent by design.  
Conversely, in the rightward‑bias condition, right‑option choices were marginally 
faster as compared to the control condition (M = 135 ms, CI = [‑36, 305], t28 = 1.62, 
p = 0.058).  Yet, left‑choice RT was not significantly slower in the case of the 
rightward‑bias condition relative to the control condition (M = 34 ms, CI = [‑120, 
189], t28 = 0.46, p = 0.326). 
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Next, differences in RT between left‑ and right‑option choices were tested for 
within each condition (Fig. 4d).  Among these predominantly right‑handed 
subjects, responses were delivered marginally more quickly with the right button in 
the control condition (M = 42 ms, CI = [‑2, 85], t14 = 2.06, p = 0.059).  This effect 
suggests an intrinsic rightward bias that influences hand movements in concert 
with the intrinsic leftward spatial bias driving eye movements and the zoom lens of 
attention.  This baseline effect was reversed such that instead left‑option choices 
were faster for the leftward‑bias condition (M = 259 ms, CI = [168, 351], t16 = 6.00, 
p < 10‑5).  Likewise, right‑option choices were more rapid for the rightward‑bias 
condition (M = 211 ms, CI = [166, 255], t14 = 10.16, p < 10‑7) and to a degree that 
exceeded the baseline effect for the control condition (M = 169 ms, CI = [110, 228], 
t28 = 5.84, p < 10‑5). 
 
Taken together, the results thus far indicate that subjects within the spatially 
structured environments of the leftward‑bias and rightward‑bias conditions learned 
to optimize value‑based decision‑making processes with respect to both precision 
and speed—but especially when the reward environment conformed to preexisting 
leftward biases. 
 
Extinction: Eye movements 
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Having demonstrated with the main analysis that learning did in fact occur as 
expected, the next set of analyses set out to determine the extent of any residual 
effects of either experimental manipulation in a subsequent extinction block with 
spatially balanced values.  In other words, the only distinguishing feature between 
an extinction condition and the control condition lies in hysteresis due to the 
internal state of the subject.  These extinction conditions were for the most part 
analyzed in the same fashion as before, beginning with the first saccade of a trial. 
 
Focusing first on the left‑extinction condition, initial saccades to the left‑hemifield 
stimulus (Fig. 5) were still more frequent than expected by chance (M = 26.3%, CI 
= [2.3, 50.4], t8 = 2.52, p = 0.036), but this effect was not significantly greater than 
the baseline effect observed in the control condition (M = 5.0%, CI = [‑20.8, 30.8], 
t22 = 0.40, p = 0.691).  Although the respective leftward bias of the right‑extinction 
condition was not significantly above chance (M = 12.2%, CI = [‑14.4, 38.7], t7 = 
1.08, p = 0.314), it was not significantly lesser than the control level (M = 9.2%, CI 
= [‑17.8, 36.1], t21 = 0.71, p = 0.487), either.  The pattern thus could align with an 
interpretation of at least to some extent returning to the baseline set by intrinsic 
biases in extinction. 
 
In contrast to the leftward bias in overall dwell time exhibited during learning, the 
left‑extinction condition was characterized by apparent overcompensation such 
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that a marginally disproportionate amount of time was actually spent fixating on the 
right side of the display (M = 2.4%, CI = [‑0.3, 5.1], t8 = 2.03, p = 0.077) (Fig. 6a).  
Again, there was some lateralized asymmetry.  Rather than being reversed, the 
learned rightward bias was neutralized in the right‑extinction condition to produce a 
null leftward effect on dwell time (M = 0.7%, CI = [‑2.7, 4.2], t7 = 0.51, p = 0.629). 
 
Although the proportion of time allocated to fixating on the stimulus with greater 
value (Fig. 6b) was still well in excess of chance for the left‑extinction condition (M 
= 5.5%, CI = [4.2, 6.8], t8 = 9.69, p < 10‑5), this imbalance was not significantly 
different from that observed in the control condition (M = 1.5%, CI = [‑0.6, 3.7], t22 = 
1.49, p = 0.151).  This value‑based bias in dwell time was likewise significant for 
the right‑extinction condition (M = 7.5%, CI = [5.6, 9.5], t7 = 8.94, p < 10‑4) and in 
this case even more robust than the biases exhibited in both the control (M = 
3.6%, CI = [1.2, 6.0], t21 = 3.11, p = 0.005) and left‑extinction (M = 2.1%, CI = [0.0, 
4.2], t15 = 2.09, p = 0.054) conditions, albeit marginally so in the latter case.  This 
improvement could reflect greater arousal as is fitting for a novel and uncertain 
environment coupled with the lack of a strong spatial bias as is fitting for a spatially 
balanced reward environment. 
 
Extinction: Choices 
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Turning back to the accuracy of choices, this score was again significantly greater 
than the chance level for any combination of condition and difficulty (p < 0.05).  
Overall accuracy (Fig. 7a) for the left‑extinction condition was no longer 
significantly greater than the control level (M = 2.2%, CI = [‑2.6, 7.1], t22 = 0.96, p = 
0.346). Likewise, any increase in accuracy relative to control in the left‑extinction 
condition was nonsignificant specifically for trials of low (M = 1.9%, CI = [‑2.0, 5.8], 
t22 = 1.02, p = 0.317), medium (M = 3.0%, CI = [‑1.3, 7.3], t22 = 1.45, p = 0.161), 
and high (M = 3.8%, CI = [‑5.5, 13.1], t22 = 0.85, p = 0.406) difficulty (Fig. 7b).  
Conversely, overall accuracy for the right‑extinction condition was not significantly 
lesser than that observed in the control condition (M = 2.7%, CI = [‑2.6, 8.0], t21 = 
1.05, p = 0.304).  Furthermore, overall accuracy for the left‑extinction condition did 
not fully surpass that for the right‑extinction condition (M = 4.9%, CI = [‑1.6, 11.4], 
t15 = 1.62, p = 0.126).  Any decrease in accuracy in the right‑extinction was 
nonsignificant for low (M = 1.1%, CI = [‑4.2, 6.4], t20 = 0.44, p = 0.666), medium (M 
= 1.5%, CI = [‑4.7, 7.6], t21 = 0.49, p = 0.626), and high (M = 1.6%, CI = [‑6.7, 9.8], 
t21 = 0.39, p = 0.698) difficulty. 
 
In keeping with the learned bias, the left‑extinction condition was still characterized 
by marginally faster RT for left‑option choices relative to control (M = 167 ms, CI = 
[‑14, 347], t22 = 1.91, p = 0.069) (Fig. 7c).  However, there was no corresponding 
effect for faster right‑option choices in the right‑extinction condition (M = 89 ms, CI 
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= [‑140, 319], t21 = 0.81, p = 0.426).  A corresponding asymmetric pattern applied 
to differences in RT between the two options (Fig. 7d).  As part of a significant 
deviation from the marginal rightward bias at baseline in the left‑extinction 
condition (M = 95 ms, CI = [24, 165], t22 = 2.78, p = 0.011), choices of the left 
option remained marginally faster than choices of the right option (M = 53 ms, CI = 
[‑12, 118], t8 = 1.88, p = 0.097).  The right‑extinction condition, on the other hand, 
did not produce a significant rightward bias in RT (M = 27 ms, CI = [‑37, 91], t7 = 
1.01, p = 0.345). 
 
Altogether, this latter set of findings concerning the extinction conditions suggests 
that oculomotor and manual biases as induced here can be unlearned in extinction 
relatively quickly.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
All findings considered, this research has demonstrated the human brain’s 
capacity to learn where to look for maximal utility and thus make decisions more 
efficiently in a setting where spatial location and hedonic value are correlated 
despite no overt signs of such a correlation.  Building upon related paradigms in 
psychophysics involving explicit, arbitrary designations of value to simple, abstract 
stimuli or locations (Awh et al., 2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Anderson, 2016; 
Bourgeois et al., 2016), this novel eye‑tracking approach incorporated implicit 
learning of spatial attentional biases into value‑based decision making with 
familiar, tangible stimuli (i.e., foods) that could be evaluated a priori independently 
of context or positions in space.  To mitigate the susceptibility of noisy 
decision‑making processes to errors, subjects took into account the additional 
spatial information when available in accord with an optimal strategy.  Rather than 
merely shifting the balance of the speed‑accuracy tradeoff (Johnson, 1939) in 
favor of quickness via reliance upon heuristics (e.g., rapidly delivering the more 
frequent response without making an effort to evaluate and compare the 
alternative), the downstream effects of induced attentional biases successfully 
honed both speed and accuracy even in the absence of any time pressure other 
than that which is self‑imposed. 
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A notable asymmetry distinguished the learning of a leftward attentional bias from 
the less robust learning of a rightward bias, reflecting conflict between the induced 
bias and an intrinsic leftward bias.  The presence of a leftward bias replicated 
findings from similar studies in which Westernized American subjects (i.e., 
left‑to‑right readers) presented with visually symmetric alternatives have exhibited 
a proclivity for first scanning the left side of a display as well as its upper portion 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011).   The 
leftward aspect may reflect the more general, low‑level phenomenon of left 
hemispatial overrepresentation implicated in tasks as basic as line bisection 
(Jewell & McCourt, 2000).  Notwithstanding the innate right‑hemispheric 
dominance of visuospatial attention in the human brain (de Schotten et al., 2011) 
and the abundance of innate leftward or left‑to‑right spatial biases in related forms 
of laterality throughout the animal kingdom (Vallortigara, 2006; Rugani et al., 2010; 
Frasnelli et al., 2012), however, the direction by which one scans the visual field is 
critical for these effects, such that right‑to‑left (e.g., Hebrew) readers instead 
naturally exhibit a contrary rightward bias as per divergent cultural norms (Chokron 
& Imbert, 1993; Chokron & De Agostini, 1995; Chokron et al., 1998).  Further study 
of the current paradigm and others like it with human subjects molded by cultures 
that diverge with respect to these spatial biases will be necessary to fully explicate 
the relationships between immediate task‑related biases learned over shorter 
temporal scales and sociocultural biases learned over longer temporal scales.  
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That such asymmetry applies even for preferential decision‑making scenarios in 
which stimuli can be abstracted away from space, actions, and actual sensory 
properties altogether is remarkable for its implications vis‑à‑vis designing any sort 
of visual interface intended for human viewers (e.g., the layout of item labeling per 
Rebollar et al., 2015)—but especially for situations where the alternatives under 
consideration themselves map directly onto space. 
 
Computational modeling that encompasses the dynamics of people’s preferential 
choices as well as the eye movements leading up to them has raised the 
importance of visual fixation and attention as part of an account of value‑based 
decision making (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal et al., 
2013).  Although not applied directly here, such modeling forms the theoretical 
framework for the present study.  This class of models emphasizes how 
attention‑based mechanisms in general will selectively enhance the neural 
representation (i.e., signal‑to‑noise ratio) of an option (Yantis & Serences, 2003; 
Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004; Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Cohen & Maunsell, 2009; 
Lim et al., 2011; McGinty et al., 2016; Leong et al., 2017) and, in doing so, 
ultimately bias decision signals being computed continuously by 
sequential‑sampling processes.  Although attention tends to at first be drawn to 
perceptually salient (Itti & Koch, 2001) or novel (Yang et al., 2009) stimuli 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995), so too are gaze and its underlying attentional 
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processes driven by the motivational salience (Schultz, 2015) or incentive salience 
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993) of options with greater value—and particularly so in 
the final moments prior to making a decision when acquisition of necessary 
information approaches its saturation point (Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion & 
Shimojo, 2006, 2007; Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal 
et al., 2013; Manohar & Husain, 2013).  Reflecting preferential looking (Fantz, 
1961) and the mere‑exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) in parallel with information 
seeking, this cascade effect of gaze emerges as a positive‑feedback loop is 
formed to the extent that attending to an option also makes it more likely to be 
chosen.  Moreover, exogenous manipulation of eye movements and visual 
attention causally biases preferences in favor of specific options—whether via 
requirements for longer periods of exposure and visual fixation (Shimojo et al., 
2003; Armel et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2011; Bird et al., 2012; Ito et al., 2014) or less 
directly via artificially increased perceptual salience (Milosavljevic et al., 2012). 
 
The paradigm illustrated here essentially lies at the interface of associative 
learning and attention, two spheres of neural phenomena that hitherto have not 
been sufficiently linked in the literature of neuroscience and psychology—much 
less economics.  As the findings herein have attested, attentional signals can be 
modulated by implicit learning even in naturalistic value‑based decision making.  
Likewise, there is a firm theoretical basis for the notion that attention plays a critical 
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role in selectively encoding the most relevant information into memory in the first 
place, raising yet further questions as to what extent different factors (e.g., reward 
or uncertainty) determine such relevance (Mackintosh, 1975; Underwood, 1976; 
Pearce & Hall, 1980; Dayan et al., 2000; Jiménez, 2003; Pearce & Mackintosh, 
2010; Gottlieb, 2012; Le Pelley et al., 2016; Leong et al., 2017).  Whereas effects 
on orienting as described here are entirely tractable within some variant of the 
basic reinforcement‑learning framework (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998)—and especially amenable to a temporal‑difference algorithm (Sutton, 
1988) given the continuous nature of events—the precise nature of the 
prediction‑error signals or other feedback involved remains largely enigmatic.  This 
set of issues adds a new dimension to the problem with computational modeling 
encompassing attention and eye movements in relation to not only 
decision‑making but also learning processes. 
 
Setting aside goal‑directed (i.e., model‑based) learning (Tolman, 1948), the 
two‑process theory of habitual (i.e., model‑free) learning (Miller & Konorski, 1928; 
Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2017) posits 
that instrumental (or operant) conditioning (Thorndike, 1898) is distinct from 
Pavlovian (or classical) conditioning (Pavlov, 1927), such that instrumental 
stimulus‑response associations differ fundamentally from Pavlovian 
stimulus‑stimulus associations.  Within Pavlovian conditioning there is an 
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additional division between preparatory and consummatory behaviors: the former 
are nonspecific (e.g., autonomic arousal, pupil dilation), whereas the latter are 
responses specific to the stimulus type (e.g., orienting, approaching, salivating, 
chewing) (Konorski, 1967).  In this context, an oculomotor orienting response is 
innate and reflexive while simultaneously possessing utility as a goal‑directed 
action.  As such, a biased response could feasibly be reinforced through either 
consummatory Pavlovian processes or instrumental processes.  Further research 
will be necessary to determine the extent to which these effects of implicit learning 
on attention generalize beyond oculomotor control (e.g., to covert shifts of attention 
in the absence any motoric orienting), as this would be indicative of a broader and 
more flexible phenomenon of instrumental conditioning as opposed to a Pavlovian 
system embedded within oculomotor circuits.  Along the same lines, another 
endeavor for future research will be to explore possible extraction of nonspatial 
features in learning how to optimally deploy attention—for example, relating 
asymmetry in value to contextual stimuli or time points within a sequence rather 
than spatial locations.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Paradigm.  (a) Following mandatory fixation at the center of the 
display, the subject made a two‑alternative forced choice (2AFC) between foods 
presented to the left and right while eye movements were monitored.  (b) The 
stimulus with greater value was usually presented on the left side of the display for 
the leftward‑bias condition (red) and usually presented on the right side of the 
display for the rightward‑bias condition (green).  Per a 2 x 2 between‑subjects 
factorial design, the biased block of trials featuring this manipulation appeared 
either before or after an unbiased block with spatially balanced values.  The pooled 
control condition (blue) was derived from the unbiased blocks that occurred first for 
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half of the subjects.  Unbiased blocks that occurred second in the sequence were 
set aside as the left‑extinction (magenta) and right‑extinction (cyan) conditions.    
   
156 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Learning: Initial saccade.  (a) Shown for each condition in the 
leftmost panel is the mean frequency of initial saccades to the stimulus presented 
to the left visual hemifield.  The default leftward bias observed in the control 
condition (p < 0.05) was enhanced in the leftward‑bias condition (p < 0.05) and 
neutralized in the rightward‑bias condition (p < 0.05).  Moving averages across 
trials are provided for reference as a depiction of the time courses of these effects 
during learning.  Saturation of effects of learning was evident by halfway into the 
block of trials.  (b) The frequency of initial saccades to the stimulus with greater 
value.  As an exploitation of the experimental manipulation, first looking left in the 
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leftward‑bias condition corresponded to usually first looking at the stimulus with 
greater hedonic value (p < 0.05).  Bar plots represent the latter half of a block.  
Error bars indicate standard errors of the means across subjects.  Asterisks 
indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 3.3.  Learning: Cumulative dwell time.  (a) Shown for each condition is 
the mean proportion of time spent looking at the stimulus presented to the left side 
of the display throughout a trial.  More time was spent fixating on the left‑side 
stimulus for the leftward‑bias condition (p < 0.05); likewise, more time was spent 
fixating on the right‑side stimulus for the rightward‑bias condition (p < 0.05).  (b) 
The proportion of dwell time spent on the stimulus with greater value.  Further 
asymmetry between conditions was revealed in that only the leftward‑bias 
condition yielded longer dwell time at the location with greater value relative to 
control (p < 0.05).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 3.4.  Learning: Accuracy and reaction time.  (a) The overall accuracy of 
choices is depicted in relation to the baseline performance level of 90% set by the 
heuristic strategy of always choosing the more frequent response.  Both the 
leftward‑bias (p < 0.05) and rightward‑bias (p < 0.07) conditions achieved even 
greater accuracy across all trials, albeit marginally so in the latter case.  (b) 
Accuracy is shown separately for choices at each of the three levels of difficulty.  
At high difficulty with the most room for improvement, decision making was found 
to improve significantly relative to control for the leftward‑bias condition (p < 0.05), 
which was also the condition yielding more robust effects on orienting.  (c) 
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Reaction time (RT) is shown separately for left‑ and right‑option choices, which 
were at least marginally faster in the leftward‑bias (p < 0.05) and rightward‑bias (p 
< 0.06) conditions, respectively, relative to the control condition.  (d) Differences in 
RT between the two responses.  Choices of the right option were marginally faster 
than choices of the left option in the control condition (p < 0.06).  As expected, this 
baseline rightward bias was strengthened in the rightward‑bias condition (p < 0.05) 
and reversed completely in the leftward‑bias condition (p < 0.05).  Crosses indicate 
marginal statistical significance (0.05 < p < 0.10).  Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance (p < 0.05).  
   
161 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Extinction: Initial saccade.  A default leftward bias for the initial 
saccade as observed in the control condition (p < 0.05) was also found for the 
left‑extinction condition (p < 0.05) but not the right‑extinction condition (p > 0.05).  
Note that the plots that would correspond to those in Figure 2b are omitted here 
because of the absence of a spatial pattern for value in the extinction blocks, such 
that the subject was unable to predictively saccade to the stimulus with greater 
value by design (p > 0.05).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 3.6.  Extinction: Cumulative dwell time.  (a) Whereas the learned 
rightward bias in dwell time was neutralized for the right‑extinction condition (p > 
0.05), the respective leftward bias was even reversed by apparent 
overcompensation in the left‑extinction condition such that there was actually a 
marginal rightward bias in dwell time (p < 0.08).  (b) Only the right‑extinction 
condition was characterized by longer dwell time at the location with greater value 
relative to control (p < 0.05).  Crosses indicate marginal statistical significance 
(0.05 < p < 0.10).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance (p < 0.05).  
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Figure 3.7.  Extinction: Accuracy and reaction time.  (a‑b) There were no 
significant differences with respect to accuracy for either of the extinction 
conditions (p > 0.05).  (c) The RT was still marginally faster for left‑option choices 
in the left‑extinction condition relative to control (p < 0.07), but there was no longer 
a corresponding effect for right‑option choices in the right‑extinction condition (p > 
0.05).  (d) Contrary to the marginal rightward bias at baseline (p < 0.05), choices of 
the left option remained marginally faster than choices of the right option for the 
left‑extinction condition (p < 0.10), whereas there was no corresponding rightward 
bias for the rightward‑extinction condition (p > 0.05).  Crosses indicate marginal 
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statistical significance (0.05 < p < 0.10).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
(p < 0.05). 
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C h a p t e r  4  
Distinct prediction errors in mesostriatal circuits of the human brain 
mediate learning about the values of both states and actions: 
evidence from high‑resolution fMRI 
Jaron T. Colas, Wolfgang M. Pauli, Tobias Larsen, J. Michael Tyszka, 
& John P. O’Doherty  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Prediction‑error signals consistent with formal models of “reinforcement learning” 
(RL) have repeatedly been found within dopaminergic nuclei of the midbrain and 
dopaminoceptive areas of the striatum.  However, the precise form of the RL 
algorithms implemented in the human brain is not yet well determined.  Here, we 
created a novel paradigm optimized to dissociate the subtypes of 
reward‑prediction errors that function as the key computational signatures of two 
distinct classes of RL models—namely, “actor/critic” models and 
action‑value‑learning models (e.g., the Q‑learning model).  The 
state‑value‑prediction error (SVPE), which is independent of actions, is a hallmark 
of the actor/critic architecture, whereas the action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) is 
the distinguishing feature of action‑value‑learning algorithms.  To test for the 
presence of these prediction‑error signals in the brain, we scanned human 
participants with a high‑resolution functional magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) 
protocol optimized to enable measurement of neural activity in the dopaminergic 
midbrain as well as the striatal areas to which it projects.  In keeping with the 
actor/critic model, the SVPE signal was detected in the substantia nigra.  The 
SVPE was also clearly present in both the ventral striatum and the dorsal striatum.  
However, alongside these purely state‑value‑based computations we also found 
evidence for AVPE signals throughout the striatum.  These high‑resolution fMRI 
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findings suggest that model‑free aspects of reward learning in humans can be 
explained algorithmically with RL in terms of an actor/critic mechanism operating in 
parallel with a system for more direct action‑value learning.   
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AUTHOR SUMMARY 
 
An accumulating body of evidence suggests that signals of a reward‑prediction 
error encoded by dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain comprise a fundamental 
mechanism underpinning reward learning, including learning of instrumental 
actions.  Nevertheless, a major open question concerns the specific computational 
details of the “reinforcement‑learning” algorithms through which these 
prediction‑error signals are generated.  Here, we designed a novel task specifically 
to address this issue.  A fundamental distinction is drawn between predictions 
based on the values of states and predictions based on the values of actions.  We 
found evidence in the human brain that different prediction‑error signals involved in 
learning about the values of either states or actions are represented in the 
substantia nigra and the striatum.  These findings are consistent with an 
“actor/critic” (i.e., state‑value‑learning) architecture updating in parallel with a more 
direct action‑value‑learning system, providing important constraints on the actual 
form of the reinforcement‑learning computations that are implemented in the 
mesostriatal dopamine system in humans.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Efforts to achieve a computational‑level understanding of how the brain learns to 
produce adaptive behavior from rewarding and punishing feedback have gained 
inspiration from a class of abstract models falling under the umbrella of 
“reinforcement learning” (RL) with roots in machine learning and artificial 
intelligence (Minsky, 1961; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) as 
well as psychology (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).  Intense focus on the applicability 
of these models to actual nervous systems arose following the seminal finding that 
the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons within the midbrain—in particular, the 
substantia nigra (SN) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA)—resembles a 
reward‑prediction‑error (RPE) signal from the temporal‑difference (TD) algorithm 
(Sutton, 1988) characteristic of a number of such RL models (Montague et al., 
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Glimcher, 2011; 
Schultz, 2015). 
 
Yet, a major open question in the literature concerns the precise form of the RL 
algorithm or algorithms that the brain—and, in particular, the mesostriatal 
dopamine system—deploys.  The “actor/critic” model (Witten, 1977; Barto et al., 
1983; Sutton, 1984) represents one class of RL algorithms that has been put forth 
to account for the functional neurocircuitry of reward learning in the basal ganglia 
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(Houk et al., 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Suri & Schultz, 1998, 1999; Joel et al., 
2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006a).  Evoking the classical 
two‑process theory of instrumental (Thorndike, 1898) and Pavlovian (Pavlov, 
1927)—essentially, response‑dependent and response‑independent—conditioning 
(Miller & Konorski, 1928; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967), the actor/critic theory 
postulates that two distinct modules play a role: the “critic” learns about the values 
of states independently of the actions taken in those states, whereas the “actor” is 
involved in encoding the action policy—that is, the likelihood of taking a particular 
action in a given state.  The TD error is computed using the state‑value predictions 
generated by the critic, and this same error signal is then used to update the policy 
in the actor module proposed.  Evidence supporting an actor/critic architecture in 
the brain has emerged from observations illustrating a broad dorsal‑ventral 
distinction in the functions of the striatum: the ventral striatum (i.e., the ventral 
putamen and the nucleus accumbens) is dedicated to learning and encoding 
reward predictions without regard for actions, whereas the dorsal striatum (i.e., the 
dorsal putamen and the caudate nucleus) is more involved for situations in which 
actions are learned and selected in order to obtain rewards (Robbins & Everitt, 
1992; Ito et al., 2002; Voorn et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2008).  In keeping with the 
actor/critic framework, the ventral striatum has been found to encode RPE signals 
during passive reward learning (i.e., Pavlovian conditioning) as well as active 
reward learning (i.e., instrumental conditioning), whereas the dorsal striatum has 
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more typically been reported to be selectively engaged for instrumental‑learning 
paradigms in which actions must be selected to obtain rewards (O’Doherty et al., 
2004; Cooper et al., 2012; Chase et al., 2015; Pauli et al., 2016). 
 
However, the actor/critic model offers but one of several RL‑based accounts for 
learning representations of hedonic value and instrumental behavior.  Another 
class of models known here as action‑value‑learning models (Watkins, 1989; 
Rummery & Niranjan, 1994) even dispenses with learning about the values of 
states altogether and instead learns directly about the values of specific actions 
available within each given state.  Thus, the corresponding TD prediction error is 
computed in accordance with differences in successive predictions about the 
values of actions as opposed to states.  In simulations where the action space is 
tractably small and well delineated, an action‑value‑learning model such as the 
Q‑learning model (Watkins, 1989) is reported to converge more quickly than the 
actor/critic model, which indicates that the former class of models is generally 
more efficient for learning actions (Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
 
Given that actor/critic and action‑value‑learning variants of RL models make 
qualitatively divergent predictions about the nature of the TD‑learning error signal 
(Niv et al., 2006), it is perhaps surprising that, to date, only a handful of studies 
have attempted to directly ascertain which algorithm best accounts for neural 
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activity in dopaminergic regions during instrumental‑learning tasks (Morris et al., 
2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Morita & Kato, 2014; Kato & Morita, 2016).  Moreover, 
studies have yielded differing conclusions with discrepancies further complicated 
by differences in species, recording sites, and tasks across studies: evidence from 
Morris and colleagues (2006) suggested that an action‑value‑learning algorithm is 
implemented in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) in macaque monkeys, 
whereas Roesch and colleagues (2007) presented evidence in the VTA in rats 
consistent with either an action‑value‑learning algorithm or an actor/critic scheme. 
 
The primary goal of the present study was to compare and contrast the actor/critic 
model and action‑value‑learning models, which are both theoretically sound 
implementations of RL, with an aim to best capture activity in the dopaminergic 
midbrain and dopaminoceptive target areas of the striatum in humans by 
identifying the specific features of the prediction‑error codes in these structures.  
To achieve this, we scanned the brains of human subjects with fMRI while they 
attempted to learn about a multi‑step Markov decision process (MDP) (Fig. 1).  
This unique task was specifically designed to enable us to distinguish two possible 
manifestations of the RPE signal—namely, a state‑value‑prediction error (SVPE), 
which would be produced by an actor/critic‑like mechanism in which prediction 
errors are computed by comparing successive differences in state values (i.e., the 
value of being in a particular state regardless of actions), and an 
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action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE), which would be computed by comparing 
successive predictions for the values of specific actions as per an 
action‑value‑learning algorithm such as Q learning. 
 
An inherent challenge in dissociating state values and action values is that they 
tend to be highly correlated with each other in most instrumental‑learning settings.  
Thus, prior to programming the fMRl experiment presented herein, we first ran 
extensive simulations in order to refine the parameters of the MDP and obtain an 
optimal task design that allowed for maximal separation of estimated state values 
and action values as simulated by RL model variants.  A key feature of our task 
and the MDP that enabled us to achieve the necessary decoupling is that, while 
some states required selection of an action in order to transition to a new state, 
other states did not have any actions available and instead would result in the 
observer passively transitioning from one state to another.  Importantly, not only 
were interleaved passive states differentially associated with receiving subsequent 
rewards, but it was also the case that intermediate passive states could be 
reached by either transitioning passively or taking particular actions.  Participants 
thus needed to learn about the values of both active and passive states in order to 
most effectively solve the task.  This configuration is ideal in that both state‑value 
learning and action‑value learning can take place and generate the respective 
signature signals of these variants of reward learning. 
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Of note is that, although previous attempts to probe the SVPE in isolation have 
relied on Pavlovian‑conditioning paradigms for which there is ostensibly no 
instrumental action‑based component (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004; Pauli et 
al., 2015), the signals observed for strictly Pavlovian learning paradigms cannot 
unambiguously address the nature of the RL signals invoked during 
instrumental‑learning paradigms.  This limitation follows from the fact that it is 
entirely plausible that there exists a separate Pavlovian value‑learning system 
acting independently from the system dedicated to learning about the values of 
instrumental actions.  Another relevant factor is that it can be difficult to completely 
rule out the roles of incidental actions simultaneously present during Pavlovian 
learning that could actually be instrumentally controlled, such as voluntary eye 
movements, oral actions (for gustatory rewards), or instrumental approach 
behaviors.  The new approach explored here overcomes those issues inasmuch 
as state‑value learning and action learning were both embedded in the same 
integrated instrumental‑learning paradigm, such that the respective signals can be 
juxtaposed directly as they are potentially computed in parallel. 
 
To enable us to effectively resolve blood‑oxygen‑level‑dependent (BOLD) activity 
within the midbrain’s dopaminergic nuclei in the midbrain—which poses additional 
technical challenges (Düzel et al., 2009, 2015; Barry et al., 2013)—we employed a 
   
175 
 
high‑resolution functional magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) protocol with 
1.5‑mm isotropic voxels that was optimized for the midbrain and the striatum (see 
Pauli et al., 2015, for a similar approach).  As part of this protocol, we concurrently 
measured cardiac and respiratory activity and then used these physiological 
signals to account for contaminating effects of physiological noise in the fMRI data, 
which is particularly detrimental to image quality in the tegmentum (Enzmann & 
Pelc, 1992; Dagli et al., 1999; Soellinger et al., 2007).  Furthermore, we deployed a 
specialized preprocessing pipeline that included denoising of the images and was 
also developed to optimize between‑subject alignment of mesencephalic 
structures.  The field of view for this imaging protocol could accommodate both 
ventral and dorsal portions of the striatum and even parts of ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) for its role in computing value signals (Bartra et al., 
2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014; Chase et al., 2015).  Hence, high‑resolution 
functional images were obtained from both the dopaminergic midbrain and its 
striatal target regions. 
 
Neuroanatomical evidence points to different subregions of the dopaminergic 
midbrain as having distinct projections to target areas of the striatum: 
dopaminergic neurons in the dorsal tier comprising the VTA and the dorsal SNc 
project to more ventral areas of the striatum, whereas dopaminergic neurons in the 
ventral tier including most of the SNc project to more dorsal areas of the striatum 
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(Beckstead et al., 1979; Haber, 2003; Voorn et al., 2004; Haber & Knutson, 2010).  
In light of this anatomical dissociation, we hypothesized that the two distinct 
subtypes of the RPE signal would be encoded within different subregions of the 
dopaminergic midbrain.  Yet, even at this maximal spatial resolution, precisely 
delineating the dopaminergic tiers or even the SNc as a whole within the SN is 
beyond the capabilities of these methods (Eapen et al., 2011).  Specifically, we 
hypothesized that the VTA and some parts of the SN would be more involved in 
encoding the critic module’s SVPE, while other parts of the SN would be more 
involved in encoding the AVPE computed by an action‑value‑learning algorithm.  
We additionally expected to find evidence of SVPE signals in the ventral‑striatal 
areas targeted by the dorsal tier of the dopaminergic midbrain as well as evidence 
of AVPE signals in the dorsal‑striatal areas instead principally linked with the 
ventral tier. 
 
As a secondary aim, we also set out to replicate findings from Schönberg and 
colleagues (2007) that RPE‑related activity in the dorsal striatum alone would 
distinguish subjects according to the degree of learning as assessed behaviorally.  
Elaborating further on the original findings of Schönberg and colleagues (2007) by 
virtue of the unique capabilities of the current paradigm, we also hypothesized that 
such a relationship between brain and behavior would be observed with respect to 
an AVPE signal in particular.  
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RESULTS 
 
Behavioral performance 
 
Following a similar approach taken by Schönberg and colleagues (2007), 
participants were first divided into two groups according to their behavioral 
performance on the task (Table 1).  Of 39 total subjects, 20 were individually 
classified as “Good‑learner” subjects for whom choice accuracy was significantly 
greater than the chance level of 50% (p < 0.05 according to a binomial test).  The 
remaining 19 participants for whom the null hypothesis of chance accuracy could 
not be rejected with significance at the individual level were further subdivided into 
15 “Poor‑learner” subjects, who nonetheless could be accounted for with an RL 
model, and only 4 “Nonperformer” subjects, who were excluded from further 
analysis because subsequent computational modeling determined that the 
behavior of these individuals was completely insensitive to outcomes.  Whereas 
the Good‑learner and Poor‑learner groups were defined on the basis of differences 
in accuracy, there were no significant differences between the groups when 
considering possible confounds in reaction time (RT), errors such as missed 
responses or inappropriate responses that resulted in missed trials, or the 
demographic variables of age and gender (p > 0.05) (Table 1).  Accuracy was 
significantly greater than the chance level across subjects not only within the 
   
178 
 
Good‑learner group (M = 20.9%, t19 = 13.22, p < 10‑10) but also within the 
Poor‑learner group (M = 3.1%, t14 = 2.23, p = 0.021) despite not having sufficient 
statistical power to verify the effects for Poor learners at the individual level.  These 
results and model fitting together demonstrate that, unlike the Nonperformers, the 
Poor learners made an effort to attend to and perform the task and, in doing so, did 
in fact learn—albeit to a lesser extent than the Good learners. 
 
Behavioral model fitting 
 
We considered as a possibility not only “model‑free” (i.e., habitual) learning 
(Thorndike, 1898; Pavlov, 1927) but also “model‑based” (i.e., goal‑directed) 
learning (Tolman, 1948).  Thus, four computational modules—to wit, the critic 
component of the actor/critic (i.e., a state‑value learner), the actor component of 
the actor/critic guided by the critic, an action‑value learner, and a model‑based 
learner—were tested along with combinations of these.  We first implemented the 
standard actor/critic model (Witten, 1977; Barto et al., 1983; Sutton, 1984), which 
updates both the critic’s cached state values and the actor’s policy via a common 
SVPE, and the Q‑learning model (Watkins, 1989), a canonical 
action‑value‑learning model that forgoes state values to instead directly encode 
action values that are updated via an AVPE.  As these model‑free alternatives are 
not mutually exclusive but rather could each exist as part of parallel systems within 
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the brain, we took the novel approach of hybridizing them.  In the presence of 
passive states, the “critic/Q‑learner” (CQ) model, which is again a TD model, 
integrates the state‑value predictions of the critic into the action‑value updates that 
exclusively determine the action policy.  The “actor/critic/Q‑learner” (ACQ) model 
goes a step further to fully integrate the SVPE and the AVPE into the action 
weights actually driving behavior.  We also tested a model‑based (MB) model with 
a dynamic‑programming algorithm (Bellman, 1957; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Gläscher 
et al., 2010) by which the agent learns the transitions from state‑action pairs and 
utilizes knowledge of the transition functions and reward availability to compute 
action‑value estimates on the fly.  This MB model was likewise incorporated into 
hybrid models that paired model‑based learning with each of the four 
aforementioned variants of model‑free learning.  The hybrid models integrated the 
outputs of each individual algorithm to compute net action weights according to 
static input‑weighting parameters, which were fitted along with other free 
parameters at the level of individual subjects.  Additional details about the models 
and model‑fitting procedures are provided in the Methods section. 
 
Each subject was modeled separately in a factorial model comparison with 22 
alternatives that simultaneously assessed model‑free learning in its various forms, 
model‑based learning, and “TD(λ)” eligibility traces as a potential augmentation of 
model‑free learning—all while rigorously controlling for internal choice biases and 
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hysteresis.  While noting the caveat that model‑free TD(λ) learning requires one 
more degree of freedom than model‑based learning with its assumptions that are 
actually less parsimonious but unquantifiable as such, formal penalties for model 
complexity were imposed according to the Akaike information criterion with 
correction for finite sample size (AICc) (Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989).  
Taking into account all of the performing subjects (i.e., Good learners and Poor 
learners) collectively to maximize not only statistical power but also 
generalizability, the 7‑parameter “ACQ(λ)” model (henceforth abbreviated as 
“ACQ”) was found to provide the best account of behavioral choice data among 
the candidate models (Fig. 2a).  For this reason, the ACQ model was utilized in the 
subsequent fMRI analyses reported here.  When considering fits at the level of 
individual subjects, model‑free learning with an eligibility trace available was also 
found to be generally preferred to the MB model or a model‑free/model‑based 
hybrid after formally penalizing model complexity (Fig. 2b).  Details of the ACQ 
model’s fitted parameters are provided in Table 2. 
 
An important caveat of the model comparison at the group level is that, after 
adjusting for model complexity, the ACQ model yielded only a marginally improved 
fit to behavior as compared to the simple Q‑learning model (i.e., the “Q(0)” model).  
This suggests that the predictions of the hybrid ACQ model and the pure 
Q‑learning model cannot be clearly separated on the basis of the behavioral data 
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alone in the present study.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of examining neural 
computations related to either state values or action values in the fMRI data, the 
ACQ model remains appropriate to use inasmuch as it enables us to 
simultaneously test for both forms of value signals along with their respective 
prediction‑error signals.  For the sake of completeness, we also used the Q(0) 
model as part of another computational‑model‑based analysis of the fMRI data, 
which is discussed briefly below. 
 
The probability of an action increased in an orderly fashion with the difference 
between its net action weight as predicted by the ACQ model and the net weight of 
the alternative for both the Good‑learner group and the Poor‑learner group (Fig. 
2c), providing evidence for the quality of the model’s fits to the behavioral data.  In 
a similar vein, we noted that RTs became faster as the absolute difference 
between net action weights increased for both the Good‑learner group (β = 86 ms, 
t19 = 3.38, p = 0.002) and the Poor‑learner group (β = 114 ms, t14 = 3.67, p = 
0.001).  Using logistic regression, we also found evidence for a bias in favor of 
repeating the previous action given the current state in both Good learners (β = 
0.368, t19 = 2.66, p = 0.008) and Poor learners (β = 0.194, t14 = 2.08, p = 0.028), 
confirming that participants showed perseveration tendencies for previously 
performed actions (Lau & Glimcher, 2005) as in the computational model. 
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Computational‑model‑based analysis of neuroimaging data 
 
Applying the ACQ model to the fMRI data (O’Doherty et al., 2007), we generated 
regressors corresponding to the prediction‑error signals and value signals that 
were simulated explicitly (see Methods for details) (Supp. Fig. 2).  In particular, we 
tested for neural activity correlating with the SVPE δVt, which is produced by the 
critic component of the combined model, and the AVPE δQt, which is produced by 
the Q‑learning component.  The representations of the state value Vt(st) and the 
action value Qt(st,at) themselves were also examined.  To assess these 
neurophysiological signals in relation to differences in behavioral performance, we 
analyzed the Good‑learner and Poor‑learner groups both separately and 
collectively and also directly tested for differences in effects between the two 
groups in an independent voxel‑wise manner. 
 
All performing participants 
 
We hypothesized that, during learning of the MDP, we would find evidence for 
separate SVPE and AVPE signals.  Initially, effects of the SVPE and the AVPE 
were examined across all performing subjects as a whole, including both the 
Good‑learner group and the Poor‑learner group. 
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State‑value‑prediction‑error signals 
 
As expected in the striatal regions that the dopaminergic midbrain projects to, 
there was an SVPE signal in the right ventral striatum (xyz = [19, 12.5, ‑13], t34 = 
4.09, p = 10‑4, k = 69, SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 3a), including the ventral putamen 
and the nucleus accumbens.  Although we did also find some effects of the SVPE 
in the left SN, the cluster did not fully reach the corrected threshold for significance 
(SVC pFWE = 0.100). 
 
Action‑value‑prediction‑error signals 
 
As part of the same model, effects of the AVPE were also observed in the ventral 
striatum in both the left (xyz = [‑12.5, 11, ‑5.5], t34 = 4.44, p < 10‑4, k = 115, SVC 
pFWE < 0.05) and the right (xyz = [8.5, 12.5, ‑4], t34 = 3.87, p < 10‑3, k = 108, SVC 
pFWE < 0.05) hemispheres (Fig. 3b). 
 
Value signals 
 
vmPFC was also partially acquired within the current field of view despite it not 
extending all the way to the frontal pole.  Accordingly, we were also able to test for 
the presence of value signals in this region; such signals have been reported 
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consistently in prior literature and even demonstrated with meta‑analyses (Bartra 
et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014; Chase et al., 2015).  In keeping with this 
prior literature, an aggregate analysis across all performing subjects yielded effects 
for state‑value signals in vmPFC (xyz = [2.5, 35, ‑13], t34 = 4.86, p = 10‑5, k = 399, 
SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 4).  No significant effect of the AVPE was found across this 
pooled sample. 
 
Good‑learner group 
 
In order to examine effects specifically in those participants who learned the task 
successfully, we next focused on the Good‑learner group alone. 
 
State‑value‑prediction‑error signals 
 
Our initial hypothesis concerning RPE signals in the dopaminergic midbrain was 
partly confirmed to the extent that significant SVPE signals were identified in the 
left SN for the Good learners (xyz = [‑11, ‑14.5, ‑11.5], t19 = 4.32, p < 10‑3, k = 26, 
SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 5).  Importantly, these results were obtained with a model 
in which the AVPE was also entered as a parametric regressor so as to compete 
equally for variance alongside the SVPE.  As a consequence of this feature, the 
present results show that SVPE‑related activity in the substantia nigra can be 
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accounted for by the SVPE signal after controlling for any effects of the AVPE in 
accordance with the extra‑sum‑of‑squares principle.  We also tested whether 
voxels in the dopaminergic midbrain responded to the SVPE to a significantly 
greater extent than to the AVPE by performing a direct contrast between the SVPE 
and AVPE regressors, but this contrast revealed no significant effects (p > 0.005).  
Thus, we cannot conclude that the SVPE provides a significantly better account of 
activity in this brain region.  However, we can conclude that the SVPE‑related 
activity found in this region is not accounted for by the AVPE up to the limits of the 
robustness of the statistical test. 
 
In addition to revealing significant effects of the SVPE within the dopaminergic 
midbrain, we also tested for SVPE signals in the striatum.  Consistent with the 
results from the pooled analysis across all performing participants, effects of the 
SVPE were found in the right ventral striatum (xyz = [17.5, 2, ‑8.5], t19 = 3.67, p < 
10‑3, k = 38, SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 6) for the Good learners alone.  We also found 
evidence for SVPE signals in the left caudate nucleus within the dorsal striatum 
(xyz = [‑17, 2, 15.5], t19 = 4.65, p < 10‑4, k = 66, SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 6).  
Altogether, this mesostriatal network encoding the SVPE was significant at the set 
level across all regions of interest (ROIs) in the dopaminergic midbrain and the 
striatum (SVC pFWE < 0.05). 
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Action‑value‑prediction‑error signals 
 
AVPE signals were likewise identified in the striatum for the Good‑learner group.  
Also found was an effect of the AVPE in the right ventral striatum (xyz = [8.5, 11, 
‑2.5], t19 = 4.02, p < 10‑3, k = 71, SVC pFWE = 0.064) that borders but does not quite 
reach our significance threshold.  This cluster also extended into the dorsal 
striatum, where its global peak was located (xyz = [11.5, 20, ‑2.5], t19 = 4.13, p < 
10‑3), and an anterior region of the caudate nucleus in close proximity to that 
originally reported for an instrumental RPE signal by O’Doherty and colleagues 
(2004).  Additional clusters for the AVPE were observed throughout the dorsal 
striatum at an uncorrected threshold (Supp. Fig. 3). 
 
Value signals 
 
State‑value signals were significant in bilateral vmPFC (xyz = [4, 33.5, ‑4], t19 = 
4.77, p < 10‑4, k = 83, SVC pFWE < 0.05) (Fig. 7) for the Good‑learner group alone.  
Action‑value signals were also identified bilaterally in vmPFC, albeit at an 
uncorrected threshold (Supp. Fig. 4). 
 
Poor‑learner group 
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Focusing specifically on the Poor‑learner group, the relevant fMRI effects were 
expected to be present to some extent but also weaker relative to the 
Good‑learner group as a reflection of the less robust learning evident in behavior.  
In line with these expectations, SVPE and AVPE signals were only identified in the 
ventral striatum at an uncorrected threshold (Supp. Fig. 5a,b).  State‑value signals 
were also found in vmPFC at an uncorrected threshold (Supp. Fig. 5c). 
 
Good‑learner group versus Poor‑learner group 
 
To an extent consistent with our initial hypothesis, direct contrasts between the 
Good‑learner and Poor‑learner groups with respect to both SVPE and AVPE 
signals revealed with uncorrected significance differences between the groups 
specifically in clusters within the dorsal striatum that overlap with those identified 
for the Good learners alone (Supp. Fig. 6a,b).  Another direct contrast with 
respect to action‑value signals revealed a region of vmPFC overlapping with that 
identified as encoding action‑value signals for the Good‑learner group (Supp. Fig. 
6c), but this effect also did not reach corrected significance. 
 
Neuroimaging analysis based on the pure Q‑learning model 
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Considering that the fits of the ACQ(λ) and Q(0) models to the behavioral data 
were comparable after formally penalizing model complexity, we conducted a 
separate fMRI analysis instead based on the Q(0) model and thus by design 
accounting for an AVPE signal alone rather than the AVPE together with the 
SVPE.  The results for this AVPE were qualitatively similar to the results found for 
the AVPE derived from the ACQ model as reported above, and hence the Q(0) 
results are not reported in further detail here.  Indeed, as with the AVPE signal 
initially produced by the ACQ model, no significant effects of the AVPE derived 
from the Q(0) model were found within the dopaminergic midbrain (p > 0.005).  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Utilizing formal computational modeling together with high‑resolution fMRI, we 
aimed to determine the nature of prediction‑error signals encoded within 
dopaminergic nuclei of the tegmentum and efferent striatal structures during 
learning and performance of a sequential instrumental‑conditioning task with an 
MDP including passive states.  This novel task was designed to facilitate 
discrimination of two distinct forms of RPE signals—namely, the SVPE, by which 
errors in predictions about the expected values of successive states are used to 
update state values as well as action weights, and the AVPE, by which errors in 
predictions about the expected values of actions are used to update explicit action 
values.  Furthermore, with multiple variants of RL algorithms to choose from such 
as the actor/critic model, action‑value‑learning models, and hybrid models, this 
approach enabled us to determine which variety of an RL model best accounts for 
not only behavior but also neural activity in the dopaminergic nuclei and their 
striatal targets during instrumental learning coupled with passive (i.e., Pavlovian) 
conditioning. 
 
As a partial confirmation of our initial hypothesis and a contradiction to the 
assumptions of a strict action‑value‑learning model, we found evidence for the 
presence of SVPE signals within the dopaminergic midbrain—specifically, in the 
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SN.  Consistent with our expectations was evidence for an SVPE signal in the 
ventral striatum.  On the other hand, contrary to what we initially expected, we also 
found evidence for SVPE signals in the caudate nucleus within a dorsal‑striatal 
ROI previously implicated in instrumental conditioning (Schönberg et al., 2007; 
Chase et al., 2015). 
 
The presence of SVPE signals in the dopaminergic midbrain as well as both the 
ventral striatum and the dorsal striatum provide direct evidence in support of the 
operation of an actor/critic mechanism in the basal ganglia (Houk et al., 1995; 
Montague et al., 1996; Suri & Schultz, 1998, 1999; Joel et al., 2002; O’Doherty et 
al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006a).  According to this actor/critic theory, a common 
SVPE signal would be utilized by not only the ventral‑striatal critic module to 
update a cached state value but also the dorsal‑striatal actor module to update the 
action policy. 
 
Our findings also suggest that the actor/critic dyad is not the only mechanism in 
play.  A hitherto unexplored possibility was that learning here can be accounted for 
not by a pure actor/critic model alone nor even by an action‑value‑learning model 
alone but rather by a hybrid of the two models that combines predictions from their 
respective algorithms in order to compute net action weights.  Complementing the 
SVPE signals within the striatum that would be produced by a state‑value‑learning 
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algorithm, there was also distinct evidence for the representation of AVPE signals 
that would be produced by an action‑value‑learning algorithm.  These AVPE 
signals were robustly represented within the ventral striatum alongside the SVPE 
signals described earlier.  These AVPE signals also extended into the dorsal 
striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004), and there was evidence—albeit uncorrected—
suggesting that dorsal‑striatal AVPE signals were associated with superior learning 
performance on the task—being more strongly represented in Good learners than 
Poor learners.  In harmony with the ACQ model, the findings of both the actor/critic 
model’s SVPE and the action‑value‑learning model’s AVPE within the striatum 
imply that both an actor/critic mechanism and an action‑value‑learning mechanism 
operate in parallel as part of an integrated learning system in the nigrostriatal 
circuit. 
 
The evidence demonstrated here in support of the coexistence of two different 
computational strategies within the basal ganglia resonates with a burgeoning 
literature surrounding the notion of multiple learning and control systems that 
interact to collectively drive behavior (Daw et al., 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2017).  
Typically, such interactions have been suggested to take place between 
model‑based control and model‑free RL (Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; 
Lee et al., 2014; Doll et al., 2015), as opposed to the interactions between two 
distinct model‑free RL mechanisms emphasized here.  In the present paradigm, 
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we also sought possible evidence of model‑based control or some hybrid of 
model‑based and model‑free learning.  However, the results of our model 
comparison did not support significant involvement of a model‑based system in the 
present experiment.  This null result was likely for the reason that the MDP in the 
present study was not designed to elicit model‑based control—being focused 
instead on dissociating the SVPE and the AVPE.  Hence, model‑free control was 
set up to be a sufficiently useful strategy for driving behavior on this task. 
 
The present findings support the functioning of purely model‑free actor/critic and 
action‑value‑learning mechanisms alongside each other but could possibly also 
align to some extent with other recent suggestions of roles for RL algorithms based 
on successor‑state representations or latent‑state representations in human 
learning (Dayan, 1993; Akam et al., 2015; Momennejad et al., 2017; Russek et al., 
2017).  Effectively occupying an intermediate position between the dichotomous 
extremes of model‑free and model‑based strategies, a successor‑representation 
system constitutes a degenerate model‑based system retaining some 
model‑based features such as devaluation sensitivity without incurring the costly 
computational demands associated with encoding a rich model of the state space 
and explicitly computing action values via planning.  Although the present task—
having not been designed for such purposes—is not suited to assess evidence 
specifically in favor of a successor‑representation scheme, there does remain a 
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possibility that the action‑value‑learning component of our ACQ model in particular 
might be mimicking some effects of this more sophisticated system.  In a similar 
vein, the “Dyna” architecture (Sutton, 1990)—notwithstanding its less 
straightforward putative neural implementation—approximates model‑based 
dynamic‑programming methods but is also based on model‑free action‑value 
learning.  Yet, additional work will be necessary to further dissociate and verify the 
predictions made by the different classes of models and hybrids of these across 
different experimental settings. 
 
In addition to testing for signatures of prediction‑error signals in the BOLD 
response, we also tested for signaling of the state values and action values being 
learned.  We found evidence for each of these signals within vmPFC as expected.  
These findings align with previous reports of correlations with expected value for 
both actions and stimuli in this area (Gläscher et al., 2009; Bartra et al., 2013; 
Clithero & Rangel, 2014).  However, the present findings do constitute an 
important advance beyond this previous literature in demonstrating the 
engagement of these two distinct value signals simultaneously during performance 
of a single integrated task.  Furthermore, action‑value signals in vmPFC were 
associated with superior performance of the task, whereas analogous state‑value 
signals in vmPFC were not. 
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Another important feature of the present study that sets it apart from many 
previous studies of the representation of RL signals is the usage of a 
high‑resolution functional‑neuroimaging protocol.  Along with optimized 
preprocessing and between‑subject spatial normalization, this spatial resolution 
allowed us to discriminate not only signals in individual dopaminergic nuclei of the 
human midbrain but also signals at precise loci within the striatum.  For instance, 
we were able to focally identify evidence for qualitatively distinct prediction‑error 
signals within different subregions of the dorsal striatum.  As such, the present 
study helps to provide new insights into potential specializations even within the 
dorsal subdivision of the striatum in terms of the computations encoded therein.  
Future high‑resolution studies in turn can utilize our findings here as priors in order 
to motivate yet more specific hypotheses about regional specialization. 
 
While the high‑resolution protocol we used enables new insights into detailed 
functional neuroanatomy within nigrostriatal circuits, this approach is not without 
inherent technical challenges and limitations.  Firstly, there are difficulties in 
applying techniques for multiple‑ comparison correction that were originally 
developed for conventional imaging protocols with lower resolution.  This issue is 
not only due in part to the vastly increased (i.e., by roughly an order of magnitude) 
number of voxels that must be corrected for within a volume or a given region of 
interest but also perhaps to some extent due to the distributional (e.g., Gaussian) 
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assumptions underpinning such multiple‑comparison methods that might not apply 
in the same way for more finely sampled data.  Another limitation of our 
high‑resolution protocol is the tradeoff between resolution and signal‑to‑noise ratio 
in fMRI; as the voxel size is decreased, the signal‑to‑noise ratio decreases 
correspondingly.  As a result of these challenges, only the results that we report in 
the main manuscript figures survived small‑volume correction, whereas some of 
the other results reported (Supp. Figs. 3‑6) did not reach fully corrected 
significance within our a‑priori search volumes.  To ensure that these search 
volumes were as unbiased as possible, we used significant coordinates from the 
two meta‑analyses on RL in the human brain that have been published to date 
(Garrison et al., 2013; Chase et al., 2015).  However, as these meta‑analyses 
were based on neuroimaging studies at conventional resolutions rather than the 
high spatial resolution available here, there was less potential to motivate more 
neuroanatomically precise hypotheses at this relatively early stage.  This being 
exploratory research as such, we documented all of the effects that we found in 
the striatum—even for clusters that did not quite achieve corrected significance.  
These limitations notwithstanding, we have to note the important caveat that the 
uncorrected results reported in the supplementary figures will require further 
confirmation and should therefore be viewed as tentative.  That said, these 
findings do in fact overlap sensibly with prior literature in expected ways, such as, 
for instance, the link we observed between not only AVPE‑related activity but also 
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SVPE‑related activity in the dorsal striatum and behavioral performance, a trend 
that is consistent with and adds to previous findings by Schönberg and colleagues 
(2007).  However, it remains possible that the between‑group comparisons in the 
present study are somewhat underpowered, and thus larger sample sizes for the 
subgroups of Good learners and Poor learners would be warranted in a future 
study to confirm and further investigate the relationship between dorsal‑striatal 
prediction‑error signals and behavioral performance. 
 
The contrast between the observed presence of SVPE signals in the SN and the 
absence of such significant effects in the VTA is also of note.  Although one 
previous high‑resolution fMRI study has reported parametric effects of RPE in the 
VTA as well as the SN (D’Ardenne et al., 2013), another study by our group 
identified RPE signals in the SN but not the VTA (Pauli et al., 2015).  The absence 
of SVPE signals in the VTA could be a manifestation of the difficulty inherent to 
capturing BOLD responses related to prediction‑error signals in this minute region 
(Düzel et al., 2009, 2015; Barry et al., 2013) or instead might provide information 
about the specific roles (or lack thereof) for the VTA in a task of this variety.  
Another issue arising from the present findings is that while AVPE signals were 
observed in the striatum as expected, no such signals were found within the 
dopaminergic midbrain, which exclusively exhibited correlations with the SVPE.  
This discrepancy raises the question of how the AVPE signals in the striatum 
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originate if correlates of these signals are not also evident in the dopaminergic 
midbrain.  While it is important to avoid too strong of an inference from a null 
result—especially as a direct contrast between the SVPE and the AVPE did not 
reveal any significant differences—one possibility is that the AVPE is not computed 
within the dopaminergic nuclei at all.  Rather, these AVPE signals may be 
computed elsewhere, whereby they serve to augment the information in the SVPE 
generated by a dopamine‑mediated actor/critic system.  A more prosaic 
explanation for this pattern could be that we have somewhat less statistical power 
to detect the AVPE as compared with the SVPE because the SVPE was elicited 
across both the passive and active states included in our MDP, whereas the AVPE 
was only present following active states in which participants actually performed an 
action and also had more of an opportunity to maximize reward and thus reduce 
signal variance.  Yet, in spite of this difference, we nonetheless did observe robust 
AVPE signals throughout both the ventral striatum and the dorsal striatum while 
related effects were not present in the midbrain even at extremely lax statistical 
thresholds.  These contrasting positive results suggest statistical power might not 
be the sole explanation for the observed difference in midbrain responsivity 
between the SVPE and the AVPE, but it will be important to follow up on these 
preliminary observations in order to reach more definitive conclusions about the 
role of the human dopaminergic midbrain in encoding of the AVPE or lack thereof. 
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To conclude, this study provides evidence that an actor/critic mechanism operating 
in concert with an additional action‑value‑learning mechanism provides an apt 
account of prediction‑error‑related neural activity within the human SN and the 
striatum.  The SVPE was robustly encoded in the SN, the ventral striatum, and the 
dorsal striatum, which is consistent with the literal implementation of an actor/critic 
mechanism.  On the other hand, we also observed evidence for signals related to 
the updating of action values per se, which is compatible with an additional 
integration of action‑value learning into this architecture.  Collectively, these results 
begin to shed light on the nature of the prediction‑error computations emerging 
from the nigrostriatal system in the human brain.  
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METHODS 
 
Ethics statement 
 
Human participants provided informed written consent for protocols approved by 
the California Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board. 
 
Participants 
 
Thirty‑nine participants ranging between 18 and 39 years old from Caltech and the 
local community volunteered for the study. Participants were first screened for MRI 
contraindications. All participants were right‑handed and generally in good health. 
Demographic information is included in Table 1. Participants were paid $40 for 
completing the study in addition to earnings from the task. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
Shown in Figure 1 is a schematic of the task that includes transition probabilities 
for one of two Markov decision processes (MDPs) within one of three blocks as 
defined by said probabilities.  A white fixation cross subtending 0.7° x 0.7° of visual 
angle was presented alone against the dark gray background throughout the 
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intertrial interval (ITI).  The duration of the ITI was drawn without replacement 
within a run from a discrete uniform distribution ranging from 4 to 8 s in increments 
of 80 ms.  The fixation cross remained within the display at all times.  Passive and 
active trial types and the two initial states specific to each occurred with equal 
probability.  Trials were also ordered in a series of randomized quartets each 
including all four initial states for balance.  A pre‑trial cue with a duration of 1 s was 
first presented on either side of the fixation cross in the form of two white circles or 
two white arrows—for passive trials or active trials, respectively—each subtending 
0.7° x 0.7° at an eccentricity of 2.4° to indicate an upcoming passive or active trial, 
respectively. 
 
Following a pre‑trial cue for a passive trial, one of two fractal cues subtending 3.7° 
x 3.7° that each represented a first‑stage passive state appeared for 1.5 s with 
equal probability while the circles remained onscreen.  The transition probabilities 
for the first‑stage state determined which of two second‑stage passive cues (i.e., 
fractals) was to be presented next for 1.5 s following an interstimulus interval (ISI) 
of 3.5 s.  In consideration of the sensitivity of these learning algorithms to the 
timing of outcomes, the jitter typical of rapid event‑related functional 
magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI) studies was forgone here in favor of stable 
prediction‑error signals.  The transition probabilities for the second‑stage state 
determined whether the final outcome reached after a second ISI of 3.5 s was an 
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intact image of equal size depicting a dime, which with every encounter 
corresponded to an actual 10‑cent reward, or a scrambled version of the coin’s 
image, which would correspond to the absence of reward for that trial.  The 
scrambled version of the dime image was generated by dividing the intact image 
into an even 34 x 34 grid and randomly rearranging the resulting fragments. 
 
Following a pre‑trial cue for an active trial, one of two fractals that each 
represented a first‑stage active state appeared with equal probability while the 
arrows remained onscreen.  The subject was allotted 1.5 s to respond by pressing 
a button with either the left or the right index finger.  Only the arrow corresponding 
to the subject’s choice continued to be displayed between the time of response 
and stimulus offset.  The transition probabilities for the action given the state 
determined which of the aforementioned pair of second‑stage passive states was 
to be presented next.  Thus, passive and active trials were comparable in 
sequence and timing following offset of the first‑stage cue.  If the subject made a 
technical error by failing to respond in time for an active cue or responding 
inappropriately for a passive cue, only a red fixation cross was presented for the 
remainder of the trial as an indication of the loss of an opportunity to receive a 
reward. 
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The transition probabilities were structured with some degree of symmetry as 
follows.  For a given block, a greater probability of transitioning to a reward state 
from one second‑stage state would correspond to a lesser probability of reward for 
the other second‑stage state.  Likewise, a greater probability of transitioning to a 
given second‑stage state from one first‑stage passive state corresponds to a 
lesser probability of transitioning to that same second‑stage state from the other 
first‑stage passive state.  The same inverse relationship applied to the action pairs 
for each of the active first‑stage states, such that the mapping between actions 
and probabilities was inverted across the two states.  To illustrate, if the left hand 
were to yield the greatest expected value for one active state, the right hand would 
yield the greatest expected value for the other active state.  Optimal performance 
is therefore sharply defined in this context. 
 
Prior to the main experiment, the subject was required to complete a 10‑trial 
practice session during structural scanning with a distinct set of fractals and 
hypothetical monetary incentives.  The subject was explicitly instructed in 
layperson’s terms that the trial sequence always retained the Markov property and 
did not maintain fixed transition probabilities across the course of the entire 
session.  The 200 trials of the experiment were divided into a first block of 80 trials 
and two subsequent blocks of 60 trials each.  The onset of a new block was 
defined by reversals of transition probabilities within an active state or between 
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temporally aligned passive states.  Although the subject was informed that the 
transition probabilities of the MDP could change throughout the session, no explicit 
indication of how or when reversals occurred was provided.  Likewise, the onsets 
of each 50‑trial scanning run were intentionally decoupled from the onsets of 
blocks.  Factors counterbalanced together across subjects were based on whether 
the initial reversal occurred for the first stage or the second stage as well as the 
mapping of the arbitrarily defined actions to the left and right hands.  This 
manipulation and the randomization of the sequences in each session overall 
ensured the generalizability of the observed effects when taking advantage of 
group‑level analyses—but with the inevitable expense of added intersubject noise. 
 
Stimuli were projected onto a 19‑inch screen that was viewed in the MRI scanner 
with an angled mirror from a distance of 100 cm.  The display was presented with 
a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz.  Fractal images were 
chromatic and had a resolution of 170 x 170 pixels.  The mapping between the six 
fractal images and the states they represent was randomized for each subject.  
The interface was programmed using MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997). 
 
Data acquisition 
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Magnetic‑resonance imaging (MRI) data were acquired at the Caltech Brain 
Imaging Center using a 3‑T Siemens Magnetom Tim Trio scanner and a 
32‑channel receive‑only phased‑array head coil.  To guide the functional imaging, 
a structural volume of the entire brain was acquired first using a T1‑weighted 
magnetization‑prepared rapid gradient‑echo (MPRAGE) sequence (repetition time 
(TR): 1500 ms, echo time (TE): 2.74 ms, inversion time (TI): 800 ms, flip angle 
(FA): 10°, voxel: 1.0 mm isotropic, field of view (FOV): 176 x 256 x 256 mm). 
 
High‑resolution functional images were acquired with a 
blood‑oxygen‑level‑dependent (BOLD) contrast using a T2*‑weighted 
gradient‑echo echo‑planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR: 2770 ms, TE: 30 ms, FA: 
81°, phase oversampling: 75%, acceleration factor: 2, voxel: 1.5 mm isotropic, 
FOV: 96 x 96 x 60 mm).  The in‑plane field of view of these images was restricted 
to covering the midbrain and the striatum using phase‑encoding oversampling with 
controlled foldover.  Forty contiguous slices were collected in 
interleaved‑ascending order for each volume.  Geometric distortions in EPI data 
were corrected using B0 field maps derived from dual gradient‑echo sequences 
acquired between functional scanning runs (TR: 415 ms, TE1: 3.76 ms, TE2: 6.22 
ms, FA: 60°, voxel: 2.5 x 2.5 x 2.6 mm, FOV: 200 x 200 x 125 mm).  Cardiac and 
respiratory signals were recorded during scanning via a peripheral pulse oximeter 
and an abdominal bellows, respectively.  The functional imaging was divided into 
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four scanning runs, each having a duration of roughly 15 min that corresponded to 
50 trials.  The first two volumes of each run were discarded to allow for 
magnetization equilibration. 
 
In the interest of discerning minute anatomical structures within the midbrain 
(Eapen et al., 2011), the volumetric resolution of the functional pulse sequence 
(i.e., 3.4 mm3) was designed to be almost an order of magnitude lower than that 
achieved in more typical fMRI protocols with a standard isotropic spatial resolution 
between 3 mm and 4 mm corresponding to a volumetric resolution between 27 
mm3 and 64 mm3.  Such an enhancement could only be achieved at the expense 
of both the signal‑to‑noise ratio and the spatial extent of the functional images, 
leaving limited coverage beyond subcortical areas.  Nevertheless, the reduced 
field of view did not interfere with the study inasmuch as its scope was to be 
restricted to the dopaminergic midbrain, the striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) a priori.  Some omission of the rostralmost portion of vmPFC 
beyond the cingulate gyrus was tolerated because hypothetical value signals in 
vmPFC were assigned less priority than the hypothetical prediction‑error signals in 
the basal ganglia that form the cornerstone of the present research. 
 
The actor/critic (AC) model 
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Considering algorithms for reinforcement learning (RL) (Minsky, 1961; Bertsekas & 
Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) via the temporal‑difference (TD) prediction 
method (Sutton, 1988), the first candidate for model‑free (i.e., habitual) learning 
(Thorndike, 1898; Pavlov, 1927) was the actor/critic (AC) model (Witten, 1977; 
Barto et al., 1983; Sutton, 1984).  The AC model posits that the only 
reward‑prediction error (RPE) that is computed is a state‑value‑prediction error 
(SVPE).  The “critic” module central to this feedback‑driven learning process lacks 
any representation of actions despite transmitting common input to the “actor” 
module.  Thus, the algorithm is simpler and somewhat more parsimonious than the 
action‑value‑learning algorithm detailed below in spite of comparable free 
parameters. 
 
The RL framework reduces the environment to an MDP in terms of sets of states s 
∈ S and actions a ∈ {A|s}.  Considering that the novel cues have no previous 
associations with reinforcers, a naïve agent lacks priors for value estimates and 
therefore initializes the expected values of these states Vt(s) to zero: 
 ∀	𝑠:		𝑉; 𝑠 = 0 
 
For each state transition within a trial, the TD algorithm updates the previous 
state‑value estimate Vt(st) by computing the SVPE δVt as determined by either the 
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current reward rt+1 or the current value estimate Vt(st+1) predicting future rewards or 
lack thereof.  The standard discount factor γ was omitted here (i.e., γ = 1) 
inasmuch as only one reward could be delivered after a constant delay across all 
trials, leaving this reduced delta‑learning rule: 
 𝛿VW = 𝑟VYM + 𝑉V 𝑠VYM − 𝑉V 𝑠V  
 
This model is formally referred to as the “AC(λ)” model with the addition of the 
“TD(λ)” eligibility trace that facilitates rapid learning across serial events.  The 
eligibility trace of this TD(λ) prediction‑error signal weights updates prior to the 
most immediate one according to the eligibility λ as the base of an exponential 
function modulating the learning rate α.  With discretely episodic paradigms such 
as in the present study, the eligibility trace only propagates back to trial onset t0.  
Thus, for λ > 0, the final state transition within a trial not only updates the value 
estimate for the second‑stage cue by αδVt but also updates the value estimate for 
the first‑stage cue by αλδVt as follows (where Ζ* denotes the set of nonnegative 
integers): 
 ∀	 𝑛 ∈ ℤ∗	|	𝑛 ≤ 𝑡 − 𝑡; :		𝑉VYM 𝑠V_` = 𝑉V 𝑠V_` + 𝛼𝜆`𝛿VW 
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Rather than representing the expected values of individual actions in the AC 
model, the actor of the actor/critic dyad encodes the weights of its stochastic 
action‑selection policy πt(s,a) in proportion to relative action preferences pt(s,a) that 
are likewise initialized to zero and then updated by the same SVPE δVt: 
 ∀	 𝑛 ∈ ℤ∗	|	𝑛 ≤ 𝑡 − 𝑡; :		𝑝VYM 𝑠V_`, 𝑎V_` = 𝑝V 𝑠V_`, 𝑎V_` + 𝛼𝜆`𝛿VW 
 
The Q‑learning (Q) model 
 
Representing in contrast the action‑value‑learning methods, the Q‑learning (Q) 
model (Watkins, 1989) remains within the domain of model‑free RL but takes the 
slightly more efficient approach of computing action values for active states and 
utilizing an action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) in doing so.  In its purest form, the 
Q model lacks representations of state‑value estimates and thus is insensitive to 
passive states as conditioned reinforcers.  In lieu of the state values characteristic 
of the AC model, the action values Qt(s,a) are initialized to zero: 
 ∀	 𝑠, 𝑎 :		𝑄; 𝑠, 𝑎 = 0 
 
The Q model’s more complex variant of the TD algorithm updates the previous 
action‑value estimate Qt(st,at) by computing the AVPE δQt as determined by either 
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the current reward rt+1 or the maximum of the current action‑value estimates 
Qt(st+1,a) predicting rewards or lack thereof: 
 𝛿Vf = 𝑟VYM + maxTg 𝑄V 𝑠VYM, 𝑎h − 𝑄V 𝑠V, 𝑎V  
 
Again, the TD(λ) prediction‑error signal would generate an eligibility trace that 
extends backward in time beyond the most recent state and action: 
 ∀	 𝑛 ∈ ℤ∗	|	𝑛 ≤ 𝑡 − 𝑡; :		𝑄VYM 𝑠V_`, 𝑎V_` = 𝑄V 𝑠V_`, 𝑎V_` + 𝛼𝜆`𝛿Vf 
 
However, in the case of the present study, there was only a single action available 
per episode, meaning that only the Q(0) model lacking an eligibility parameter λ 
could be fitted.  A related aspect of the present paradigm was that the “off‑policy” 
Q‑learning method could not be readily distinguished from an “on‑policy” 
counterpart such as the state‑action‑reward‑state‑action (SARSA) method 
(Rummery & Niranjan, 1994).  The former computes an AVPE using the maximal 
expected value across subsequently available actions, whereas the latter 
computes an AVPE using the value of the action actually chosen according to the 
current policy.  For clarity in this study, we elected to focus on only Q learning as 
the canonical archetype of an action‑value‑learning algorithm and thus do not 
consider the SARSA model further. 
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The critic/Q‑learner (CQ) model 
 
The hybridized “critic/Q‑learner” (CQ) model essentially retains the action values 
and the AVPE of the Q model for active states but also represents both active and 
passive states in terms of state values and the SVPE as the critic would even in 
the absence of its complementary actor.  If active and passive states are in 
sequence as in the present study, more information becomes available to guide 
control for the CQ model than for a pure action‑value‑learning model. 
 
To adhere to the equations described in the preceding sections, the values of 
passive states Vt(s) and the values of state‑action pairs Qt(s,a) can nominally be 
referred to collectively for the CQ model with the introduction of a null 
“pseudoaction” A0.  However, this notational simplification should not be 
misconstrued as implying actual equivalence in the neural representations of the 
SVPE δVt and the AVPE δQt, which still function separately for passive and active 
states, respectively: 
 ∀	 𝑠	|	 𝐴	|	𝑠 = ∅ :		𝑄V 𝑠, 𝐴; ≡ 𝑉V 𝑠  
 
The actor/critic/Q‑learner (ACQ) model 
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Although the actor/critic and Q‑learning models have typically each been 
considered in isolation, they are neither mutually exclusive in practice nor mutually 
exclusive in theory.  The “actor/critic/Q‑learner” (ACQ) model was introduced as a 
novel model‑free hybrid that incorporates the SVPE as well as the AVPE into 
updates for active states according to a parameter for action‑value weighting, wQ.  
The AC model (i.e., wQ = 0) and the CQ model (wQ = 1) are thus both nested in the 
ACQ model.  Such hybridization entails the representation of net action values 
QVt(s,a) incorporating both action and state values.  One possible interpretation of 
this integration could be that the simpler (but also more generalizable) information 
maintained within the critic module leaks into the richer action‑specific 
representations of value within the Q‑learner module: 
 𝑄VW 𝑠, 𝑎 = 𝑤f𝑄V 𝑠, 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑤f)𝑉V 𝑠  
 
The complete ACQ(λ) model retains not only the SVPE and the AVPE but also the 
respective eligibility traces for each of the dual updates as described in the 
preceding models.  The weighting parameter wQ likewise dictates the net 
action‑value‑prediction error δQ,Vt  as follows: 
 𝛿Vf,W = 𝑤f𝛿Vf + (1 − 𝑤f)𝛿VW 
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The ACQ model does not directly factor net action values into the decision‑making 
process, however.  Rather, the SVPE δVt  and the AVPE δQt  similarly update a net 
action weight Wt(s,a) that integrates the actor’s action preference pt(s,a) and the 
Q‑learner’s action value Qt(s,a) as combined inputs to the policy πt(s,a): 
 𝑊V 𝑠, 𝑎 = 𝑤f𝑄V 𝑠, 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑤f)𝑝V 𝑠, 𝑎  
 
The model‑based (MB) model 
 
As model‑free learning was the primary focus of the present study, the task was 
not designed in such a way that a model‑based (i.e., goal‑directed) learning 
(Tolman, 1948) system would be likely to take effect.  Nevertheless, only a 
rigorous model comparison as conducted here could entirely rule out the possibility 
of more complex model‑based learning as opposed to direct RL. 
 
The model‑based (MB) model (Bellman, 1957; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Gläscher et 
al., 2010) features an optimal dynamic‑programming algorithm that—unlike the TD 
algorithm—plans forward in time and maintains explicit estimates of the transition 
probabilities of the MDP as part of a transition function T.  Diverging from the 
model‑free learner’s estimates of value even at the first time step, a naïve 
model‑based learner initializes the transition matrix with uniform priors over 
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feasible target states s’ ∈ {S|(s,a)}, which happen to always be binarized in this 
case.  Adhering to the convention used for Q‑learning, passive and active states 
are not differentiated merely for the sake of readability: 
 ∀	 𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠h :		𝑇; 𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠h = 1/|{𝑆	|	(𝑠, 𝑎)}| = 1/2 
 
The MB algorithm updates the probability estimates by computing a 
state‑prediction error (SPE) δ*t analogous to the model‑free RPE (i.e., the SVPE 
δVt or the AVPE δQt) but unique in that is determined by the probability of the 
outcome state st+1 itself: 
 𝛿V∗ = 1 − 𝑇V 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠VYM  
 
The estimated probability of the observed transition is thus increased in 
accordance with the model‑based learning rate α*: 
 𝑇VYM 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠VYM = 𝑇V 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠VYM + 𝛼∗𝛿V∗ 
 
The probability estimates for all transitions other than that observed must be 
proportionally decreased as well: 
 ∀	 𝑠h	 	 𝑠V, 𝑎V ∧ 𝑠h ≠ 𝑠VYM}:		𝑇VYM 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠h = 𝑇V 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠h − 𝛼∗𝑇V 𝑠V, 𝑎V, 𝑠h  
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Utilizing the transition function, the MB learner’s action‑value estimates Q*t(s,a) 
correspond to explicit expectations for successor states, their outcomes in turn, 
and their known rewards per a reward function R(s).  Whereas model‑free value 
estimates at the first stage are updated only on trials for which they have been 
encountered, all of their model‑based counterparts are updated on every trial with 
the influx of any new information.  The dynamic‑programming algorithm 
accomplishes this by recursively evaluating the following Bellman optimality 
equation: 
 
∀	 𝑠, 𝑎 :		𝑄VYM∗ 𝑠, 𝑎 = 𝑇VYM 𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠hsg∈t|(s,T) 𝑅 𝑠h + maxTg 𝑄VYM∗ 𝑠h, 𝑎h  
 
Computational modeling of action selection 
 
The “ACQ(λ)+MB” model, which is the full hybrid model within which every 
reduced model was nested, assumes that both model‑free systems and the 
model‑based system all operate as subcomponents in parallel.  As the ACQ model 
already specifies a net action weight Wt(s,a) for model‑free learning, the 
model‑based weighting parameter w* controls the weighting of model‑based input 
relative to model‑free and thus accommodates the cases of exclusively model‑free 
learning (i.e., w* = 0), exclusively model‑based learning (w* = 1), or both types of 
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learning in parallel (0 < w* < 1) with a model‑based/model‑free net action weight 
W*t(s,a): 
 𝑊V∗ 𝑠, 𝑎 = 𝑤∗𝑄V∗ 𝑠, 𝑎 + (1 − 𝑤∗)𝑊V 𝑠, 𝑎  
 
With regard to action selection, all of the learning algorithms converge on a Gibbs 
softmax model (Shepard, 1957; Luce, 1959; Sutton & Barto, 1998).  This 
augmented version models hysteresis via a perseveration bias βt(s,a) (Lau & 
Glimcher, 2005) as well as a constant choice bias βR with the arbitrary convention 
that positive and negative map onto rightward and leftward biases, respectively.  
Learned and intrinsic biases were all incorporated into the probabilistic 
action‑selection policy πt(s,a) via the following softmax function with temperature τ, 
which regulates the stochasticity of choices.  This equation reduces to a logistic 
function in this paradigm’s two‑alternative forced‑choice task: 
 
𝜋V 𝑠V, 𝑎 = 𝑃 𝑎V = 𝑎	|	𝑠V = exp 𝑊V∗ 𝑠V, 𝑎 + 𝛽V 𝑠V, 𝑎 + 𝛽y𝐼y 𝑎 /𝜏exp 𝑊V∗ 𝑠V, 𝑎h + 𝛽V 𝑠V, 𝑎h + 𝛽y𝐼y 𝑎h /𝜏Tg∈||s}  
 
Modeling hysteresis in terms of the dynamics of cumulative perseveration biases 
first requires an initialization of βt(s,a), which is here notated so as not to be 
confused with the parameter β0: 
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 ∀	 𝑠, 𝑎 :		𝛽V~; 𝑠, 𝑎 = 0 
 
A counter variable Ct(s), indexing the number of arrivals to a state s, is similarly 
initialized: 
 ∀	𝑠:		𝐶; 𝑠 = 0 
 
The arrival‑counter variable is simply incremented after each encounter with a 
given state: 
 𝐶V 𝑠V = 𝐶V_M 𝑠V + 1 
 
According to this arrival index, the indicator function IC(s)(s,a) tracks the history of 
all state‑action pairs: 
 
∀	 𝑎	|	𝑠V :		𝐼} s} 𝑠V, 𝑎 = 	1, 𝑎 = 𝑎V	0, 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎V 
 
The exponential decay of the perseveration bias is determined by its initial 
magnitude β0 and inverse decay rate λβ.  The latter is notated with the convention 
used for the eligibility trace, such that λ and λβ both correspond to the complement 
of (i.e., unity minus) the decay rate.  The exponential decay of a perseveration bias 
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occurs within a state per each action executed in that state, as described in the 
following equation that integrates cumulative perseveration biases: 
 
∀	 𝑎	|	𝑠V :		𝛽VYM 𝑠V, 𝑎 = 𝛽;𝜆`𝐼} s} _` 𝑠V, 𝑎} s} _M`~;  
 
Finally, the indicator function IR(a) arbitrarily dictates the constant choice bias like 
so (where “R” and “L” stand for right action and left action, respectively): 
 
𝐼y 𝑎 = 	1, 𝑎 = 𝐴y	0, 𝑎 = 𝐴  
 
The full ACQ(λ)+MB model includes nine free parameters altogether—viz., 
model‑free learning rate α, eligibility λ, action‑value weight wQ, model‑based 
learning rate α*, model‑based weight w*, softmax temperature τ, rightward bias βR, 
and initial magnitude β0 coupled with inverse decay rate λβ for exponential decay 
of the perseveration bias—with the following constraints: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 
wQ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α* ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w* ≤ 1, τ > 0, 0 ≤ λβ ≤ 1.  The different types of model‑free 
learning, eligibility traces either decaying or constant (i.e., λ = 1), and model‑based 
learning were all counterbalanced factors in the formal comparison of 22 nested 
models. 
 
Model fitting 
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Along with the hysteresis model and a null intercept model, 21 learning models—
namely, Q(0), AC(0), AC(1), AC(λ), CQ(0), CQ(1), CQ(λ), ACQ(0), ACQ(1), 
ACQ(λ), MB, Q(0)+MB, AC(0)+MB, AC(1)+MB, AC(λ)+MB, CQ(0)+MB, 
CQ(1)+MB, CQ(λ)+MB, ACQ(0)+MB, ACQ(1)+MB, and ACQ(λ)+MB—were all 
fitted to each individual subject’s behavior using maximum likelihood estimation.  
By capturing constant choice biases and response perseveration or alternation, 
the 4‑parameter hysteresis model with learning rates fixed at zero offers a nested 
learning‑independent control model more viable than the null intercept model with 
its lone parameter P(A1).  Thus, sensitivity to outcomes or lack thereof can be 
detected with greater precision by setting the performance of the hysteresis model 
as a benchmark for comparison with learning models.  Tuning parameters were 
optimized with respect to goodness of fit for each subject using iterations of the 
Nelder‑Mead simplex algorithm (Nelder & Mead, 1965) with randomized seeding. 
 
To adjust for model complexity when performing the model comparisons, we used 
the Akaike information criterion with correction for finite sample size (AICc) 
(Akaike, 1974; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989).  The preferred model ideally balancing 
parsimony and accuracy on the basis of the behavioral model fits would then be 
used for the subsequent neuroimaging analysis.  To verify the discriminability of 
the preferred ACQ(λ) model here, each fitted instantiation of the model was used 
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to simulate an artificial data set yoked to that of the respective subject for another 
model comparison.  Furthermore, an artificial data set was also simulated in 
accordance with the ACQ model, and the same model comparison was conducted 
for that data set to verify that the ACQ model could in principle be discriminated 
among the alternatives here (Supp. Fig. 1). 
 
Data analysis: Behavior 
 
Performance on the learning task was assessed for each subject by calculating 
overall accuracy—that is, the proportion of choices for which the subject chose the 
option more likely to ultimately result in delivery of an actual reward.  The earliest 
trials in which the subject encounters a state for the first time and thus lacks 
information were excluded from this metric.  Accuracy was compared with the 
chance level of 50% for each subject using a one‑tailed binomial test.  Subjects 
were initially divided into the “Good‑Learner” and “Poor‑learner” groups a priori 
according to whether or not accuracy was significantly greater than the chance 
level.  The “Nonperformer” group was subsequently distinguished as the subset of 
Poor learners whose behavior is best accounted for by the hysteresis model.  As 
the hysteresis model is characterized by absolute insensitivity to outcomes, 
Nonperformer subjects were necessarily excluded from further analysis. 
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Accuracy was compared with the chance level across subjects within the 
Good‑learner group and within the Poor‑learner group using one‑tailed 
one‑sample t tests.  Accuracy was compared between subject groups using a 
two‑tailed independent‑samples t test.  Similarly tested for between groups were 
possible confounds in the form of differences in reaction time (RT), errors such as 
missed or inappropriate responses that resulted in missed trials, or the 
demographic variables of age and gender.  Utilizing the fitted parameters for each 
subject, the sensitivity of each instantiation of the ACQ(λ) model, which was 
preferred by the AICc, was calculated as log(α(1+λ)/τ).  With logarithmic 
transformation of this metric, zero sensitivity corresponds to a balance between the 
eligibility‑adjusted learning rate and the temperature; absolute insensitivity to 
outcomes instead produces a sensitivity score approaching negative infinity.  
Positive sensitivity was tested for across subjects within each group using 
one‑tailed one‑sample t tests.  Sensitivity was compared between groups using a 
one‑tailed independent‑samples t test, and post‑hoc tests were subsequently 
conducted for learning rate, eligibility, and temperature.  Finally, a positive 
correlation between model sensitivity and empirical choice accuracy was tested for 
across all subjects using linear regression and a one‑tailed one‑sample t test. 
 
Taking quantitative estimates of internal signals as predicted by the fitted models, 
subjects’ choices were analyzed with two complementary logistic‑regression 
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models.  The first modeled the probability of a right‑action choice P(at=AR) as a 
function of the difference between the right and left options’ net action weights 
Wt(st,AR) and Wt(st,AL).  The second modeled the probability of a “stay” choice as a 
function of the difference between the net “stay” and “switch” weights, where 
“staying” or “switching” in this context refer to repeating the previous action given 
the current state or instead switching to another action, respectively.  Subjects’ 
RTs were analyzed with a linear‑regression model that captured the RT as a 
function of the absolute value of the difference between the right and left net action 
weights.  In order to accommodate intersubject variability in the range of estimated 
values encountered throughout a session, these differences in net action weights 
were normalized with respect to the maximum absolute value for each subject.  In 
preparation for the aggregate RT analysis, excessively fast contaminant 
observations were omitted at a threshold of 300 ms, which accounts for the 
cumulative temporal constraints of visual recognition, decision making, and motoric 
execution.  Parameters for these mixed‑effects models were first estimated at the 
level of an individual subject and assessed using one‑tailed one‑sample t tests.  
Parameter estimation was conducted using MATLAB and the Statistics and 
Machine Learning Toolbox.  Choice curves were plotted with inner bins having 
width equal to 0.2 times the maximum weight difference and bins at the edges 
having width equal to 0.3 times the maximum. 
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Data preprocessing 
 
Preprocessing of neuroimaging data was mostly conducted using the FMRIB 
Software Library (FSL) (Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain, University of 
Oxford).  Preprocessing steps included unwarping with field maps, slice‑timing 
correction, motion correction, and high‑pass temporal filtering at 0.01 Hz. 
 
Denoising of data first required spatial independent‑component analysis (ICA), 
which was implemented via the MELODIC (multivariate exploratory linear 
optimized decomposition into independent components) routine (Beckmann & 
Smith, 2004) in FSL.  Following decomposition, artifactual noise components were 
identified and removed using the FIX denoising algorithm (Salimi‑Khorshidi et al., 
2014) in FSL.  Moreover, the time courses of the five ICA components ranked with 
the greatest weights in the interpeduncular cistern were extracted for subsequent 
inclusion as regressors of no interest in the general linear model (GLM) (as in Pauli 
et al., 2015; Woo et al., 2015).  In addition to suffering an already poor 
signal‑to‑noise ratio, BOLD signals from the brainstem are especially susceptible 
to physiological artifacts (Enzmann & Pelc, 1992; Dagli et al., 1999; Soellinger et 
al., 2007), and the proximity of the pulsatile interpeduncular cistern to the 
tegmentum warranted this additional direct approach.  Yet another solution to 
physiological contamination lay in modeling actual cardiac and respiratory signals 
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with the RETROICOR (retrospective image correction) method (Glover et al., 
2000) as carried out by the Physiological Log Extraction for Modeling (PhLEM) 
Toolbox (Verstynen & Deshpande, 2011) with bandpass filters.  High‑ and 
low‑frequency phase information was extracted along with the broadband 
photoplethysmogram; the respective time courses were all to be included as 
regressors of no interest.  Fourier decomposition was also utilized for respiration 
before incorporating its time course into the GLM as regressors of no interest. 
 
Functional images were coregistered to a high‑resolution (i.e., 0.7‑mm isotropic), 
multimodal template (Tyszka & Pauli, 2016) in Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space with nearest‑neighbor interpolation using the Advanced Normalization 
Toolbox (ANTs) (Avants et al., 2010).  All coordinates are accordingly reported in 
MNI space.  This template is multimodal (or multivariate) in the sense of integrating 
complementary information from both T1 weighting and T2 weighting, thus 
enabling more precise alignment and delineation of subcortical structures and the 
brainstem in particular.  The final step was spatial smoothing via an isotropic 
Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 2 mm, which was 
reduced from the standard 8‑mm FWHM to preserve the fine granularity critical for 
detecting mesencephalic signals (Chase et al., 2015). 
 
Data analysis: Neuroimaging 
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Analysis of fMRI data was conducted using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London).  The 
computational‑model‑based analysis (O’Doherty et al., 2007) utilized the ACQ(λ) 
model with subject‑specific parameters as fitted for each individual.  The GLM of 
BOLD signals was essentially characterized by four parametric regressors derived 
from the ACQ(λ) model—SVPE δVt, state value Vt(st), AVPE δQt, and action value 
Qt(st,at).  These corresponded to four indicator variables as boxcar functions each 
with their own respective parametric modulators.  Action‑value and AVPE signals 
were assumed to occur during and immediately following (i.e., after the ISI) active 
states, respectively.  An active state was defined as one in which the subject was 
to select an action in order to proceed to the subsequent state.  The intermediate 
state that immediately followed an active state was incorporated into the AVPE 
computation because the updates of TD algorithms require comparison of 
successive value predictions in two temporally adjacent states in this context.  
State‑value and SVPE signals were assumed to occur during and immediately 
following both active and passive states.  A passive state was defined as one 
during which no action was required on behalf of the agent in order to transition to 
the subsequent state.  Also included in the analysis were the ITI and the pre‑trial 
cues (i.e., those cues indicating which type of trial was coming) coded as passive 
states with concomitant state‑value and SVPE signals in a manner similar to those 
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of all of the states denoted by the fractal images.  The duration of each boxcar 
function corresponded to the duration that a particular stimulus was presented with 
the exception that expected‑value signals were also assumed to persist beyond 
stimulus offset through a subsequent ISI on the grounds that one’s expectations 
should remain the same during this interval between relevant states.  Positive and 
negative prediction errors were represented symmetrically about zero along a 
common linear scale.  To better account for signal variance overall, additional 
indicator variables in the form of boxcar functions lacking parametric modulators 
were used to define the onset of various events within the sequence of a trial—
specifically, the passive‑trial cue, the active‑trial cue, the passive states with 
fractals, active states for choices of the left action, active states for choices of the 
right action, rewarded or unrewarded outcome states, and the onset of the fixation 
cross during both ISIs and ITIs.  Moreover, events were included as separate 
regressors for trials during which an error such as a missed response or an 
inappropriate response occurred and prematurely ended the trial. 
 
To rule out the possibility of signals that are in actuality AVPE signals 
contaminating the SVPE signal, the AVPE was extended to include error signals 
that updated a post‑action state value but also could update the preceding action’s 
weight via an eligibility trace.  Although AVPE signals overlap in time with the 
SVPE signals that correspond to the values of active states, the SVPE regressors 
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also extending throughout passive states were clearly dissociable from the AVPE 
regressors by this design (mean r = 0.570).  This multicollinearity was sufficiently 
subtle for the regression to not require an orthogonalization procedure that could 
potentially distort the results or their interpretation (Mumford et al., 2015). 
 
All of the above predictor variables were convolved with a canonical 
double‑gamma hemodynamic‑response function.  We also included as 
nonconvolved regressors 6 movement parameters (i.e., 3 translation and 3 
rotation), 2 variables for respiration, 9 variables for blood circulation (i.e., 4 
high‑frequency, 4 low‑frequency, and 1 broadband), 5 ICA components from the 
interpeduncular cistern, a first‑degree autoregressive (i.e., “AR(1)”) term, and a 
constant term.  GLMs were first estimated at the level of an individual subject, and 
contrasts of parameter estimates were subsequently computed for the parametric 
regressors at the group level as part of a mixed‑effects analysis.  Positive effects 
of these contrasts were tested for using one‑tailed one‑sample t tests.  The 
Good‑learner and Poor‑learner groups were analyzed collectively as well as 
separately for juxtaposition.  Furthermore, direct contrasts of the Good‑learner and 
Poor‑learner groups with respect to these parametric effects were tested in an 
independent voxel‑wise manner using one‑tailed independent‑samples t tests. 
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A pair of recent meta‑analytical studies—the only two such studies to date—were 
consulted to constrain the hypothesis space, as their findings encompass various 
fMRI results for RPE signals.  These studies are henceforth referred to as “GED” 
(Garrison et al., 2013) and “CKED” (Chase et al., 2015).  The default thresholds for 
statistical significance and cluster extent were preset at standard levels of p < 
0.005 and k ≥ 10 voxels (Forman et al., 1995; Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009).  
Whole‑brain correction was precluded by so many voxels being sampled with high 
resolution.  Regardless of this, coordinates from the meta‑analyses could guide 
a‑priori regions of interest (ROIs) as part of small‑volume correction (SVC) for 
multiple comparisons controlling the familywise error (FWE) rate at the cluster 
level.  ROIs were defined for the dopaminergic midbrain, the ventral striatum, the 
dorsal striatum, and vmPFC as spheres with 7.5‑mm radii centered at loci derived 
from rounded averages of two estimates offered by the meta‑analyses, which were 
mostly in agreement. 
 
The first two ROIs were defined by virtue of their association with RPE signals in 
appetitive Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.  The ROI for the dopaminergic 
midbrain was centered on the left side at (x = ‑9.5, y = ‑20.5, z = ‑10), taken from 
GED’s and CKED’s local maxima at (‑10, ‑20, ‑8) and (‑10, ‑20, ‑6), respectively, 
after rounding and with a minor 3‑mm ventral translation to better align with the 
precise location of this structure in the anatomical template used.  The ROI for the 
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ventral striatum was defined bilaterally near the boundary of the ventral putamen 
and the nucleus accumbens with noncontiguous centers at (14.5, 6.5, ‑8.5) and 
(‑14, 6.5, ‑8.5), taken from the average of GED’s and CKED’s peaks at (‑10, 6, ‑6) 
and (‑20, 6, ‑12), respectively.  An ROI for the dorsal striatum was defined in the 
left caudate nucleus at (‑9.5, 6.5, 14), taken from GED’s and CKED’s maxima at 
(‑8, 4, 18) and (‑10, 8, 10), respectively, for putative contrasts of instrumental as 
opposed to Pavlovian conditioning.  Finally, only one meta‑analysis furnished 
predictions for the ROI in vmPFC, which has been associated with expected value 
in RL paradigms; hence, a bilateral ROI centered at (‑0.5, 30.5, ‑13) extracted both 
of CEKD’s peaks at (4, 34, ‑6) and (‑6, 28, ‑20).  SVC is reported for all clusters 
that were identified in whole‑brain analyses and additionally withstood correction 
within these ROIs. 
 
Furthermore, the high spatial resolution of both anatomical and functional images 
allowed for activity in the dopaminergic midbrain to be localized more specifically 
to either the VTA or the SN (Eapen et al., 2011).  The tissue contrast revealed with 
T2‑weighted structural images is particularly informative inasmuch as the SN and 
the red nucleus have distinctively low intensity in these images and mark 
boundaries of the VTA with its conspicuously greater intensity.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Markov decision process.  This schematic of the task illustrates the 
transition probabilities for a Markov decision process featuring interleaved and 
interrelated passive and active states.  Passive and active types of trials occurred 
with equal probability.  On a passive trial the initial presentation of two circles was 
followed by one of two fractal cues that each represented a first‑stage passive 
state.  The transition probabilities for the first‑stage state determined which of two 
second‑stage passive states (i.e., fractals) were to be presented next.  The 
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transition probabilities for the two second‑stage states determined whether the 
final outcome was a monetary reward or nothing.  On an active trial, two arrows 
were followed by one of two fractals that each represented a first‑stage active 
state.  The transition probabilities for an action given the state determined which of 
the same pair of second‑stage passive states was to be presented next.  Solid 
lines represent transitions having an equal or relatively greater probability of 
occurring.  Dashed lines represent transitions having a relatively lower probability 
of occurring.  Dotted lines represent transitions that are determined by an action.  
The fixation cross appeared as depicted on every trial regardless of whether a 
given arrow actually passes through the representation of an interstimulus interval 
here.  
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 Good learner Poor learner Nonperformer Performer Aggregate 
n 20 15 4 35 39 
Accuracy (%) 70.9 (7.1) 53.1 (5.4) 43.5 (6.1) 63.3 (10.9) 61.2 (12.1) 
RT (ms) 755 (107) 779 (137) 712 (170) 765 (120) 760 (124) 
Missed trials 6.0 (5.2) 5.5 (5.3) 12.8 (13.1) 5.8 (5.2) 6.5 (6.5) 
Age (y) 23.5 (3.8) 25.8 (5.2) 27.3 (8.3) 24.5 (4.6) 24.7 (5.0) 
M:F (%) 50 40 100 45.7 51.3 
 
Table 4.1.  Subject groups.  Subjects were first objectively divided into two 
groups a priori according to their performance on the task as represented by the 
accuracy score listed here.  Of 39 total subjects, 20 were classified as 
“Good‑learner” subjects for whom choice accuracy was significantly greater than 
the chance score of 50% at the level of an individual subject (p < 0.05).  Of the 
remaining 19 “Poor‑learner” subjects, 4 were subsequently reclassified as 
“Nonperformer” subjects in cases of complete insensitivity to outcomes, which was 
verified with computational modeling.  There were no significant differences 
between the two main groups when considering possible confounds in reaction 
time (RT), the total number of missed trials following errors, or age and gender (p 
> 0.05).  Standard deviations are listed in parentheses by the corresponding 
means within groups. 
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Figure 4.2.  Model fitting and behavior.  (a) Average goodness of fit relative to 
the outcome‑insensitive hysteresis model across performing subjects is shown for 
each model tested with (light bars) and without (light and dark bars combined) a 
penalty for model complexity according to the AICc.  A positive residual 
corresponds to a superior fit.  After correcting for model complexity, the 
7‑parameter ACQ model provided the best overall fit for the data.  Degrees of 
freedom are listed in parentheses.  (b) At the level of individual subjects, the AICc 
generally favored a model‑free (MF) algorithm as opposed to a model‑based (MB) 
algorithm or some combination of the two within both the Good‑learner group (blue 
bars) and the Poor‑learner group (red bars).  (c) The relationship between the 
normalized difference in the net action weights Wt(st,a) predicted by the ACQ 
model and observed choices is plotted separately for the Good‑learner (blue line) 
and Poor‑learner (red line) groups.  Error bars indicate standard errors of the 
means.    
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 Good learner Poor learner 
n 20 15 
Accuracy (%) 70.9 (7.1) 53.1 (5.4) 
Sensitivity log(α(1+λ)/τ) 0.440 (0.352) 0.020 (0.417) 
Learning rate α 0.588 (0.237) 0.551 (0.308) 
Eligibility λ 0.682 (0.323) 0.687 (0.431) 
Action‑value weight wQ 0.661 (0.315) 0.626 (0.418) 
Softmax temperature τ 0.404 (0.262) 1.390 (1.512) 
Perseveration bias: magnitude β0 0.093 (0.366) ‑0.088 (0.521) 
Perseveration bias: rate λβ 0.621 (0.375) 0.751 (0.281) 
Rightward bias βR 0.230 (0.425) 0.128 (0.673) 
Null: residual deviance D6  45.60 (20.31) 21.59 (20.15) 
Hysteresis: residual deviance D3 20.18 (13.32) 9.41 (9.13) 
 
Table 4.2.  Model parameters.  The means and standard deviations of the ACQ 
model’s fitted parameters—including from the hysteresis model the (arbitrarily 
rightward) constant choice bias βR and initial magnitude β0 coupled with inverse 
decay rate λβ for exponential decay of the perseveration bias—are listed 
separately for each group, revealing a tendency for Good learners to have lower 
temperature than Poor learners (M = 0.987, t33 = 2.88, p = 0.004).  The logarithm 
of the ratio between the eligibility‑adjusted learning rate and the temperature 
provides a more precise metric for the sensitivity dictated by the model’s fitted 
parameters than the temperature alone—especially given the correlation between 
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the eligibility‑adjusted learning rate and the temperature (Daw, 2011) exhibited 
within the Poor‑learner group (r = 0.547, t13 = 2.36, p = 0.035) and the lack of such 
a correlation among Good learners (r = 0.121, t18 = 0.52, p = 0.611).  Model 
sensitivity, which was significantly positive across the Good‑learner group (M = 
0.440, t19 = 5.59, p < 10‑4) but not the Poor‑learner group (M = 0.020, t14 = 0.18, p 
= 0.428), was not only greater for Good learners than for Poor learners (M = 0.420, 
t33 = 3.23, p = 10‑3) but also significantly correlated with the objective metric for 
choice accuracy (r = 0.409, t33 = 2.57, p = 0.007).  The residual deviance D (with 
degrees of freedom in the subscript) corresponds to the ACQ model’s 
improvement in fit relative to either a null intercept model or the hysteresis model.  
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Figure 4.3.  All performing participants: Two types of reward‑prediction‑error 
signals.  (a) State‑value‑prediction error (SVPE) δVt signals were observed in the 
ventral striatum across all performing subjects (p < 0.005 unc., SVC pFWE < 0.05).  
(b) Complementary action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) δQt signals were likewise 
identified in the ventral striatum (p < 0.005 unc., SVC pFWE < 0.05).  As in 
subsequent figures, the upper‑left corner of each panel depicts the entire coronal 
section that the remainder of the respective panel zooms in on. 
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Figure 4.4.  All performing participants: State‑value signals.  State value Vt(st) 
signals were observed in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) across all 
performing subjects as hypothesized (p < 0.005 unc., SVC pFWE < 0.05). 
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Figure 4.5.  Good‑learner group: State‑value‑prediction‑error signals in the 
dopaminergic midbrain.  Focusing on the dopaminergic midbrain, SVPE signals 
were found within the substantia nigra for the Good‑learner group (p < 0.005 unc., 
SVC pFWE < 0.05).  To better visualize the anatomy of the dopaminergic midbrain, 
the same statistical map is plotted over T2‑weighted and T1‑weighted structural 
images in the left and right panels, respectively.  Also visible is the ventral 
tegmental area (high intensity for T2, low intensity for T1), corresponding to a 
region between the dorsal edge of the substantia nigra (low intensity for T2, 
heterogeneous intensity for T1) and the ventral edge of the red nucleus (low 
intensity for T2, high intensity for T1).  Coronal sections are displayed in the upper 
panels, and axial sections are displayed in the lower panels.  
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Figure 4.6.  Good‑learner group: State‑value‑prediction‑error signals in the 
striatum.  In addition to the substantia nigra, SVPE signals were also located in 
both the ventral striatum and the dorsal striatum for the Good‑learner group (p < 
0.005 unc., SVC pFWE < 0.05). 
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Figure 4.7.  Good‑learner group: State‑value signals.  State‑value signals were 
similarly identified in vmPFC when focusing on the Good‑learner group alone (p < 
0.005 unc., SVC pFWE < 0.05). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 4.1.  Model discriminability.  The model comparison 
reported in Figure 2a was replicated using artificial data that were simulated with 
the ACQ(λ) model as fitted for each subject but otherwise yoked to the empirical 
data set.  Average goodness of fit relative to the outcome‑insensitive hysteresis 
model across performing subjects is shown for each model tested with (light bars) 
and without (light and dark bars combined) a penalty for model complexity 
according to the AICc.  A positive residual corresponds to a superior fit.  As 
expected, only the ACQ(λ)+MB model—within which the actual model is nested—
surpassed the actual model with respect to raw goodness of fit, but this overfitting 
was fully neutralized after correcting for model complexity.  Degrees of freedom 
are listed in parentheses. 
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Supplementary Figure 4.2.  Model predictions.  Representative dynamics of 
value signals and learning signals as generated by the ACQ(λ) model are 
Illustrated with the final subject from the Good‑learner group.  Fitted parameters 
were assigned as follows for this subject: α = 0.639, λ = 0.322, wQ = 0.857, τ = 
0.197, β0 = ‑0.046, λβ = 0.976, and βR = 0.193.  (a‑b) The model’s estimates (solid 
lines) of state value (SV) Vt(s) as the probability of reward for the active states 
independent of actions are displayed in the upper‑left corners of each panel along 
with empirical values (dashed lines) over the course of the experiment.  Displayed 
in the upper‑right corners are the state‑value‑prediction error (SVPE) δVt signals 
that for active states update not only the critic module’s state values Vt(s) but also 
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the actor module’s relative action preferences pt(s,a), which are shown in the 
lower‑left corners of each panel.  As derived from the Q‑learning component of the 
model, estimates of action value (AV) Qt(s,a) for the left and right options (red and 
green, respectively) are plotted at the left side of each panel along with empirical 
values.  Each colored circle indicates an occurrence of the respective action.  
Adjacent to these plots on the right side of each panel are the time courses of the 
action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) δQt signals updating the action values.  Net 
action weights Wt(s,a) that integrate the aforementioned action preferences and 
action values are shown in the lower‑right corners of each panel.  (c‑d) Time 
courses of state values and the SVPE are plotted for the first‑stage passive states.  
(e‑f) As plotted here, the SVPE for the second‑stage passive states additionally 
updated representations for the first‑stage states and actions via the eligibility 
trace.  For this subject, a probability reversal at the second stage occurred before 
a probability reversal at the first stage. 
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Supplementary Figure 4.3.  Action‑value‑prediction‑error signals.  (a) For the 
Good‑learner group, AVPE signals were identified throughout both the ventral 
striatum and the dorsal striatum.  As with the aggregate analysis, the global peak 
of a cluster also within the ROI for the right ventral striatum (xyz = [8.5, 11, ‑2.5], t19 
= 4.02, p < 10‑3, k = 71, SVC pFWE = 0.064) was actually located in the dorsal 
striatum (xyz = [11.5, 20, ‑2.5], t19 = 4.13, p < 10‑3).  The corresponding 
anterior‑caudate region in the left hemisphere (xyz = [‑8, 18.5, ‑7], t19 = 3.53, p = 
10‑3, k = 14) was likewise engaged in this way.  The anterior‑caudate regions 
identified here are in close proximity to those reported for an instrumental RPE 
signal by O’Doherty and colleagues (2004), both falling within 7.5 mm of the 
previously reported peak and its mirror‑symmetric location.  More caudally, AVPE 
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signals were also observed in the right dorsal putamen (xyz = [28, 6.5, ‑1], t19 = 
3.30, p = 0.002, k = 17).  The last of these clusters distinguished the Good‑learner 
and Poor‑learner groups (Supp. Fig. 6b) and was to be found in the left dorsal 
striatum (xyz = [‑20, 11, 0.5], t19 = 4.12, p < 10‑3, k = 58) for the most part but also 
extended somewhat into the ventral striatum.  Otherwise, these results mostly 
aligned with those of the aggregate analysis of Good learners and Poor learners 
together.  (b) Across all of these performing subjects, there were corrected 
significant results in the ventral striatum in both the left (xyz = [‑12.5, 11, ‑5.5], t34 = 
4.44, p < 10‑4, k = 115, SVC pFWE < 0.05) and the right (xyz = [8.5, 12.5, ‑4], t34 = 
3.87, p < 10‑3, k = 108, SVC pFWE < 0.05) hemispheres as previously mentioned.  
Despite having local maxima within the ventral striatum, however, these same 
clusters also extended into regions of the dorsal striatum outside of the primary 
ROI with global peaks elsewhere in both the left (xyz = [‑20, 11, ‑2.5], t34 = 4.55, p 
< 10‑4) and the right (xyz = [11.5, 20, ‑2.5], t34 = 4.24, p < 10‑4) hemispheres. 
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Supplementary Figure 4.4.  Good‑learner group: Action‑value signals.  In 
addition to the separate types of RPE signals, separate types of value signals were 
evoked by the current paradigm.  Among the Good‑learner group, action‑value 
signals were identified bilaterally in vmPFC (xyz = [1, 33.5, ‑17.5], t19 = 3.87, p < 
10‑3, k = 21, SVC pFWE = 0.086) as anticipated with marginal corrected 
significance. 
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Supplementary Figure 4.5.  Poor‑learner group.  (a) For the Poor‑learner group, 
the relevant neural signals were expected to be weaker as a reflection of the less 
robust learning evident in behavior.  In line with this expectation, SVPE signals 
were only identified in the right ventral striatum (xyz = [19, 11, ‑11.5], t14 = 4.92, p = 
10‑4, k = 13).  (b) Correspondingly, AVPE signals were limited to the left ventral 
striatum (xyz = [‑12.5, 9.5, ‑5.5], t14 = 4.64, p < 10‑3, k = 44, SVC pFWE = 0.056) 
among the Poor learners.  (c) Although action‑value signals were not observed in 
vmPFC at this statistical threshold for the Poor‑learner group as for the 
Good‑learner group (p > 0.005), state‑value signals were nonetheless again found 
bilaterally in vmPFC (xyz = [‑3.5, 30.5, ‑20.5], t14 = 3.65, p = 10‑3, k = 18, SVC pFWE 
= 0.137) among the Poor learners. 
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Supplementary Figure 4.6.  Good‑learner group versus Poor‑learner group.  
(a) The aforementioned lack of dorsal‑striatal RPE signals among Poor learners 
was confirmed as part of direct contrasts of the Good‑learner and Poor‑learner 
groups with respect to the different parametric effects.  First, the between‑group 
contrast of SVPE signals revealed a cluster in the left dorsal striatum (xyz = [‑15.5, 
2, 14], t33 = 3.81, p < 10‑3, k = 11) overlapping with that independently identified for 
the Good‑learner group (k = 10).  (b) Another region of the left dorsal striatum (xyz 
= [‑17, 11, 8], t33 = 4.54, p < 10‑4, k = 75) emerged from a direct contrast of the 
Good‑learner and Poor‑learner groups with respect to AVPE signals and again 
intersected with one of the clusters found for Good learner alone (k = 25).  (c) 
Similarly, the lack of action‑value signals in vmPFC among Poor learners was 
confirmed with a direct contrast that pointed to a cluster in bilateral vmPFC (xyz = 
[1, 33.5, ‑17.5], t33 = 3.57, p < 10‑3, k = 20, SVC pFWE = 0.126) overlapping with 
that independently identified as encoding action‑value signals for the Good‑learner 
group (k = 10). 
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C h a p t e r  5  
Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
– George E. P. Box 
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Summary 
 
By way of an empirical approach grounded in the lens of computational modeling, 
the present dissertation has made progress along the path toward achieving a 
comprehensive mechanistic understanding of value‑based decision making and 
learning in the human nervous system.  Chapter 1 established an overarching 
theoretical and methodological framework from first principles, setting the stage for 
the series of experiments and computer simulations that followed.  Chapter 2 first 
explored the basic problem of decision making in itself and introduced dynamical 
models that emulate neural decision‑making processes with sequential‑sampling 
algorithms.  Chapter 3 took advantage of eye tracking to extend these ideas and 
especially the role of attention into a context that also involves value‑based 
learning, where the spatial mapping of hedonic value exhibited an informative 
pattern that could be exploited while searching visually.  Aided by high‑resolution 
functional magnetic‑resonance imaging (fMRI), Chapter 4 formally modeled 
associative learning at the level of both brain and behavior and introduced a novel 
hybrid model of dopaminergic learning circuits integrating parallel 
reinforcement‑learning (RL) algorithms that update the expected values of both 
states and actions via prediction errors.  This final chapter brings all of the 
preceding chapters together as components of an integrated thesis and discusses 
them in further depth as new additions to a budding literature. 
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Implications of findings 
 
Chapter 2 made strides toward understanding value‑based decision making by 
formally juxtaposing the explicit predictions of computational models and empirical 
observations of the behavior of human subjects in the form of both choices and 
reaction times.  The two‑dimensional input space (Teodorescu et al., 2013; Liston 
& Stone, 2013) common to every experiment tested as part of this meta‑analytic 
approach crucially enabled rigorous assessment of parametric value‑related 
effects.  Although the neural drift‑diffusion model appreciably outperformed the 
race model here, the strictest normative assumptions of either independent 
accumulation or perfect subtractive comparison that underlie the race (LaBerge, 
1962; Raab, 1962; Vickers, 1970; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) and drift‑diffusion 
(Stone, 1960; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Wagenmakers et al., 2007) algorithms, 
respectively, were each apparently falsified.  By instead representing signals 
separately but also with imperfect direct competition between them in the form of 
mutual inhibition, more neurally plausible sequential‑sampling models offered an 
account both quantitatively and qualitatively superior while remaining relatively 
parsimonious.  Foremost among these was the supralinear subtractive 
competing‑accumulator (SSCA) model, a novel connectionist model of a 
multidimensional nonlinear dynamical system featuring hierarchical levels of 
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competition as well as an approximation of attentional modulation (Shimojo et al., 
2003) with the efficiency of only six free parameters.  This framework and the 
SSCA model have demonstrated the potential to be useful and tractable enough to 
feasibly be generalizable elsewhere. 
 
In the broader context of the decision sciences and decision theory, the purely 
descriptive SSCA model is relatively far removed from any provably optimal 
computations other than the fundamental feature of sequential sampling.  Yet, a 
constrained optimization shaped by evolutionary adaptation need not necessarily 
align with mathematically provable optimality in a specific context when there also 
exists demand for versatility across the diverse and dynamic environments that 
humans and other animals encounter.  In a certain respect, neurally plausible 
sequential‑sampling models with imperfect competition such as the SSCA model 
strike a balance that effectively tempers the narrower optimality (Wald & Wolfowitz, 
1948) of the drift‑diffusion model and the sequential probability‑ratio test (Wald, 
1945, 1947; Barnard, 1946) with the broader optimality (Marley & Colonius, 1992; 
Bundesen, 1993) of the race model and the axiom of “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives” (Shepard, 1957; Luce, 1959).  Although its influences are broad—
also including the feedforward‑inhibition model (Ditterich et al., 2003; Mazurek et 
al., 2003), the urgency‑gating model (Cisek et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012), and 
the drift‑diffusion model with attention (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 
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2011)—the SSCA model is distinguished as a member of a narrow class of 
nonlinear attractor‑network models such as the leaky‑competing‑accumulator 
(LCA) model (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 2004) and established biophysical 
models (Wang, 2002; Wong & Wang, 2006; Wong et al., 2007) that emphasize 
state‑dependent (i.e., dependent on the state of the decision signal) competition 
via lateral inhibition.  However, the SSCA model as a whole is unique and deviates 
from the original seven‑parameter LCA model in multiple ways.  In catering to this 
paradigm, the SSCA model exchanges four free parameters representing leakage, 
decision‑signal thresholds, nondecision time, and starting‑point variability for only 
three new parameters representing baseline input, input‑dependent competition, 
and the net impact of attentional modulation. 
 
Although practical constraints were duly accommodated for the model designed for 
direct application to both behavioral and neurophysiological data, elaborating on 
concepts of theoretical significance such as hierarchical competition, attentional 
modulation, and urgency signals stands to advance our understanding of decision 
making at a computational level with key additions to the sequential‑sampling 
framework.  In addition to making progress toward resolving the disparity between 
mutual‑inhibition models highlighting different levels of competition (Bogacz et al., 
2006; Ditterich, 2010; Teodorescu et al., 2013), this synthesis has also marked an 
effort to bridge the apparent disconnect between sequential‑sampling models 
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(Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Gold & Shadlen, 2007) and the urgency‑gating model 
(Cisek et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012), two classes of models that need not be 
mutually exclusive despite being presented as such.  That is, urgency signals are 
actually integrated into the sequential‑sampling process here.  There is certainly 
no “correct” degree of abstraction for modeling phenomena of the brain and mind 
(Frank, 2015), but the noteworthy performance of the low‑dimensional SSCA 
model in contrast to its parsimony and interpretability attests to the potential of this 
incremental “top‑down” approach to modeling based on measurable functional 
properties at an intermediate level of abstraction.  It is with these computational 
methods that Chapter 2 cemented the importance of the role of attention in 
value‑based decision making (Shimojo et al., 2003; Krajbich et al., 2010) even 
without modeling eye movements.  This made for a natural segue into the 
eye‑tracking study that followed in Chapter 3, where effects of the dynamics of 
attention were emphasized foremost. 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated capacity of the human brain to learn where to look for 
maximal utility and thus make decisions more efficiently in a setting where spatial 
location and hedonic value are correlated despite no overt signs of such a 
correlation.  Building upon related paradigms in psychophysics involving explicit, 
arbitrary designations of value to simple, abstract stimuli or locations (Awh et al., 
2012; Chelazzi et al., 2013; Anderson, 2016; Bourgeois et al., 2016), this novel 
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eye‑tracking approach incorporated implicit learning of spatial attentional biases 
into value‑based decision making with familiar, tangible stimuli (i.e., foods) that 
could be evaluated a priori independently of context or positions in space.  To 
mitigate the susceptibility of noisy decision‑making processes to errors, subjects 
took into account the additional spatial information when available in accord with 
an optimal strategy.  Rather than merely shifting the balance of the 
speed‑accuracy tradeoff (Johnson, 1939) in favor of quickness via reliance upon 
heuristics (e.g., rapidly delivering the more frequent response without making an 
effort to evaluate and compare the alternative), the downstream effects of induced 
attentional biases successfully honed both speed and accuracy even in the 
absence of any time pressure other than that which is self‑imposed.  Yet, a notable 
asymmetry distinguished the learning of a leftward attentional bias from the less 
robust learning of a rightward bias, reflecting conflict between the induced bias and 
an intrinsic leftward bias (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Reutskaja 
et al., 2011) presumably due to deeply ingrained cultural conventions among the 
Westernized American subjects (e.g., reading from left to right) (Chokron & Imbert, 
1993; Chokron & De Agostini, 1995; Chokron et al., 1998) as well as innate biases 
found in various different animal species (Vallortigara, 2006; Rugani et al., 2010; 
Frasnelli et al., 2012).  That such asymmetry applies even for preferential 
decision‑making scenarios in which stimuli can be abstracted away from space, 
actions, and actual sensory properties altogether is remarkable for its implications 
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vis‑à‑vis designing any sort of visual interface intended for human viewers (e.g., 
the layout of item labeling per Rebollar et al., 2015)—and especially for situations 
where the alternatives under consideration themselves map directly onto space.  
The model‑free (i.e., habitual) learning documented in Chapter 3 was then 
elaborated on in more general algorithmic terms using the more tractable 
paradigm of Chapter 4 with binary rewards and the absence of visual search as 
simplifying features. 
 
Chapter 4 utilized formal computational modeling together with a specialized 
high‑resolution fMRI protocol to determine the precise nature of prediction‑error 
signals encoded within dopaminergic nuclei of the midbrain (Montague et al., 
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Glimcher, 2011; 
Schultz, 2015) and efferent striatal structures during learning and performance of a 
sequential instrumental‑conditioning task with a Markov decision process including 
passive states.  This novel task was designed to facilitate discrimination of two 
distinct forms of reward‑prediction error (RPE) signals (Sutton & Barto, 1998)—
namely, the state‑value‑prediction error (SVPE) (Witten, 1977; Barto et al., 1983; 
Sutton, 1984), by which errors in predictions about the expected values of 
successive states are used to update state values and action weights, and the 
action‑value‑prediction error (AVPE) (Watkins, 1989), by which errors in 
predictions about the expected values of actions are used to update explicit action 
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values.  Furthermore, with multiple variants of RL algorithms to choose from such 
as the actor/critic model, action‑value‑learning models, and hybrid models, this 
approach enabled determination of which variety of an RL model best accounts for 
not only behavior but also neural activity in the dopaminergic nuclei and their 
striatal targets during instrumental learning coupled with passive (i.e., Pavlovian) 
conditioning.  The synthesis of the actor/critic and action‑value‑learning models 
that was arrived at introduced a solution hitherto unexplored but with potentially 
significant implications for RL as a whole to the extent that the 
actor/critic/Q‑learner (ACQ) model and the associated framework unite the SVPE 
and the AVPE as part of a more nuanced conceptualization of the RPE signals 
fundamental to trial‑and‑error learning across both active and passive states. 
 
Looking forward along the same lines, linking state values and action values as 
coexisting variables in the brain could even have implications for understanding 
the relationships and interactions between Pavlovian (Pavlov, 1927) and 
instrumental (Thorndike, 1898) forms of learning (Miller & Konorski, 1928; 
Thorndike, 1932; Skinner, 1935, 1937; Konorski & Miller, 1937; Schlosberg, 1937; 
Mowrer, 1947; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; O’Doherty et al., 2017).  For instance, 
such interactions are often studied by presenting previously learned Pavlovian 
cues during instrumental performance and exploring interactive effects on behavior 
as part of a process aptly dubbed “Pavlovian‑instrumental transfer” (PIT) for which 
   
257 
 
factors such as attention, arousal, and motivation are typically cited (Walker, 1942; 
Estes, 1943, 1948; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Holmes et al., 2010; Liljeholm & 
O’Doherty, 2011; Corbit & Balleine, 2015; Cartoni et al., 2016).  Characterized 
essentially by second‑order instrumental conditioning via Pavlovian conditioned 
reinforcers, the novel experimental paradigm of Chapter 4 differs from standard 
PIT paradigms in multiple respects.  For instance, there was not only a lack of 
direct pairing of Pavlovian and instrumental cues but also thoroughly interleaved 
rather than blocked instances of Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.  
Together with RL models, paradigms such as this one, which features multiple 
stages with interleaved and interrelated passive and active states, show promise 
for a useful new perspective on states versus actions and the dichotomy of 
Pavlovian and instrumental learning within model‑free learning as this set of 
processes continues to be unraveled along with reward learning as a whole. 
 
In contrast to a number of previous reports convincingly highlighting regions of the 
human striatum in relation to functions consistent with RL (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 
2003, 2004; Schönberg et al., 2007; Garrison et al., 2013; Chase et al., 2015), 
research that localizes RPE signaling and other valence‑related roles to individual 
structures within the dopaminergic midbrain in humans remains sparse (but see 
the recent high‑resolution neuroimaging studies of D’Ardenne et al., 2008, 2013; 
Guitart‑Masip et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2011; Hennigan et al., 2015; Pauli et al., 
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2015).  This dearth of knowledge can largely be attributed to challenges both in 
resolving subtly delineated mesencephalic structures spatially (Eapen et al., 2011) 
and in measuring uncontaminated signals from them (Enzmann & Pelc, 1992; 
Dagli et al., 1999; Soellinger et al., 2007) when limited to conventional 
neuroimaging techniques (Düzel et al., 2009, 2015; Barry et al., 2013).  Whereas 
the practical constraints of macroscopic neuroimaging demand use of heuristics in 
classifying neuroanatomy, with histology, not only the pars compacta and the pars 
reticulata but furthermore as many as five subdivisions within the substantia nigra 
(SN) and seven subdivisions within the ventral tegmental area (VTA) have been 
proposed on the basis of cytoarchitecture and input‑output characteristics 
(McRitchie et al., 1996; Fu et al., 2012; Cavalcanti et al., 2016).  Intrinsic limitations 
in spatial resolution and tissue contrast prohibit deriving such fine segmentation of 
the tegmentum with structural MRI data alone (Eapen et al., 2011), but being able 
to distinguish signals in the SN from signals in the VTA as well as neighboring 
structures set the high‑resolution neuroimaging findings of Chapter 4 apart as a 
substantial advancement in the first steps toward comprehending the functions of 
nuclei in the human midbrain as a critical hub of the basal ganglia and the 
mesostriatal dopamine system. 
 
Future directions 
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The timeless metaphor of us in the modern age as observers standing on the 
shoulders of giants (Salisbury, 1159, quoting Bernard of Chartres) becomes 
increasingly apt with each passing generation.  In other words, we are advancing 
closer and closer to the truth by building upon the discoveries of those who 
preceded us.  In the light of the great progress of science thus far, we also 
currently have unprecedented access to the human nervous system with 
sophisticated signal‑recording technology complemented by vast computing power 
for experimentation, analysis, and simulation.  Yet, as computational cognitive 
neuroscience, decision neuroscience, and various related fields still remain in their 
fledgling stages, we are in the midst of a watershed moment where there is still 
much left for research to reveal in these new directions.  For instance, 
experimental control currently takes precedence over ecological 
representativeness (Gibson, 1979) in the designing of tasks that remain relatively 
simple for the sake of interpretability and as such removed from certain aspects of 
naturalistic settings.  To point out but one obvious example beyond the scope of 
the present dissertation, neurocomputational modeling has only recently begun to 
shed new light on topics such as social decision making and observational 
learning (Dunne & O’Doherty, 2013) in the realm of social neuroscience (Cacioppo 
& Berntson, 1992; Cacioppo et al., 2002; Adolphs, 2010) that involve more 
high‑dimensional problems of relevance to social psychology (Lewin, 1935, 1936, 
1951; Aronson, 2011) as well as game theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
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1944; Camerer, 2003) and the social sciences more generally (e.g., sociology, 
economics, jurisprudence, or political science).  Chaos theory (Moon, 1992; 
Abraham & Gilgen, 1995; Robertson & Combs, 1995) will thus become yet more 
essential in these endeavors. 
 
Even as the immediate goals of this basic science remain relatively narrow, 
unlocking the mysteries of decision making and learning will require a multimodal 
approach that utilizes precisely manipulated experimental tasks together with a 
wide array of tools, such as the eye‑tracking, functional‑neuroimaging, and 
computer‑simulation techniques featured here.  Moreover, causal methods such 
as noninvasive brain stimulation (Wagner et al., 2007) and lesion studies (Adolphs, 
2016) should also be employed for further validation.  Notably absent in the 
present dissertation, however, is an analysis of neurophysiological measurements 
with temporal resolution better matched to that of the nervous system, which can 
be achieved with electrophysiological techniques such as electroencephalography 
(EEG).  High temporal resolution on the order of milliseconds is critical for 
assessment of the dynamics of neural decision‑making processes within individual 
trials (e.g., Hunt et al., 2012; O’Connell et al., 2012; Kelly & O’Connell, 2013; 
Polanía et al., 2014) and could facilitate verification and refinement of the sort of 
neurally plausible dynamical models proposed in Chapter 2 in particular.  Indeed, 
preliminary computational‑model‑based analyses of both fMRI and EEG data sets 
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have lent credence to the SSCA model and others like it for temporally precise 
interpretation of not only behavior but also underlying neural activity during 
value‑based decision making.  (Mentioned only in passing in Chapter 2, these data 
sets were among those acquired but omitted from the present dissertation in the 
interest of brevity.)  Ultimately, neurophysiological data can be used to further 
refine this computational modeling by revealing not only the final output but also 
the signatures of individual signals as they relate to model predictions that would 
otherwise be omitted variables.  For instance, in attempting to emulate the 
dynamics of different signals recorded at the relevant sites in actual brains, the 
strictly feedforward scheme currently used for simplicity could be elaborated on to 
additionally capture the reciprocity of intermodular connections within a 
hierarchically organized system (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Simen, 2012). 
 
The present dissertation adds to two growing bodies of literature that advocate the 
application of sequential‑sampling models (Wald, 1947; Stone, 1960; Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006) or reinforcement‑learning models (Minsky, 1961; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Witten, 1977; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998) to neural systems.  Whereas the core mechanisms of sequential 
sampling and prediction‑error signaling have been firmly established here and 
elsewhere, many additional details of these processes as they apply in this and 
other contexts have yet to be clarified.  For instance, the two‑alternative 
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forced‑choice paradigms dealt with herein can be scaled up to multialternative 
choices and even settings where the action space is continuous rather than 
discrete to reflect the analog nature of motor output.  With heterogeneous forces at 
play in environments that are quintessentially dynamic across temporal and spatial 
scales, the ultimate outcomes of one’s actions are often obscure, and affordances 
(i.e., opportunities for action) (Gibson, 1979) often materialize or dematerialize 
unpredictably.  For an embodied and embedded system such as an organism, 
decision making primarily revolves around action selection and optimal control of 
interactions with the physical environment.  As such, making a decision entails 
somehow either directly or indirectly assigning values to potential actions and 
comparing them (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010).  Serial models of 
value‑based decision making assert that action planning is only a conversion stage 
occurring after an option has been evaluated, compared, and committed to in the 
abstract space of goods (Padoa‑Schioppa, 2011).  At the opposing extreme of this 
spectrum of models is the affordance‑competition hypothesis, which postulates 
that value is immediately, directly, and continuously assigned to representations of 
options in the tangible space of actions prior to comparison (Cisek, 2007).  
However, with relaxed assumptions these good‑based and action‑based models of 
decision making are not mutually exclusive.  An intermediate model could posit 
competition at multiple levels of representation interacting to achieve a distributed 
consensus (Cisek, 2012).  With value‑based levels of representation such as for 
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stimuli, space, actions, effectors, tools, and less tangible abstractions in keeping 
with field theory (Lewin, 1935, 1936), a hybrid model is plausible inasmuch as local 
neural subnetworks can represent attributes of options at multiple levels in parallel 
and integrate them with global synchronization as hubs of a small‑world network in 
the nervous system (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009).  Chapter 4 began to address 
these complexities by modeling parallel representations of state values and actions 
values, but further questions remain as to the implications of such parallel streams 
of information for sequential‑sampling and reinforcement‑learning models that 
typically reduce all available information to a single integrated representation of an 
option or state. 
 
Furthermore, the parameters of stimuli and options can be decomposed in 
multiattribute evaluations that likely give rise to yet another hierarchical level of 
representation in decision‑making and learning processes.  Generalization of the 
models herein to multialternative and multiattribute settings can be straightforward 
in theory (e.g., Roe et al., 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004); excluding the 
drift‑diffusion model, the former case merely requires adding dimensions to the 
system without necessitating any additional free parameters, whereas at a 
minimum the latter case simply requires the addition of linear weighting 
parameters for each individual attribute after the first.  However, in the real world, 
these more nuanced scenarios are likely to warrant increased complexity as 
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nonlinear processing and the dynamics of attention become more relevant for 
considerably multidimensional processes that would impose greater cognitive 
demands for both decision making and learning.  That is, shifting attention 
produces differential processing of not only alternatives, as is mostly mentioned 
herein, but also the attributes of each alternative.  Yet another consideration is that 
the presence of attributes having both positive and negative valence can give rise 
to nonlinear effects in the form of approach‑avoidance conflict (Lewin, 1935, 1936).  
Even more neurally plausible modeling could be a promising approach in this 
regard (e.g., Wang, 2002; Wong & Wang, 2006; Wong et al., 2007), but, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, more complex models must be built incrementally with 
formal falsification of alternatives (Palminteri et al., 2017) and due consideration of 
parsimony and practical constraints in application of the models to both behavioral 
and neurophysiological data (Myung, 2000).  A challenge for future work thus 
arises in assigning priority to certain elements over others while it is impractical to 
simply include every element that can be theorized in a model.  Incremental 
augmentations of the model could then be achieved by deliberately controlled 
experiments (e.g., with manipulations of timing) that would yield testable 
predictions contingent on inclusion of a given element that in theory better 
emulates actual nervous systems at a more abstract computational level.  The 
robustness of any assumptions must be verified under a variety of different 
conditions, including more complex and naturalistic tasks.  Sequential‑sampling 
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and reinforcement‑learning processes per se are both quite versatile and tractable 
in their raw forms, thus making for frameworks well suited to expansion as needed 
to address findings across diverse experimental settings.  Relying on empirical 
data, Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 each made progress in this way with respect to 
sequential sampling and reinforcement learning, respectively. 
 
Despite their compatibility in principle, the sequential‑sampling literature and the 
reinforcement‑learning literature have for the most part remained independent of 
each other.  As RL often represents active conditions for which an agent must 
strive for optimal control with reward‑maximizing behavior, an action‑selection 
policy is embedded in most RL models.  These policies are typically stochastic 
rather than deterministic to accommodate not only intrinsic noise but also the need 
to explore as well as exploit (Daw et al., 2006b).  Yet, conventional RL policies are 
limited to static discriminative models that are unable to factor in reaction time 
despite the usefulness of chronometry for inference about neurophysiological and 
mental processes (Luce, 1986).  In contrast, the generative decision‑making 
models of the sort introduced in Chapter 2 are dynamical and can yield 
probabilistic output in both Euclidean space and time.  Emerging as the most 
popular option in RL and accordingly used here in Chapter 4, the Gibbs softmax 
model associated with the Shepard‑Luce choice rule (Shepard, 1957; Luce, 1959; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998) is actually nested within the race model for any number of 
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alternatives (Marley & Colonius, 1992; Bundesen, 1993), which was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Moreover, for a two‑alternative forced choice, the logistic function that 
the softmax function reduces to is also nested within the drift‑diffusion model.  
Recently, a few studies have begun to bridge these domains in computational 
modeling with the suggestion that decisions made in the context of an RL 
paradigm could be manifestations of sequential‑sampling processes (Frank et al., 
2015; Dunovan, 2017; Pedersen et al., 2017).  Indeed, the prominent effects of 
modeled net action weights on not only the choices made by human subjects but 
also their reaction times as documented in Chapter 4 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the updated outputs of RL algorithms are translated into the inputs 
driving sequential‑sampling algorithms.  These downstream algorithms would 
produce actions via integration‑to‑threshold processes common to other contexts 
for decision making where evidence accumulation is advantageous.  Further 
investigation will be necessary to ascertain the feasibility of such a synthesis of 
processes unfolding across a wide range of temporal scales and explore its 
potential implications for the hitherto separate domains of sequential sampling and 
reinforcement learning. 
 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 introduced various novel hybrids of mechanisms that 
have each been considered individually for the most part.  The nervous system is 
a massively parallel information‑processing system with many modular 
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components mediating functions that are orchestrated collectively within a highly 
interconnected small‑world network (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009).  As such, the 
nervous system is capable of maintaining multiple levels of representation as well 
as multiple learning and control subsystems that interact and even compete with 
each other (Daw et al., 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2017).  A standard taxonomy has 
emerged to divide these subsystems into four categories that cross the dichotomy 
between model‑free and model‑based learning with that between Pavlovian and 
instrumental learning (Dayan & Berridge 2014; O’Doherty et al., 2017), but RL 
algorithms based on successor‑state representations and latent‑state 
representations (Dayan, 1993; Akam et al., 2015; Momennejad et al., 2017; 
Russek et al., 2017) or Monte Carlo methods—in the case of “Dyna” (Sutton, 
1990), for example—can actually blur the boundaries between model‑free and 
model‑based types.  Rather than representing a transition matrix over all states 
and actions and iteratively computing values as in a model‑based 
dynamic‑programming algorithm or instead caching long‑range reward predictions 
as in a model‑free temporal‑difference algorithm, the intermediate 
successor‑representation algorithm caches long‑range state predictions.  
Moreover, the architecture explored in Chapter 2 could also relate to the concept 
of parallel and hierarchical control to the extent that the dynamics of 
value‑encoding, decision‑making, and motoric‑execution signals could be 
differentially associated with competing levels of abstraction and concomitant 
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learning signals, as suggested by the dichotomy of state and action 
representations established in Chapter 4.  Whereas the interactions between two 
distinct model‑free RL mechanisms have been emphasized here in Chapter 4, 
such interactions have also been suggested to take place between model‑based 
control and model‑free RL (Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; Lee et al., 
2014; Doll et al., 2015) or the successor representation and one of these 
(Momennejad et al., 2017).  Further evidence points to one of perhaps many 
arbitration mechanisms that dynamically regulate the relative influence of each 
subsystem as a function of its estimated reliability for a given context (Daw et al., 
2005; Lee et al., 2014). 
 
Taking the ACQ model of Chapter 4 as an archetypal example of a hybridized 
model encoding different variables, there are likely to be adaptive advantages in 
the flexible representation of both state values and action values while learning to 
maximize rewards in environments that are quintessentially dynamic.  Whereas 
pure action‑value learning (Watkins, 1989; Rummery & Niranjan, 1994) is a more 
efficient strategy—that is, quicker to converge asymptotically to accurate 
estimates—in situations where the action space is tractably small and well 
delineated, pure state‑value (i.e., actor/critic) learning (Witten, 1977; Barto et al., 
1983; Sutton, 1984) is a more efficient strategy when there is ambiguity concerning 
the actions that are available or an excessive number of actions to choose from 
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along a continuum of possibilities.  Moreover, the method of action‑value learning 
itself can be partitioned into “off‑policy” algorithms such as in the Q‑learning model 
(Watkins, 1989), which features an abstract AVPE reflecting the action estimated 
to be the best given the subsequent state, and “on‑policy” algorithms such as in 
the state‑action‑reward‑state‑action (SARSA) model (Rummery & Niranjan, 1994), 
which features an experiential AVPE reflecting the action actually selected in the 
subsequent state.  As such, the latter “on‑policy” subclass may be slower than the 
former with respect to convergence in environments that are stable and 
predictable, but it is nonetheless potentially more efficient in volatile environments 
where persistent exploration is key because estimates at any given instant are not 
necessarily reliable.  The “expected‑SARSA” model (Sutton & Barto, 1998; van 
Seijen et al., 2009), another on‑policy candidate, additionally takes into account 
information about the stochastic action‑selection policy so as to reduce variance in 
updates.  Having multiple learning and control strategies available to meet 
whatever the current demands of the environment are could make for an optimal 
metastrategy as long as the agent possesses sufficient computational resources.  
Indeed, a dual neural‑network architecture has recently been proposed for 
machine learning (Wang et al., 2016), where maintaining separate value and 
“advantage” functions can produce better performance than monitoring of a single 
action‑value variable.  Originating with the advantage‑updating algorithm (Baird, 
1993; Harmon et al., 1995) and its successor, the advantage‑learning algorithm 
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(Harmon & Baird, 1996), this advantage function represents the difference 
between an action value and the state value as the respective action’s relative 
advantage.  Notably, for this scheme, state‑value learning that is potentially of use 
for future actions could still occur in the absence of action at the time of learning.  
Many open questions remain regarding the feasibility of more high‑dimensional 
models in this spirit, and further research with meticulously designed paradigms 
will be able to determine in humans the extent of different learning capabilities and 
subsystems when the proper circumstances invoke them as well as potential 
interactions between subsystems. 
 
Beyond basic science 
 
By emulating the adaptive solutions of natural selection for problems repeatedly 
encountered by organisms, these classes of neurally plausible learning and 
decision‑making models not only facilitate the progress of neuroscience but also 
can go on to inspire domains such as machine learning and artificial intelligence as 
part of a cyclical symbiotic relationship between neuroscience and computer 
science (Minsky, 1961; Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998), 
including tangible applications in neuromorphic engineering (Mead, 1989, 1990; 
Douglas et al., 1995) and robotics (Meyer & Wilson, 1991; Arbib et al., 2008).  As 
suggested earlier, the present scope within computational cognitive neuroscience 
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is especially relevant to control theory and decision theory and can give rise to 
more nuanced perspectives on prescriptive models to the extent that neither the 
solutions nor the problems faced by an autonomous agent are immediately 
apparent in many settings.  Despite considerable advances with deep multilayer 
networks such as convolutional neural networks (LeCun et al., 1990, 1998) in 
recent years (LeCun et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016), even the so‑called 
“artificial neural networks” (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943; Rosenblatt, 1962; Minsky & 
Papert, 1969; Fukushima, 1980; Hopfield, 1982; Rumelhart et al., 1986; 
McClelland et al., 1986) currently bear a rather superficial resemblance to actual 
neural networks with respect to architecture, scale, and efficiency.  It remains 
feasible that reverse engineering just the right set of features found in the brain 
could yield a neural‑network model with objectively superior performance for 
whatever purpose.  Indeed, the complexity of tasks for which flexibly programmed 
machines can outperform even expertly trained humans is becoming more 
impressive each year (e.g., checkers in Schaeffer et al., 1992, backgammon in 
Tesauro, 1995, chess in Campbell et al., 2002, simple video games in Mnih et al., 
2015, and Go in Silver et al., 2016).  To take an example from the present 
dissertation, the novel hybrid model formulated in Chapter 4 in the interest of 
representing neurophysiology and behavior could itself also be viable in the realm 
of machine learning, where such a configuration has yet to be employed, for 
dynamic problems with interleaved passive and active states or ambiguous delays 
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between windows for action, among other scenarios.  The distinction between 
states and actions emphasized here is relevant for all embodied systems equipped 
with sensors and effectors, including biotic and robotic systems alike.  The wisdom 
implicit in the well‑developed trial‑and‑error approach of biological evolution often 
augments or even defies our intuition about what constitutes an optimal design for 
a given set of circumstances, leaving untold possibilities for innovation that is 
inspired by the nervous system. 
 
Although the work presented herein falls under the category of basic research in 
neuroscience, discoveries within this area of decision making and learning in 
particular can yield a variety of practical applications for the direct benefit of all of 
society (Miller, 1969).  Ascertaining how to optimize decisions, actions, and 
institutions in light of our capabilities and limitations is integral to everyone’s 
well‑being and equal opportunity.  For a simpler example, research‑guided 
strategies to most effectively modify behavior with respect to diet, exercise, and 
other lifestyle choices can profoundly impact countless lives by not only treating 
but also preventing diseases.  It is only in the past decade that the zeitgeist has led 
to serious consideration of computational psychiatry and computational neurology 
as reified fields in medicine and public health (Neufeld, 2007; Maia & Frank, 2011; 
Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012).  Problems that essentially involve neural 
processes can be framed in terms of computational models rather than vague 
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terminology so as to eliminate subjectivity and sociocultural biases as part of 
efforts to coherently classify, diagnose, and treat apparent neurological, mental, 
and behavioral disorders along with complex social issues.  Neurology, psychiatry, 
clinical psychology, and applied sociology have long been reduced to separate 
entities, but all of these approaches relate directly to the nervous system and thus 
are inextricably intertwined with each other as well as neuroscience (Martin, 2002).  
Linking isolated descriptions at the levels of the brain, the mind, behavior, and 
society within a unified neurocomputational framework (e.g., Lewin, 1935, 1936, 
1951; Wiener, 1948) could constitute vital progress toward promoting for everyone 
equally the interrelated somatic and mental aspects of good health as well as 
overall quality of life.  Beyond the labels of traditional clinical populations, the great 
potential for positive social change toward egalitarianism and altruism extends 
universally.  Humans have become the most powerful organisms in the entire 
history of Earth.  Empowered by knowledge about ourselves, we can strive for 
more ethical decision making with empathic recognition of the equality of all 
sentient beings.  As issues of sustainability become increasingly pressing for our 
society with the dangers posed by anthropogenic climate change (Rosenzweig et 
al., 2008), environmental pollution, overconsumption of finite resources, and even 
weapons of mass destruction, behavioral adjustments informed by introspection 
are imperative to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968) 
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and instead promote sustainable interactions with our global ecosystem in 
harmony, unity, and peace. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
At the outset of this thesis, I opined that humans are machines.  This foundational 
premise has remained at the core of three studies that have illuminated different 
aspects of value‑based decision making and learning in humans.  The phenomena 
of decision making and learning themselves have been modeled mathematically in 
the explicit terms of generalizable algorithms computed by the nervous system.  
Although a human brain is not exactly identical to a computer built by human 
brains, the present models have demonstrated with their empirical performance at 
describing humans that emphasizing the fundamental similarities between neural 
systems and conventional computing systems can be useful for understanding 
both types of information‑processing systems and even helping them to function in 
better ways.  The research compiled herein has proven itself a testament to the 
promise of not only sequential‑sampling and reinforcement‑learning models but 
also computational cognitive neuroscience more broadly as a means to 
deciphering the enigma that is us. 
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